Metaphysics of Mind

Question 1

What are qualia?

Answer 1

Qualia are properties of mental states which can be defined as ‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible’. These can include beliefs, desires and sensations.

Question 2

What intentionality?

Answer 2

Intentionality is a property of mental states whereby they are directed towards a certain thing. It is not possible to simply believe, fear or hope; you must believe, fear of hope something. For example, I may believe that it is raining. In this case my belief is directed towards rain.

Question 3

Outline substance dualism

Answer 3

Substance dualism is a dualist theory of mind which claims that humans are composed of two distinct properties – a mind and a body – and each has a distinct set of properties, mental and physical. They are ontologically independent from each other (meaning that neither depends on the other’s existence to exist itself). Furthermore, mind and body causally interact (for example, acts of will in the mind cause the body to move and damage to the physical body causes mental pain).

Question 4

Explain the indivisibility argument for substance dualism

Answer 4

The indivisibility argument is an argument put forward by Descartes as a proponent for substance dualism, the view that mind and body are separate substances. His argument can be summarised as such:

P1: The body is divisible; it has parts that can be removed

P2: The mind is indivisible; it is a unitary thinking thing

C1: The mind and body have separate properties

P3: Two things with different properties cannot be the same thing (according to Leibniz’s law of indiscernables)

C: Therefore, the mind must be a different substance to the body

Question 5

Explain the issue that the mental is divisible for the indivisibility argument

Answer 5

Descartes attempts to support substance dualism with his divisibility argument, which claims that, since the body is divisible and the mind is indivisible, mind and body must be separate substances. However, we can challenge the notion that the mind is indivisible to undermine his argument. Firstly, people are capable of self-deception (for example, I could try to convince myself that I did not eat too much cake). This can be explained by arguing that consciousness is not unitary; one part of my mind is guilty about eating too much cake, whereas the other part denies it. Furthermore, modern neuroscience supports this. For example, people with multiple personality disorder can be said to have a divided mind. Therefore, Descartes’ indivisibility argument is flawed.

Question 6

Explain the issue that not everything physical is divisible for the indivisibility argument

Answer 6

Descartes attempts to support substance dualism with his divisibility argument, which claims that, since the body is divisible and the mind is indivisible, mind and body must be separate substances. However, we can challenge the notion that everything physical is divisible to undermine his argument. The physical body can be divided. However, if you keep dividing it, you may eventually reach a point where you cannot divide it any further (such as sub-atomic particles). The issue that arises here is that this shows that not everything that is indivisible is non-physical. Therefore, it is possible that the mind is a physical substance like the body, but just an indivisible form of that same substance, showing that substance dualism fails.

Question 7

Explain the conceivability argument

Answer 7

The conceivability argument is an argument put forward by Descartes’ in support of substance dualism, the theory that mind and body are two separate substances. He argued that:

P1: If I can clearly and distinctly recognise the natures of two things to be different, then they must be different things.

P2: I clearly and distinctly recognise the nature of the mind to be consciousness and nothing more.

P3: I clearly and distinctly recognise the nature of the body to be extension and nothing more.

C: Therefore, the mind is a distinct substance from the body.

Question 8

Explain the argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible (for the conceivability argument)

Answer 8

Descartes believed that mind and body are separate substances as he ‘clearly and distinctly’ conceived of this to be so. However, just because Descartes cannot conceive of mind and body being connected, this does not mean that they cannot be. Perhaps he is lacking crucial information about the relationship between mind and body. This issue can be illustrated by using the masked man fallacy. Bruce Wayne’s chauffeur clearly and distinctly conceived of Bruce Wayne and Batman being separate. However, he was missing some crucial information. This presents an issue for the conceivability argument for substance dualism as it discredits Descartes’ reasoning.

Question 9

Explain the issue that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world

Answer 9

Descartes argued that it is conceivable that mind and body are distinct substances – therefore, this is metaphysically possible, meaning that there are possible worlds in which this is true. However, he has not proven that physicalism (the view that minds are not distinct from the physical body) is metaphysically impossible, therefore there are also possible worlds in which this is true. If both dualism and physicalism are metaphysically possible, then we are none the wiser as to which situation is true. Therefore, Descartes’ conceivability argument fails as we would need further empirical evidence to establish or deny dualism.

Question 10

Explain the issue that mind without body is not conceivable

Answer 10

Cartesian dualism states that mind and body are separate substances. The implication of this is that mind would be able to exist without a body. However, if we take the physicalist stance, this can be criticised. For example, a behaviourist would hold the view that the mental states of happiness and sadness are outwardly expressed in physical behaviour. For example, someone who is happy expresses this by smiling. Therefore, it could be argued that it is mistaken to believe that a mind could exist independently from a body.

