Metaphysics Of Mind Flashcards
Define elimination
Elimination : ceasing to use a concepts on the grounds that what it refers to does not exist
Define Ontological reduction
Things in one domain are identical with ) or can be completely explained in terms of ) some things in another domain
Define supervience
a relation between two types of properties. Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties.
What is mind brain type identity theory
The theory that mental properties are identical ( ontologically reducible) to physical properties of the brain
Why be a mind brain type identity theorist
1.empirical observations and Ockham’s razor
2. The principle of causal principle
Define correlation
A relationship between two things whereby one always accompanies the other ( in the line y= x any increase in y will always mean an increase in x )
Correlation is distinct from identity
What are the strong points about mind brain type identity theory
-mind brain type identity theory can cohere with what we know empirically ( neuroscience)
- does not violate the principle of causal closure
- is the simplest explanation of correlations between mental and physical properties compared to supervenience or causation
Explain the multiple realisability objection to mind brain type identity theory
The claim that one and the same mental states can be realised ( have its function preformed ) by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states.
P1. If mental property type M is identical to human brain property type B then any instance of M must be an Instance of B
P2. Multiple realisability premise : it is empirically plausible that some instances of M are not Instances of B ( they are instances of different , non human brain properties )
C1. Therefore , M-type is not identical to B-type
Explain the multiple realisability objection to mind brain type identity theory
The claim that one and the same mental states can be realised ( have its function preformed ) by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states.
P1. If mental property type M is identical to human brain property type B then any instance of M must be an Instance of B
P2. Multiple realisability premise : it is empirically plausible that some instances of M are not Instances of B ( they are instances of different , non human brain properties )
C1. Therefore , M-type is not identical to B-type
Define Intra-species variation
Individual humans can differ in term of which brain states correspond to which mental states ( eg two people can have different brain states but are experiencing the same mental state types )
What is physicalism ( 3m)
The theory that everything that exists is physical or depends upon something that is physical. Everything that is ontologically fundamental is therefore physical and comes under the laws and investigations of physics.
(Physicalism is therefore a monist theory – it claims there is only one kind of substance).
What is hempel’s hard behaviorism
Hempel’s version of philosophical behaviorism claims that statements containing mental concepts can be reduced or translated into statements about behavior and physical states containing no mental concepts only physical ones . Also known as “ analytical” behaviorism or “logical” behaviorism.
What is philosophical behaviorism
A family of theories that claim that our talk about the mind can be analyzed in terms of talk about behavior. The meaning of our mental concepts is given by behavior and behavioral dispositions.
Why is eliminative materialism a from of physicalism
Eliminative materialism endorses a futurepicture where mental states aredescribed andexplained purely in terms ofneuroscience.This implies that mental states either areidentical to or aresupervenient upon physical(brain) states.
What is introspection
Direct, first-personal awareness of one’s own mental states
What is philosophical behaviourism ( 3m)
A family of theories that claim that our talk about the mind can be analysed in terms of talk about behaviour. The meaning of our mental concepts is given by behaviour and behavioural dispositions.
What is Hempel’s Hard behaviourism
Claims that statements containing mental concepts can be reduced or translated into statements about behaviour and physical states containing no mental concepts only physical ones. Also known «analytical» behaviourism
What is the verification principle
A statement is meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable
How does Ryle think we can define dispositions
Partially and hypothetical statements
What is the multiple reliability objection to behaviorism
The same mental state can be expressed by different behaviors in different situations or even by different behaviors in the same situation by different people
There are 2 interpretations of this objection:
1. Incomplete translation
2. Individuation of mental concepts
What is the multiple reliability objection to behaviorism
The same mental state can be expressed by different behaviors in different situations or even by different behaviors in the same situation by different people
There are 2 interpretations of this objection:
1. Incomplete translation
2. Individuation of mental concepts
Give the arguments for the incomplete translation part of the multiple releasability objection
P1. People with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance
P2. It is not possible to draw up a finite list of hypothetical conditionals ( Ryle soft ) or stamens of verification ( Hemples hard) that describe all the ways someone with that meant state may behave
C1. therefore the claim that mental states can be analyzed in terms of behavior is false
C2. therefore, philosophical behaviorism is false
( issue for Hemple NOT Ryle , Ryle will suggest then an open list )
Give the arguments for the incomplete translation part of the multiple releasability objection
P1. People with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance
P2. It is not possible to draw up a finite list of hypothetical conditionals ( Ryle soft ) or stamens of verification ( Hemples hard) that describe all the ways someone with that meant state may behave
C1. therefore the claim that mental states can be analyzed in terms of behavior is false
C2. therefore, philosophical behaviorism is false
( issue for Hemple NOT Ryle , Ryle will suggest then an open list )
What does “individuation of mental concepts mean”
mental concepts can be distinguished from one another
( for Ryle you individuate mental concepts though their behavioral dispositions, ie fear Is distinct from joy, because fear will cause you to cry while joy will cause you to cheer)
Exaplin the individuation of mental concepts objection to Ryle’s soft behaviorism
P1. People with the same mental state behave differently, both in difference circumstances and even in the same circumstance
C1. therefore what makes it true that two people have the same mental state is not that they have the same behavioral disposition ( targeting Ryle )
How this applies ( explained ) : There are far to many dispositions that can be manifested from each circumstance and because there is so much overlap between different mental states then there is no way to create a definition of mental concepts from behavior. Which means we cannot have the identity relation that Ryle suggests between mental concepts and behavioral dispositions
What is an example of the individuation of mental concepts objection to Ryle ?
Example. I might believe that rats are scared of silence, and so when I see a rat I will have the behavioral disposition to remain silent If I see a rat. But someone else might not have this belief and will have a different behavioral disposition to scream.
So the mental statement of ”being scared of rats” Includes:
- If S sees rat they remain silent
- If S sees rat they scream
These seem like the two hypothesis are contradictory
What is the theoretical reason as to why the individuation objection is not an issue for Ryle
He is not claiming that a mental state Can be defined even partially into single hypotheticals. Instead he suggests the partial definition will include a very large list of hypotheticals and it is as a whole that gives the partial definition
What is the theoretical reason as to why the individuation objection is not an issue for Ryle
He is not claiming that a mental state Can be defined even partially into single hypotheticals. Instead he suggests the partial definition will include a very large list of hypotheticals and it is as a whole that gives the partial definition
What are superspartans
People ( or creature) in Putnam’s thought experiment who so completely disapprove of showing pain that all pain behavior has been suppressed and they no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behavior. The thought experiment is presented as an objection to behaviorism
