MG_L3 Flashcards

1
Q

What is a mixed strategy?

A
  • A strategy where a player assigns probabilities to each pure action.
  • For player i, let their pure strategies be Si.
  • A mixed strategy is any probability distribution over Si.
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2
Q

What is a Nash equilibrium?

A
  • A profile of strategies (possibly mixed) where no player can unilaterally deviate and gain a higher payoff.
  • Formally, each player’s chosen strategy is a best response to the others’ strategies.
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3
Q

How do we find a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?

A
  • Compute each player’s best response as a function of the others’ mixed strategies.
  • Identify an intersection where all best responses coincide.
  • Players are often indifferent among pure strategies used with positive probability.
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4
Q

What is expected utility?

A
  • The weighted average of utilities over all possible outcomes under a random strategy.
  • For outcomes with utilities u1, u2, … having probabilities p1, p2, …
  • Expected utility = Σ (pk × uk).
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5
Q

What is a strictly dominated strategy?

A
  • A strategy that yields a lower payoff than another strategy, for every possible action profile of the other players.
  • Strictly dominated strategies are never part of a Nash equilibrium.
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6
Q

What is a weakly dominated strategy?

A
  • A strategy that never gives a higher payoff than another, and in at least one case gives a strictly lower payoff.
  • A weakly dominated strategy can still appear in some Nash equilibria, unlike a strictly dominated one.
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7
Q

What is iterated deletion of dominated strategies?

A
  • Repeatedly remove strictly dominated strategies from the game.
  • The remaining reduced game has the same set of Nash equilibria as the original.
  • This process can simplify the search for equilibria.
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8
Q

Explain the matching pennies equilibrium.

A
  • Pure strategies (Heads or Tails) have no equilibrium.
  • The mixed equilibrium is each player choosing Heads with probability 1/2 and Tails with probability 1/2.
  • Each player’s expected payoff is 0 at equilibrium.
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9
Q

What does Nash’s Theorem (1950) state?

A
  • In a finite game with a finite number of players and strategies, there is at least one Nash equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies).
  • This was a foundational result in modern game theory.
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10
Q

Why might professionals follow mixed-strategy predictions?

A
  • Studies (e.g., penalty kicks in football) show experts use near-Nash mix proportions.
  • They ensure opponents remain indifferent, preventing exploitation.
  • Demonstrates that high stakes and experience can bring play closer to theoretical predictions.
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