Question 11

Outline property dualism

Answer 11

Property dualism is the view that there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervene upon physical properties. While mental properties are possessed by physical substances (and therefore not ontologically independent from physical properties), they are a fundamentally different kind of property from physical properties. For example, mental properties of a brain (its thoughts, sensations, desires etc..) are different from its physical properties (its physical structure, temperature, electrochemical activity etc..).

Question 12

Outline the philosophical zombies argument for property dualism

Answer 12

P1: Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature

C1: So, if physicalism is true, then any possible world which is identical to the actual world must contain consciousness (i.e. a zombie world would be metaphysically impossible).

P2: But we can conceive of a world that is physically identical to this one, but in which there is no conscious experience (i.e. a zombie world)

P3: What is conceivable is metaphysically possible

C2: Therefore, a zombie world must be metaphysically possible

C3: Therefore, (physicalism is false and) property dualism is correct

Question 13

Explain the argument that a zombie world is not conceivable

Answer 13

Chalmers claims that there is no contradiction in the idea of a philosophical zombie world, and therefore it is conceivable. However, this could be attacked from the physicalist perspective

P1: A zombie is a physical duplicate of a person with phenomenal consciousness, but without phenomenal consciousness

P2: (If physicalism is true,) A physical duplicate is a functional duplicate

C1: Therefore, a zombie is a physical and functional duplicate of a person but without phenomenal consciousness

P3: (If physicalism is true,) Phenomenal properties are physical properties realising particular functional roles

C2: Therefore, a physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness must have phenomenal consciousness

P4: A physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness cannot both have and lack consciousness

C3: Therefore, (if physicalism is true,) zombies are inconceivable

Question 14

Explain the argument against philosophical zombies that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible

Answer 14

Chalmers argues that zombies are conceivable, and therefore must also be metaphysically possible. However, this claim can be challenged as what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. Hilary Putnam gave the example of our being able to conceive of water not being H2O. Before the molecular structure of water was discovered, it was entirely conceivable that water was something completely different. However, given that water is H2O, it is not metaphysically possible for it to be something else. Therefore, we can see that just because something is conceivable, does not mean it is metaphysically possible.

Question 15

Explain the argument against philosophical zombies that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world

Answer 15

Chalmers claims that zombies are conceivable, and therefore must also be metaphysically possible. However, in the actual world the natural laws are such as to make zombies an impossibility, and this is what matters. While philosophical zombies may be a possibility in another possible world, this leaves us none the wiser about the state of affairs in this world. Therefore, this is unhelpful in trying to ascertain the relationship between mind and body.

Question 16

Explain the knowledge/Mary argument for property dualism

Answer 16

Property dualist Frank Jackson argues that physicalism is incorrect with his knowledge/Mary argument. This can be laid out as such:

P1: Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical processes involved in colour vision

P2: She lives in a black and white room, so has never experienced the colour herself

P3: One day, she leaves her room and experiences colour for the first time. She learns something new from this

C1: Therefore, there is more to know about colour vision than what is given in a wholly physical account of it

C2: Therefore, physicalism is false (and property dualism is true)

Question 17

Explain the acquaintance knowledge response to the knowledge/Mary argument

Answer 17

Frank Jackson argues that, in the knowledge/Mary argument scenario, Mary gains new knowledge when she experiences colour. However, this argument can be criticised by pointing out that she may not have gained propositional knowledge (knowledge of facts). Jackson argues that a complete physical account does not fully explain colour vision, but it could be argued that this account does fully explain Mary’s propositional knowledge about colour. Instead, upon leaving the room, she becomes acquainted with the phenomenal property of colour vision (gaining acquaintance knowledge), but she does not learn new facts.

Question 18

Explain the ability knowledge response to the knowledge/Mary argument

Answer 18

Frank Jackson argues that, in the knowledge/Mary argument scenario, Mary gains new knowledge when she experiences colour. However, this argument can be criticised by pointing out that she may not have gained propositional knowledge (knowledge of facts). Jackson argues that a complete physical account does not fully explain colour vision, but it could be argued that this account does fully explain Mary’s propositional knowledge. Instead, upon leaving the room, Mary acquires new abilities through experiencing colour vision (e.g. she can now recognise ripe tomatoes by observing their colour). However, this new ability knowledge does not mean that she has learned any new facts about colour vision.

