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Metaphysics of Mind > metaphysics of mind 3 marker definitons > Flashcards

metaphysics of mind 3 marker definitons Flashcards

1
Q

ability knowledge

A

Knowing ‘how’ to do something, e.g ‘I know how to ride a bike’, ‘I can imagine seeing the colour red’.

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2
Q

argument from analogy

A

The argument that we can use the behaviour of other people to infer that they have minds because they behave as I do, and I have a mind.

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3
Q

aquaintance knowledge

A

Knowledge of someone or something gained by direcet experience (not description). For example, ‘I know the manager of the restaurant’, or ‘I know the colour red’.

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4
Q

‘hard’ bahaviourism

A

Hempel’s version of philosophical behaviorism that claims that statements containing mental concepts can be reduced or translated into statements about behaviour and physical states containing no mental concepts, only physical ones. AKA ‘analytical’ or ‘logical’ behaviourism

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5
Q

‘soft’ behaviourism

A

Ryle’s version of philosophical behaviourism that claims that our talk of the mind is talk of how someone does or would behave under certain conditons. However. behavioural dispositions are not reducible to a finite set of statements about how someone would behave, nor to a set of statements containing no mental concepts.

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6
Q

methodological behaviourism

A

The theory that claims that because science can only investigate what is publicly accessible, pyschology is concerned only with the explanation and prediction of behaviour and not with any ‘inner’ mental states

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7
Q

philosophical behaviourism

A

The family of theories that claim that our talk about the mind can be analysed in terms of talk about behaviour. The meaning of our mental concepts is given by behaviour and behavioural dispositions. aka ‘logical’ behaviourism

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8
Q

category mistake

A

Treating a concept as belonging to a logical category that it doesnt belong to. e.g. ‘this number is heavy’ commits a category mistake as numbers are not the sorts of things that can have a weight.

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9
Q

causal closer

A

another term for the completeness of physics

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10
Q

China thought experiment

A

A thought experimemnt by Block, presented as an objection to functionalism. If the population of China, using radios, dupliacted the functioning of your brain, would this create conscious expereinces (just s your brain does?) If not, functionalism (about consciousness) is false.

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11
Q

compatibilism

A

The theory that the causal determination of human conduct is consistent with the freedom required for responsible moral agency.

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12
Q

completeness of physics

A

The thesis that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause that brings it about in accordance with the laws of physics. aka causal closure.

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13
Q

conceivability argument

A

Arguments for dualism from the conceivability of mind and body being distinct.
Descartes argues that:
1) it is conceivable that the mind can exist without the body
2) conceivability enatils possibility.
3) so it is possible that the mind can exist without the body.
Therefore, the mind and body are distinct substances.
The zombie argument is a form of conceivability argument for property dualism.

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14
Q

conceivable

A

Capable of being imagined or grasped mentally without incoherence or contradiction.

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15
Q

consciousness

A

The subjective phenomenon of awareness of the world and/or of one’s mental states.

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16
Q

easy propblem of consciousness

A

The problem of analysing and explaining the functions of consciousness, e.g. the facts that we can consciously control our behaviour, report on our mental states, and focus our attention. According to Chalmers, it is ‘easy’ to provide a successful analysis in physical and/or functional terms.

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17
Q

hard problem of consciousness

A

The problem of analysing and explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness, what it is like to undergo conscious experiences. According to Chalmers, it is ‘hard’ to provide a successful analysis in physical and/or functional terms.

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18
Q

correlation

A

A relationship between two things whereby one always accompnies the other, e.g. the properties of size and shape are correlated. Correlation should be distinguished from identity.

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19
Q

Disposition

A

How something or someone will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances: they would do, could do, or are liable to do, in particular situations or under particular conditions, including conditions that they are not in at the moment. E.g. sugar is soluble (it tends to dissolve when places in water) and someone who has a friendly disposition tends to smile when they are smiled at.

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20
Q

interactionist dualism

A

The theory that mental and physical events can cause one another even though the mind and body are distinct substances (interactionist substances dualism) or mental and physical properties are distinct fundamental properties (interactionist property dualism).

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21
Q

property dualism

A

The theory that there is only one kind of substance, but two ontologically fundamental kinds of property - mental properties and physical properties.

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22
Q

substance dualism

A

The theory that two kinds of substances exist, mental and physical substance.

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23
Q

elimination

A

Ceasing to use a concept on the grounds that what it refers does not exist, e.g. the idea of ‘caloric fluid’ was eliminated by a new theory of heat in molecular motion.

