MetaEthics 2

Question 0

Mind independent?

Answer 0

Y: anti-realist
N: realist

Question 1

Map of meta ethics

Answer 1

Is the status of moral claims dependent on our beliefs about them

Question 2

Anti-realist

Answer 2

Rejection of idea things=intrinsic value indep of human mind

Question 3

Realist

Answer 3

Ethical concepts = value in themselves

Ethical facts exist = indep of human mind

Question 4

Anti-realist:

Beliefs expressed true sometimes?

Answer 4

Y: beliefs made true by natural properties?
Y: moral naturalism (reductive/ non reductive)
N: moral non-naturalism–> intuitionism (Moore) or divine command theory
N: error theory

Question 5

Realist: expresses beliefs?

Answer 5

Y: constructivism
N: non cognitivism (emotivism or prescriptivism)

Question 6

Moral naturalism

Answer 6

Look at basis found in nature
Experiences/feelings
Derives ethics from sensory experiences (natural law)

Question 7

Moral non naturalism

Answer 7

Moral statements not reducible to any set of non moral features

Question 8

Constructivism

Answer 8

Moral truths exist and ethical statements can be verifies empirically =objective

Question 9

Non-cognitivism

Answer 9

M truths matters of personal choice and don’t exist outside human experiences
Subjective

Question 10

Emotivism def

Answer 10

Statements express emotions

Ayer

Question 11

Prescriptivism def

Answer 11

M statements order all to act upon it
Imperatives
Hate

Question 12

Emotivism

Answer 12

Ayer:
meaning of prop is its means of verification
True statement= verifiable (by experience/trivially true)
Moral statements only express speakers feelings
Ethical talk not trivially true
Boo-hooray theory

Question 13

Prescriptivism: does our moral talk just refer to ourselves?

Answer 13

Hare: universal prescriptivism

- moral statements order everyone to follow (Don’t kill)

Question 14

Prescriptivism and Kant

Answer 14

Kants categorical imperative bind all rational beings

Question 15

Prescriptivism and consquentialism

Answer 15

Pettit concerned w universal prescription

= same if consq think max pleasure commands everything

Question 16

Frege-Geach problem

Answer 16

By subscribing to expressivism, one must accept meaning of ‘it is wrong to tell lies’ is diff from that part in conditional “if it is wrong to tell lies, them it is wrong to get your little brother to lie”
Expressivism= inadequate explanation for moral language

Question 17

Quasi-realism –> Simon Blackburn

Answer 17

Non cognitivists must either abandon basic reasoning about morality or find a way to use non cognitive moral vocab as if it was truth-functional

Human projectionism: hare: we project our attitudes about world onto our experience of it
- we see world as if it’s morally charged (drowning child=-ve emotions)

Question 18

Why be a realist

Answer 18

Moral claims mean exactly what they seem to mean
Accounts for degree of agreement and convergence in moral attitudes
Inference to best explanation
-most plausible reason for success of our theories predictions

Question 19

What kind of things are the objective moral values?

Natural objects and properties

Answer 19

-railton’s reductive naturalism
x is good for me if an ideally rational and fully informed version of me would want me to have it
We evolve towards favouring the objective good
Moral good is not from individual but social view

Question 20

Problems with railton’s reductive naturalism

Answer 20

1) my ideal self is not myself-motivating?
2) free-riding- pursuit of individual good may encourage individuals to evolve away from social/moral goodness

-R’s solution: theory is about what is good not moral conduct

Question 21

Divine command theories

Answer 21

An actions status is morally good is equivalent to whether it is commanded by God
-but DCT theories do t imply atheists can’t talk/believe in right/wrong