Question 19

Explain the new knowledge/old fact response to the knowledge/Mary argument

Answer 19

Frank Jackson argues that, in the knowledge/Mary argument scenario, Mary gains new knowledge when she experiences colour. However, the new knowledge/old fact response objects to this. According to this objection, upon her leaving the room, Mary gains knowledge of what it is like to see colours and acquires new concepts, based on her new phenomenal experience. This means that she can now describe the process of colour vision using concepts she did not possess before leaving the room. However, these descriptions are not of new facts, but they represent the same facts about colour vision she already possessed and spoke about in physical terms. The only difference is how the same facts are presented. Therefore, Mary does not learn anything new when she leaves the room.

Question 20

Explain the problem of other minds facing dualism

Answer 20

The problem of other minds presents a sceptical concern about dualism. Dualism argues that mind and body are separate, and therefore it is entirely plausible that a body can exist without a mind. I have direct access to my own mind via introspection, but I am not able to access anybody else’s minds. As I cannot directly observe other minds, I have no way of establishing whether other minds exist. This is an issue for dualism as it leads us to a place of philosophical scepticism.

Question 21

Explain the argument from analogy against the problem of other minds

Answer 21

P1: I observe that I have a mind

P2: I also observe that my mental states are systematically connected with my behaviour (for example, acts of will cause bodily movements and damage to my body causes pain)

P3: I also observe that other people who have bodies like mine behave similarly to me

C1: So it is likely that their bodies and behaviour are connected to mental states too

C2: Therefore, it is likely that others have minds

Question 22

Explain the existence of other minds being the best hypothesis

Answer 22

A possible solution to the problem of other minds is the argument that it is the best hypothesis, based on observations of human behaviour. This argument can be laid out as such:

P1: Humans have complex behaviour

P2: If humans have mind, then this would explain that behaviour

P3: There is no available alternative theory which explains their behaviour well

C: Therefore, it is likely that humans have minds

Question 23

Explain Ryle’s argument that dualism makes a category mistake

Answer 23

Gilbert Ryle accuses dualism is committing a ‘category mistake’, meaning it muddles one type of concept with another. He gives an example of somebody visiting Oxford University, being shown all of the libraries, faculties and colleges and then asking ‘but where is the university?’ Similarly dualists make a category mistake by treating the mind as though it were in the same category as physical things or substances.

Question 24

Explain the conceptual interaction problem facing interactionist dualism

Answer 24

In correspondence with Descartes, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia identified the conceptional interaction problem for interactionist dualism. This can be laid out as such:

P1: It is inconceivable for two things to causally interact, unless their surfaces come into contact with each other

P2: According to substance dualism, the mind is unextended and so has no surface

C1: Therefore it is inconceivable for the mind to interact with the body

P3: What is inconceivable is impossible

C2: Therefore, mind-body interaction is impossible, so substance dualism is wrong

Question 25

Explain the empirical interaction problem for interactionist dualism

Answer 25

Physics is committed to the law of the conservation of energy, which states that in a closed system, energy cannot be created and destroyed, but only transferred. This forms the basis of the empirical interaction problem. If substance dualism is true, it would mean that energy is constantly being added into the closed system of our universe every time the mental interacts with the physical. If substance dualism is true, then the law of the conservation of energy is wrong. However, this is extremely unlikely, meaning that substance dualism is likely to be false.

Question 26

Outline epiphenomenalist dualism

Answer 26

Epiphenomenalist dualism is the view that the mind is a ‘collateral property’ of the activity of the brain; it is produced by the brain but has no reciprocal influence. This means that it would be unrealistic to consider that your mind causes you to act in a certain way of its own volition, as it has no causal influence on physical actions. For example, we may suppose that the pain caused by placing your hand in the fire makes you move away when it is the by-product of physiological processes that causes this reaction.

Question 27

Outline interactionist dualism

Answer 27

Interactionist dualism, heavily associated with Cartesian dualism, argues that mind and body causally interact with each other. Walking, talking and other bodily movements are caused by thoughts, feelings and decisions, and physical stimuli such as a burn cause mental sensations of pain.

Question 28

Explain the issue of introspective self-knowledge facing epiphenomenalist dualism

Answer 28

If epiphenomenalism is correct, then when we talk about mental states, these statements describing mental states are not causally connected to my subjective experiences. For example, if you complain to the dentist about toothache, this is caused by the decay in your tooth. The pain is a mere by-product and has no causal effect. The issue here is that it seems that we are unable to meaningfully talk about our introspectively accessible mental states, and therefore epiphenomenalism is flawed.