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24
Q

eliminative materialism

A

The theory that at least some of our basic mental concepts, such as consciousness or Intentionality, are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned, as they dont refer to anything that exists.

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25
Q

epiphenomenalism

A

The theory that mental states and evemts are epiphenomena, by-products, the effects of some physical process, but with no causal influence of their own. Often combined with property dualism.

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26
Q

folk pyschology

A

A body of knowledge or theory regarding the prediction and explanation of people’s behaviour constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endore, e.g. ‘if someone is thirsty, they will normally try to find something to drink’.

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27
Q

free will

A

The capaciity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.

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28
Q

function

A

A mapping from each of the possible inputs to some state to its output. The description of a state’s function describe what that state does.

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29
Q

functionalism

A

The theory that mental states are (can be reduced to) functional states, i.e. what it is to be a mental state is just to be a state with certain input and output relations to stimuli, behaviour and other mental states.

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30
Q

causal role functionalism

A

The version of functionalism that interprets the function of mental states in terms of the role they play in a network of causes and effects. A mental state can be ‘realised’ by any state that plays that causal role.

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31
Q

Ghost in the Machine

A

Ryle’s name for substance dualism.

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32
Q

idealism

A

The theory that minds are the only kind of substance. Therefore, all that exists are minds and what depends on them (ideas).

33
Q

numerically identical

A

One and the same thing. Everything is numerically identical to itself, and nothing else.

34
Q

qualitatively identical

A

Two or more things are qualitively identocal if they share their properties in common, for example, two separate copies of the same picture.

35
Q

indefinitely heterogenous dipositions

A

Dispositions that can be manifested in many, many different ways. Ryle argued that mental states are indefinitely hetergenous behavioural dispositions, so that while mental concepts can be analysed in terms of behaviour, they cannot be reduced to talk about behaviour - (soft behaviourism)

36
Q

indiscernibility of identicals

A

Leibniz’s principle that if two things are identical (i.e. are just one thing) then they share all their properties and so are indiscernible, i.e. you cannot have numerical identiy without qualitiative indentity.

37
Q

indivisibility argument

A

Descartes’ argument that bodies are divisible into spatial parts, but minds have no such parts. Therefpre, the mind is a distinct substance from the body.

38
Q

intention

A

A mental state that expresses a person’s choice. It specifies the action they choose and often their reason or end in acting.

39
Q

intentionality

A

The property of mental states whereby they are ‘directed’ toawrds an ‘object’, that is they are ‘about’ something, e.g. the beleife that paris is the capital of france is about paris, and the desire to eat chocolate is about chocolate.

40
Q

conceptual interaction problem

A

The objection to interactionist dualism that mind and body (or mental and physical properties) cannot interact causally, because they are too different in narure e.g. the mind is outside space while the body is in space.

41
Q

empirical interaction problem

A

The objection to interactionist dualism that the claim that the mind or mental states causes changes to the body or physical states conflicts with scientific theory or evidence, e.g. that the total energy in the universe stays constant.

42
Q

introspection

A

Direct, first-personal awareness of one’s own mental states.

43
Q

intuition

A

Direct non-inferential awareness of truths or abstract objects.

44
Q

inverted qualia

A

The thought experiment that supposes that two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways, e.g. they both call the object ‘red’. The argument is presented as an objection to a functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness.

45
Q

knowledge argument

A

Jackson’s argument for property dualism, presenting the thought experiment of Mary, a neuroscientist who has lived her entire life in a black-and-white room, but who knows all the physical information there is to know about what happens when we see a ripe tomato. When she first leaves the room and comes to see something red for the first time, does she learn something new? If so, some properties are not physical properties.

46
Q

machine table

A

A table listing every possible combination of input and output for a machine, describing the operations of its software.

47
Q

Masked Man Fallacy

A

A fallous form of argument that uses what one belives about an object to infer whether or not the object is identical with something else, e.g. I believe the Masked Man robbed the bank; I do not believe my father robbed the bank; therefore the Masked Man is not my father. This is a fallacy, because one’s beliefs may be mistaken. More generally, it is said to challenge the use of conceivability to infer what is possible/actual.

48
Q

materialism

A

The theory that the only substance is matter (or physical substance). Everything that exists, including the mind, depends on matter (physica substance) to exist.

49
Q

mental states

A

Mental phenomena that can endure over time, such as beliefs and desires. The term is sometimes used more broadly to cover mental phenomena or mental properties in general. (states, processes and events).

50
Q

monism

A

The theory that only one kind of substance exists. Both materialism (physicalism) and idealism are monist theories

51
Q

multiple realisability

A

1) The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour.This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions.
2) The claim that one and the same mental state can have its function performed by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states.

