Midterm 1

Question 1

Why do we need government?

Answer 1

Large groups on a national scale couldn’t organize in anarchy; must work together and agree on collective decisions; contract trust/enforcement; social welfare/redistribution coercion

Question 2

Prisoners dillemma

Answer 2

If I know partner will coop I should defect; if I know partner will defect I should defect

Question 3

Nash Equilibria

Answer 3

Stable system: no one gains by changing strategy

Question 4

Tragedy of the commons

Answer 4

Cost of one more is shared by everyone else; individual marginal cost = cost/n; individual marginal benefit = benefit/1; individual decision: benefit exceeds cost

Question 5

Repeated Games

Answer 5

Number of games played must be random; if one-shot then no coop; mathematically if repeated: tit for tat; real life: WWI

Question 6

Strategies in repeated games

Answer 6

Grim trigger: coop until screwed once then defect always and tit for tat: start coop, follow other player just did

Question 7

Preference

Answer 7

What players want; optimize benefit while maintaining majority

Question 8

Outcome

Answer 8

How everyone voted; final result from players actions

Question 9

Action

Answer 9

How individuals voted- what specific choices each player can make

Question 10

Strategy

Answer 10

Gain majority and maximize utility; series of actions each player plans to take to help them achieve the best outcome based on their preferences

Question 11

Median voter theorem

Answer 11

Middle pref will win if proposed and no alternative can beat it (nash equilibria: once we get here we are stuck)

Question 12

Majority Rule Cycles

Answer 12

ie, divide the dollar game; can’t predict outcome, agenda will determine outcome oftentimes

Question 13

Pareto Set

Answer 13

Any alternative from SQ in the triangle that makes all better off –> should always be within points but doesn’t work out that way

Question 14

Chaos Theorem

Answer 14

Knowing the outcomes can be unstable and these unstable outcomes can be used by a strategic agenda setter to achieve any outcome

Question 15

Structurally Induced Equilibrium

Answer 15

Procedural regulations–>stable equilibrium outcomes; Voting should be an unstable institution but is actually too stable;

1) no party splits–>only 1D voting–>median voter
2) Rules in House and Senate –> stability (ie, majority party controls amendments allowed)

Question 16

Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention

Answer 16

Pivotal voter from CT a median state (while Johnson was also pivotal, Sherman’s ideology made him a median member from the state)