Question 29

Explain the issue of the phenomenology of our mental life facing epiphenomenalist dualism

Answer 29

Epiphenomenalism can be rejected by observing the phenomenology of our mental life. We would say that it is self-evident and certain that there is a causal interaction between our mental states and physical actions. For example, when I choose to go to the dentist, it is the pain that leads me to this decision. Here we can see that volition has caused my actions, rather than physical processes. These experiences in our daily lives clearly show that the claims of epiphenomenalism are flawed.

Question 30

Explain the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution for epiphenomenalism

Answer 30

Evolutionary theory states that the characteristics of a species have evolved because they offer some survival or reproductive advantage. If they do not do this, they tend to die out. However, according to epiphenomenalism, consciousness has no causal influence on the physical. An issue arises here that, if epiphenomenalism were true, then conscious mental states would not exist now. However, they do still exist, which suggests that they must have some survival advantage (i.e. they do have causal influence on the physical).

Question 31

What does physicalism assert about mental states?

Answer 31

Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical. Therefore, what we think of as mental states do not exist as such, they are simply part of physical processes.

Question 32

Outline behaviourism

Answer 32

Philosophical behaviourism is a physicalist theory of mind which argues that we can understand mental states in terms of observable behaviour. It has two distinct strands: hard behaviourism (which argues that mental states are fully analytically reducible to outward behaviour) and soft behaviourism (which understands mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions).

Question 33

Outline hard behaviourism

Answer 33

Behaviourism argues that mental states can be analytically reduced to observable behaviour. Hard behaviourism is a strand of behaviourism associated with Carl Hempel, who argued that, since only behaviour rather than introspection is publicly observable, then talk of mental states should be based on behavioural evidence alone. Furthermore, all talk about mental states can be translated into observational statements about people’s behaviour. For example, to say that ‘Paul is in pain’ is equivalent in meaning to saying ‘Paul cries’.

Question 34

Outline soft behaviourism

Answer 34

Behaviourism argues that mental states can be analytically reduced to observable behaviour. Soft behaviourism, associated with Gilbert Ryle, argues that propositions about mental states are equivalent to propositions about behavioural dispositions. This means that we have tendencies to behave a certain way on the right conditions. This can be shown through the analogy of a sugar cube: it has the disposition to be soluble, and although this does not mean that it is currently dissolving, it means that it has the property of being soluble given the right conditions.

Question 35

Explain the issue of multiple realisability for behaviourism

Answer 35

Behaviourism argues that mental states can be analytically reduced to observable behaviour. However, particular mental states may be realised through different behaviours. For example, if you feel that it might rain, this could lead you to stay at home, or go out with your umbrella, or go out with a coat. Since a complete analysis of mental states would have to include all of the possible ways mental states may be manifested in behaviour, it would be indefinitely long. Therefore, philosophical behaviourism cannot give a full account of mental states.

Question 36

Explain the issue of circularity for behaviourism

Answer 36

A complete behavioural analysis of mental states would have to reduce all talk of mental states to talk of behaviour. However, whether a mental state manifests itself in terms of specific behaviours depends on the other mental states that person has. For example, if I am thirsty, whether or not this leads me to drink depends on my other mental states (e.g. if I believe that the drink is poisoned, I won’t drink it). This analysis of one mental states has to make reference to another mental state, which leads to circularity. Therefore, behaviourism cannot give a complete account of mental states.

Question 37

Explain dualist arguments (evidence of introspection) against behaviourism

Answer 37

Dualists will argue that our own experience tells us that mental states have a more subjective a private quality than behaviourism suggests. These subjective qualities are not something that can be rendered in terms of behaviour. Any analysis of observable behaviour cannot explain what it is like for me to, for example, experience a toothache. Therefore, behaviourism cannot do justice to the lived experience of mental life.

Question 38

Explain the issue of asymmetry for behaviourism

Answer 38

Behaviourism argues that mental states can be analytically reduced to observable behaviour. However, there is an important difference between the way I come to know about my own mental states as opposed to the mental states of others. To determine the mental state of somebody else, I have to make an inference from their behaviour. To determine my own mental state, I am in no need of behavioural evidence (e.g. if I have a toothache, I do not need further evidence to corroborate this). However, behaviourism is unable to explain this asymmetry, making it far less credible.

