Metaphysics of Mind Flashcards
Define Qualia
Intrinsic (and non-intentional) phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible
ineffable properties of mental/conscious states
Non intentional quality of conscious states (sense data)
Outline how knowledge/mary argument can be applied to functional facts
P1: If functionalism is true, having complete knowledge of all the functional facts about colour
perception would be to have complete knowledge of all the mental facts involved in colour
perception
P2: Mary knows all the functional facts involved in colour perception
P3: When Mary sees colour (eg a red rose), she learns a new fact (the fact of what it is like for
both herself and other people to see red)
P4: If Mary learns a new fact, not all mental facts can be functional facts (since Mary already
knew all of these)
C1: Therefore, not all mental fact’s are functional facts
C2: Therefore, functionalism is false.
Explain Ryle’s claim that substance dualism makes a ‘category mistake’
To make a category mistake is to assign a concept to a logical category to which it doesn’t belong
eg. someone unfamiliar with cricket asking a player who is responsible for the team spirit
the category mistake involves thinking team spirit is an operation conducted by the players in the game (batting, bowling)
team spirit isn’t in the same category as bowling, and it isn’t a specific task performed by the team, but a way of talking about how the team plays
Ryle claims sub dualism assigns mind/mental states to category’s of a thing (stuff, attribute, process) and concieves of them as non physical
Explain the philosophical zombies argument
Zombie:An exact duplicate of a person, which is functionally identical but doesn’t possess any conscious subjective quality of experience (phenomenal consciousness/Qualia)
Argues for Prop dualism, aims to disprove physicalism through zombie analogy
P1: Its concievable that there are zombies
P2: If its concievable that there are zombies, its metaphysically possible that ther are zombies
C1: therefore,it is metaphyiscally possible that there are zombies
P3 If its mentphysically possible that there are zombies then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties
C2: therefore phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properites nor supervene on physical properties
C3: therefore physicalism is fallse and property dualism is true
Response to Zombie argument: What is concievable may not be metaphyiscally possible
Targets P2 of zombie argument.
Argues that although we can concieve of zombies, they aren’t metaphysically possible
What we can concieve isn’t reliable enough to determine whats possible
If phenomenal properties are just certain physical/functional properties, it isn’t possible for zombies to exist because they have no capability of expressing phenomenal properties
If physicalism is true, it isn;t possible for a being with the same physical properties to not have a consciousness
When we think of phenomenal consciousness, we think of one and same property in different ways
What is eliminative materialism?
(25) (Is EM convincing)
The claim that the use of folk psychology radically misrepresents the true nature of human beings/inadqeute account of our nature
Eg. Being in pain isn’t an accurate representation of our nature, its actually receptors sending message to a brain
Eg. The sun setting is inaccurate: Its actually the earth shifting
Instead, concepts of folk psychology should be eliminated and replaced by accounts of neuroscience
What is the churchlands view on EM
(25) (Is EM convincing)
Folk psychology is an empirical theory (postulates mental states to explain and predict behaviour)
In order for a empirical theory to be good it must:
cannot be to many explanatory failures
Growth and promise of future development
theory must cohere with other empirical theories
-FP doesn’t fufill any of this criteria
Many aspects of mental life that folk psychology cannot explain (Mental illness, sleep, perception, learning) To explain these we need concepts that FS doesn’t have.