52
Q

ontologically distinct

A

Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other, and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other, e.g. substance dualists claim that mind and body are ontologically distinct substances.

53
Q

ontologically independent

A

Not depending on anything else for existence. According to traditional metaphysics, only substances can be ontologically independent.

54
Q

para-mechanical hypothesis

A

Ryle’s name for understanding mental states and processes as akin to physical states and processes, but non-spatial and non-mechanical.

55
Q

phenomenal concept

A

A concept by which you recognise something as of a certain kind when experiencing it or perceiving it, e.g. a phenomenal concept of red as ‘this’ colour. Contrasted with theoretical concepts, whch describe something in theoretical concepts, e.g. a theoretical concept of red as a light with a frequency of 600 nanometres.

56
Q

phenomenal consciousness

A

A form of consciousness with a subjective experiential quality, as involved in perception, sensation, and emotion. Awareness of ‘what it is like’ to experience such mental phenomena.

57
Q

phenomenal properties

A

Properties of an expereince that gives it its distinctive experiential quality, and which are apprehended in phenomenal consciousness.

58
Q

Physicalism

A

A modern form of materialism, which claims that everything that exists is physical, or depends upon something that is physical. More precisley, the theory that everything that is ontologically fundamental is physical, that is comes under the laws and investigations of physics, and every physical event has a sufficient physical cause.

59
Q

reductive physicalism

A

A form of physicalism that claims that mental properties are physical propertues. - type indentity theory.

60
Q

possible world

A

A way of talking about how things could be. Saying that something is possible is saying that it is true in some possible world. Saying that something is impossible is saying that it is false in all possible worlds.

61
Q

private

A

Capable of being experienced or known by no one other than the subject themselves.

62
Q

problem of other minds

A

The question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own, given that our experience of other minds (if they exist) is through behaviour.

63
Q

Intentional property

A

A property of a mental state that enables it to be ‘about’ something, to represent what it does. It is an extrinsic or relational property.

64
Q

propositional knowledge

A

Knowing ‘that’ some claim - a propositon - is true or flase, e.g. ‘I know that Paris is the capital of France’.

65
Q

qualia

A

Phenomenal properties understood as intrinsic and non-Intentional properties of mental states.

66
Q

reducible

A

A phenomenon or property is reducible to another if the first can be completely explained in terms of, or identified with, the second (which is considered more ontologically fundamental), e.g. type identity theory claims that mental properties are reducible (identical) to physical properties.

67
Q

reduction

A

The reducing of one thing to another.

An analytic reduction claims that one set of concepts can be translated without loss of meaning into another set of concepts, e.g. Hempel’s ‘hard’ behaviourism claims that mental concepts are reducible to behavioural and physical concepts.

An ontological reduction claims that the things in one domain are identical with (or can be completely explained in terms of) some of the things in another domain, e.g. type identity theory claims that mental properties are reducible to physical properties.

68
Q

sensation

A

Our experience of objects outside the mind, perceived through the senses.

69
Q

soul

A

The immortal, non-material part of a person.

70
Q

subjective

A

That which depends upon the personal or individual, especially where it is supposed to be an arbitrary expression of preference.

71
Q

substance

A

Something that does not depend on another thing in order to exist, which possesses properties and persists through changed.

72
Q

super spartans

A

People (or creatures) in Putnam’s thought experinemnt who so completely disappove of showing pain that all pain behavhiour has been suppressed, and they no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behaviour. Th thought experiment is presented as an objection to behaviourism.

73
Q

supervenience

A

A relation between two types of property. Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties, e.g. aesthetic properties supervene on physical properties if two paintings that have identical physical properties cannot have different aesthetic properties.

74
Q

though experiment

A

A philosophical method designed to test a hypothesis or philosophical claim through imagining a hypothetical situation and coming to a judgement.

75
Q

type identity theory

A

The theory that mental properties are identical (ontologically reducible) to physical properties. Mind-brain type identity theory claims that mental properties are idenitcal to physical properties of the brain.

76
Q

unconscious

A

A mental state is unconscious if the subject is not aware of having that mental state.

77
Q

zombie argument

A

The argument for property dualism that if consciousness were identical to some physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness. However, 1) philosophical zombies are conceivable, and so 2) philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore, 3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false.

78
Q

philosophical zombie

A

An exact physical duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without any phenomenal consciousness. It therefore has identical physical properties to the person (and identical functional properties, if these are fixed by physical properties), but different mental properties.

Metaphysics of Mind (1 decks)

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