Question 39

Explain the distinctness of mental states from behaviour

Answer 39

Behaviourism argues that mental states can be analytically reduced to observable behaviour. However, there are arguments to show that there is an importance difference between behaviour and mental states. For example, Hilary Putnam asks us to imagine ‘Super Spartans’, elite warriors who feel pain, yet are trained not to show it. Behaviourism would suggest that they do not feel pain, but clearly they do. Therefore, behaviourism cannot give a convincing account of mental states.

Question 40

Outline mind-brain type identity theory

Answer 40

Mind-brain type identity theory says that the mind is the brain and that all mental states and processes are identical with brain states and processes, ontologically reducing mental states to brain states. This means that mind and brain are exactly the same entity. For example, thinking a thought or feeling an itch are the same thing as certain neurons firing, or having a belief is the same as certain neural connections existing.

Question 41

Dualist argument against mind-brain type identity theory (evidence of introspection)

Answer 41

Dualists may argue against mind-brain type identity theory (the theory that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states) by rejecting their reductionism. They may argue that mental states must be irreducible, due to the fact that a fully physical account of the state of a brain could not explain qualia. For dualists, this would mean that mind-brain type identity fails as it cannot account for what they believe to be self-evident phenomenal properties of mind.

Question 42

Dualist argument against mind-brain type identity theory (spatial location problem)

Answer 42

According to Leibniz’ law of indiscernibles, if we can find a property of the mind that the brain does not possess, then the two cannot be considered to be the same entity. An example of this is the spatial location problem: brain states have a clear spatial location, yet it makes no sense to speak of a mental state as having a spatial location. This suggests that the two cannot be identical. Furthermore, the indivisibility argument (where mind is indivisible but the brain is divisible) proves that we cannot ontologically reduce mental states to brain states as they are not the same thing.

Question 43

Dualist arguments against mind brain type identity theory (irreducibility of intentionality)

Answer 43

Dualists can challenge mind-brain type identity theory (the theory that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states) by appealing to the irreducibility of intentionality. Intentionality is the quality of mental states, like beliefs or desires, to be directed beyond themselves. They are about things, e.g. my belief that the moon is full is about the moon. However, intentionality is a problem for physicalists as it is unclear how this can be a property of any purely physical system. Within mind-brain type identity theory, any arrangement of neurons in your brain cannot be about something else. Therefore, intentional states such as beliefs and desires are irreducible to the physical and mind-brain type identity theory is wrong.

Question 44

Explain(an extra argument) against MBTIT

Answer 44

P1: It is conceivable that, for any type of mental state, someone can have a particular type of mental state without having the brain state with which, according to mind-brain identity type theory, it is identical.

P2: What is conceivable is metaphysically possible

C1: Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that for any type of mental state, it can exist in the absence of the brain state with which, according to mind-brain identity type theory, it is identical.

P3: If one thing exists in the absence of a second thing, then they are not the same thing.

C2: Therefore, mental states cannot be brain states.

Question 45

Explain the issue of multiple realisability for mind brain type identity theory

Answer 45

Mind-brain type identity theory argues that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states. However, the issue of multiple realisability challenges this:

P1: It is conceivable, and therefore possible, for a being with a different physical constitution from us to have the same thoughts or sensations (for example, a dog is also able to experience pain).

P2: Mind-brain type identity theory argues that mental states are identical to brain states.

P3: However, other beings can have the same mental states as humans without having the same brain states.

C: Therefore, mental properties cannot be the same as physical properties.

Question 46

Arguments for behaviourism

Answer 46

Category mistake

Question 47

Arguments for mind-brain type identity theory

Answer 47

If states of consciousness, such as sensations, could not be reduced to the physical, then they would be ‘nomological danglers’ (according to Smart)- means that they would have an ontologically peculiar status as the only thing in the universe to not follow the laws of physics

Advances in neuroscience shows more clearly the role of the brain in mental states – a range of mental states can now be precisely correlated with activity in specific regions of the brain

Question 48

Explain the issue that mind-brain type identity theory is chauvinistic

Answer 48

Mind-brain type identity theory claims that mental states are reducible to brain states. However, if pain were identical with a brain process in humans, this would imply that other animals, because they have different types of brains, do not experience pain. But this is implausible. It would be chauvinistic to claim that the fact that an animal has a different type of neurophysiology means it cannot have the same type of mental state. Therefore, types of mental states cannot be identical with types of brain states.