There has been no progress of folk psychology since its greek authors 2.5k years ago
3.Folk psychology cannot be made coherent with other scientific theories (Intentionality)
-Concludes that folk psychology doesn’t fit in with theories such as neuroscience and should be abandoned
What is the our certainty about the existence of our mental states argument
(25) Counter to churchland take on EM (Is EM convincing)
Argues EM is counter intuitive
- Argument based on introspection, there is nothing more immediately and directly ovbious than the fact that we have thoughts, desires, beliefs) Descartes even takes I think to be his first certainty
P1- When you look into your own mind you appear to be directly aware of your own mental states (belief, desire, sensation)
P2-Its absurd to deny the existence of what one is directly aware of
C- Eliminativism is wrong to deny existence of the mental states picked out by concepts of FP
Reply to certainty about existence of mental states
(25) (Is EM convincing)
-Claims objection misunderstands Churchlands claim
They do not deny the existence of psychological phenomena, accepts that phenomena we conceptualise as thinking occurs, but they deny that folk psychology is the correct theory
They claim that neuroscience provides the correct account of what these are, and we will still experience these things even if we understand it in neurophysiological terms
FP has good predictive and explanatory power
(25) arg2 (Is EM convincing)
Claims Paul criticising FP for its explanatory failures (Mental illness, sleep, learning) is unfair as FP is not intended to be a theory of mental life but it is intended for an explanation of human action, in which it is successful in doing so
Eg. If P1 is asked why P2 goes to cinema, P1 can explain by discussing P2’s love of films
In contrast, neuroscience is almost useless at explaining why P2 goes to the cinema
-In addition, to elimate concepts of belief, desires and intentional mental states also would remove parts of scientific psychology on top of FK
-We don’t have good reason to think FK will be eliminated as neuroscience develops, and Fk will continue to be a part of the most powerful explanatory theory
Reply to FP has good predictive and explanatory power
(25) (Is EM convincing)
-Argues objections are not strong: we need to know how human behavior relates to mental life, and theories (FP and Neuroscience) explaining its aspects are unsatisfactory
Folk psychological explanations of behaviour are less powerful than other scientific explanations. Only way to address this issue is through neuroscience
What is Hard behaviouralism?
Hard behaviourism claims that ‘all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss
of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily
states
we can give a complete account of the mind in purely in terms of behaviour
the mind is nothing more than behaviours, if you describe all behaviours in physical terms you describe the mind
we can translate all talk about mental states into observation statements about peoples physical states and behaviour
Explain the claims made by eliminative materialism and mind-brain identity theory
differ.
Eliminative materialism :claim that some or all mental states, as understood by folk psychology , don’t exist so folk-psychology is false or at least radically misleading.
Mind-brain type identity theory :claim that mental states can be ontologically (but
not analytically) reduced to brain states.
MBTI is ontologically reductive, EM claims that there are no phenomena that needs reducing
MBTI claims mental states as understood by FP exist, but EM claims mental states understood by FP do not exist
Descartes indivisibility argument
The mind/ body have different essential properties (thought and extension, with thought understood as consciousness and extension as taking up space)
Descartes claims this provides an argument as the mind and the body aren’t the same as they have different essential properties, unlike physical objects the mind cannot be divided and doesn’t have any parts
For example
P1-Willing, understanding, percieving are properties of the mind, which are different ways of thinking
the body is divisible into parts ( you can lose a limb)
P2-The mind cannot be divided
C-Therefore mind and body are distinct from each other
Epiphenomanlist dualism
Claims that dualism is true
Substance dualism: Mind exists and aren’t identical to bodies/parts of it (mind and body ontologically distinct)
Property dualism: At least some mental properties that are not reducible to physical properties
Mental states are caused by physical and are a biproduct of physical
Mental states are important, and are merely epiphenomena, and do not have effects nor can they cause physical events
Challenge to epiphenomanlist dualism by Introspective self knowledge
Introspective self knowledge: knowledge that is about the mind (mental states, events, what exists and occurs outside of ones mind)
Only your mind
Acquired through immediate experience, and is non inferential
The challenge
Introspective self knowledge claims that belief is caused by the mental events which it is about
But this requires mental states to be effective
Eg. If epiphenomanlism true, I cant know im in pain as it doesn’t cause any thing, and has no effects
If pain doesnt cause anything its impossible for my pain to cause me to believe im in pain
What is Functionalism
25: does functionalism give convincing acc of mental state
View that all mental states are functional states
mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles that can be multiply realised
Computational functionalism
25: does functionalism give convincing acc of mental state
argument that compares mental states to software
(Machine table: creates list of every possible combination of state and input, and assigns an output)
Eg. If machine is in State 1 and recieves Input 1, it will produce Output 1 and go into state 2
Putnam claims that mental states are simply machine table states
Eg. A mental state such as being in pain can be described by a set of states adn range of inputs within a MT
Anything that can recieve the inputs and have the same states as MT has the relevant mental state
Causal functionalism
25: does functionalism give convincing acc of mental state
Any functional state that can be described in terms of what causes it and what it causes in turn
Eg. What makes an eye is what it does: converting lightwaves into neural signals to enable an organism to navigate its enviroment
Inverted qualia argument
25: does functionalism give convincing acc of mental state
Aims to disprove functionalism by claiming phenomenal properties cannot be understood in terms of functions if we can show two people have states with identical functions but different phenomenal properties
Eg. two people learn to look at tomatos and grass, and learn to associate red with T and green with G
But the way tomatos seem to person 1 is the same way grass seems to person 2 and vice versa
This means that two people are functionally identical (the way grass looks to both people is the same as they are caused by the same input “green”
But they have different colour experience, meaning they aren’t identical intrinsically as they refer to different qualia, making functionalism false
Response to mary argument applied to functional facts
Qualia may appear to have an intrinsic nature which escapes a functional reduction, but this could be the consequence of us not being aware of functional facts
We can’t know the details presicely as we need to become apprised of our functional states
If mary knew all of these facts, she would be able to predict what it would be like to expereince colour vision herself
Hard behaviouralists cannot define mental states due to multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour
Problem: many behaviours wil be a part of the analysis of any given mental state, because of how people act
Eg. Analysis of “If S sees a spider, S runs away/hides/ prays” due to the different possibility of differing responses from different people/ same person at different times
This is multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour
Because of this, we can no longer give the necessary and sufficent conditions for having a particular mental states as they vary between people
How Natural selection poses an issue towards epiphenomenalist dualism
Natural selection: process in which a species evolves in order to gain a specific trait that will benefit them in survival
The problem:
P1-Organisms with mental states ultimately evolved from creatures that lack them
P2-For natural selection to select a feature, it must be casually potent
C1-Therefore mental states have casual powers
P3-Ephiphenomanlist dualism says mental states have no power
C2-Therefore Epiphenomalism is false
Mind is diviisble in some sense (counter 2 indivisibility arg)
25 can dualist account be defended
Argument aims to prove that the mind is divisible
For example, cases of mental illness such as multiple personality disorder can suggest the mind can be divided
Some parts of a persons mind are unable to communicate with other parts, which makes it divisible
Reply to Mind is divisible in some sense
25 can dualist account be defended
The body is spatially divisible, the mind is only functionally divisible
The different parts of the mind do different things, but aren’t in a different spatial location
This means that the argument that mind and body are different things still stands
Mary knowledge argument
25 can dualist account be defended
P1)M ary is a colour scientist that knows all the physical info about colour experience
P2)She lives in a black and white room and has access to the world via black and white media
P3)When she sees the colour red, she learns something new (what it’s like to experience colour)
C1)Therefore not all facts are physical facts, phenomenal properties are not physical making physicalism false
Mary gains aquaintance knowledge rather than new propersiitonal
25 can dualist account be defended
Acquaintance knowledge: knowledge gained through perceptual/sensational experience
-She gains a different kind of knowledge, acquaintance (Direct awareness of something in experience)
-For example suppose seeing red is a physical property of the visual experience
-Mary can be aware of this physical property, but she isn’t actually acquainted with it (She doesn’t have direct knowledge as she hasn’t experienced it herself
-When she sees red, then it becomes acquainted in her mind
-She gains new knowledge, but she hasn’t learned any new facts as she knows about it before leaving the room