Question 49

Outline eliminative materialism

Answer 49

Eliminative materialism is a physicalist theory of mind which argues that future developments in neuroscience will show that the way we think and talk about the mind is fundamentally flawed. It rejects our common-sense understanding of mental states as ‘folk psychology’, the everyday explanations of behaviour we use, such as saying ‘he ran away because he was scared’ or ‘she got a drink because she was thirsty’. Therefore, eliminative materialists argue that we should eliminate such talk about mind and instead focus on developing a proper analysis of mental states through neuroscience.

Question 50

Arguments for eliminative materialism

Answer 50

Folk psychology is an inadequate account of human nature (cannot explain why we need to sleep, why we dream or how we learn, for example). Neuroscience will soon be able to offer a much fuller explanation.

Question 51

Explain the issue of our certainty about the existence of our mental states for eliminative materialism

Answer 51

Eliminative materialism dismisses the way we currently talk about mental states as mere ‘folk psychological’ explanations, which should be eliminated. However, this does not fit with our own understanding of our mental states.

P1: When you look into your own mind (through introspection), you appear to be directly aware of your own mental states, such as your beliefs, desires and sensations.

P2: It is absurd to deny the existence of what one is directly aware of.

C: Therefore, eliminative materialism is wrong to deny the existence of the mental states discussed through ‘folk psychology’.

Question 52

Explain the issue for eliminative materialism that folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power

Answer 52

Eliminative materialism dismisses the way we currently talk about mental states as mere ‘folk psychological’ explanations, which should be eliminated. However, we can refute this by arguing that folk psychology is effective in predicting human behaviour in a range of situations, as well as explaining what people do well. For example, if you believe that it is raining and desire to stay dry on your way to work, I can use folk psychology to predict that you will bring your umbrella out with you. Furthermore, since neuroscience cannot yet give a satisfactory alternative explanation, we should be content with folk psychology, contrary to the claims of eliminative materialism.

Question 53

Explain the issue for eliminative materialism that it is self-refuting

Answer 53

Eliminative materialism dismisses the way we currently talk about mental states as mere ‘folk psychological’ explanations, which should be eliminated. However, a criticism can be raised here that this makes the theory self-refuting.

P1: Eliminative materialism claims that mental states, such as beliefs, do not exist.

P2: But if beliefs do not exist, then it is not possible to believe that eliminative materialism is true. And if the language used to articulate the theory does not express genuine propositions or beliefs, then it is meaningless.

C1: Therefore, according to the eliminativists’ own view, it is not possible to believe and coherently articulate eliminative materialism.

C2: Therefore, the theory is self-refuting.

Question 54

Outline functionalism

Answer 54

Functionalism is a physicalist theory of mind which argues that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles. To define a mental state functionally is to define it in terms of the causal role it plays by processing environmental inputs and manifesting this into behaviour. For example, pain is a mental state caused by damage to the body (the environmental input), which produces pain behaviour as well as efforts to be rid of the pain (the behavioural output). According to functionalism, anything that functions as a mind is a mind.

Question 55

Arguments for functionalism

Answer 55

Recognises causal role of mental states have (fits in with common-sense view, thus protecting itself from the criticisms of other physicalist theories)

Protects itself from the chauvinistic criticism of MBTIT

Question 56

Explain the issue of a functional duplicate with inverted qualia for functionalism

Answer 56

Functionalism is a physicalist theory of mind which argues that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles. However, an issue can be raised by the possibility of inverted qualia. Suppose that you and I have functionally identical visual systems. It is conceivable that we have inverted qualitative experiences of colour. For example, when you experience the colour red, I experience the colour green. Functionalism is unable to account for the intrinsic nature of qualia, as it defines mental states extrinsically (i.e. in terms of their relation to other mental states and behaviour).

Question 57

Explain the knowledge/Mary argument applied to functionalism

Answer 57

Functionalism is a physicalist theory of mind which argues that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles. However, the knowledge/Mary argument seeks to prove that this cannot give a full account of mental states.

P1: Mary knows all the functional facts involved in colour vision

P2: But she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself

C1: Therefore, there is more to know about colour vision that what is given in a complete functional account

C2: Functionalism is false

Question 58

Explain the possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia for functionalism

Answer 58

Functionalism is a physicalist theory of mind which argues that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles. Therefore, anything which functions like a mind is a mind. However, Ned Block seeks to refute this with his ‘China brain’ thought experiment. The population of China is about the same as the number of neurons in the brain. Suppose that every Chinese person were all given radios connecting them to each other and controlling a body, becoming functionally identical to a mind. However, if the body that they were controlling was damaged, we would not say that all of China would experience pain. This suggests that functionalism is incorrect to reduce qualia to functional states.