metaethics Flashcards
what is moral realism?
there are mind-independent mora properties and facts
what is moral anti-realism?
there is no such thing as mind-independent moral properties or moral facts
what is cognitivism?
moral judgements express cognitive mental states i.e. beliefs that can be true or false (truth-apt)
what is non-cognitvism?
moral judgements express non-cognitive mental states which are not capable of being true or false
what are the moral realist theories?
- naturalism (cognitivist) = murder is wrong is true if the act of murder has the natural property of wrongness (because it causes pain which is a natural property)
- non-naturalism (cognitivist) = murder is wrong is true if the act of murdre has the non-natural property of wrongness
what are the moral anti-realist theories?
- error theory (cognitivist) = murder is wrong is false because the property of wrongness does not exist (murder is good is also false because the property of goodness doesn’t exist either)
- emotivism (non-cognitivst) = murder is wrong just means BOO MURDER and so is not capable of being truth apt
- prescriptivism = murder is wrong means don’t murder people and so is not capable of being truth apt
what does moral realism think about moral judgements?
murder is wrong is either true or false in the same way that ‘grass is green’ is true
- murder has the (mind-independent) property of wrongness in the same way grass has the property of greeness
- moral naturalism says moral properties are natural
- moral non-naturalism says moral properties are non-natural (non-physical not supernatural)
what is moral naturalism?
moral naturalism says that moral properties exist and that these moral properties are natural (physical) properties - they can be reduced to natural properties
what is utilitarian moral naturalism?
utilitarianism is the most obvious example of moral naturalism
- Mill and Bentham argue that good can be reduced to pleasure and bad can be reduced to pain
- pain and pleasure are natural properties
what are the key points of Mill’s metaethical argument?
- peope desire their own happiness, so individual happiness is desirable
- this is reason to believe the general happiness is desirable
- the fact that the general happiness is desirable is the only possible proof we could ive that the general happiness is good
- further, happiness is the only good, because all other values are just part of what makes us happy
what is virtue ethics moral naturalism?
virtue ethics is a form of moral naturalism
- Aristotle’s discussion of ergon can be interpreted as a discussion of natural facts about human beings
- we could argue that it is a natural fact that the function of human beings is to use reason just like the function of a knife is to cut things
there is nothing non-natural claiming that the function of a knife is to cut things
what is moral non-naturalism?
moral non-naturalism says moral properties exist and that they are non-natural properties
- whereas moral naturalism says moral properties can be reduced to natural properties, non-naturalism says that moral properties are basic and cannot be reduced to anything simplier.
- these basic moral properties exist independently of our minds
what does Moore argue for?
he argues for moral non-naturalism
- he begins with criticisms of moral-naturalism with the naturalistic fallacy and the open question argument
- he then uses intuitionism
what is the naturalistic fallacy?
Moore would say it is a fallacy to conclude that drining beer is good from the fact that drinking beer is PLEASURABLE because goodness and pleasure are two different kinds of properties; good is a moral property, whereas pleasure is a natural property.
- they are not the same thing
Moore argues that moral properties such as GOOD and BAD cannot be reduced to natural properties - they cannot be reduced at all because they are basic
(response to utilitarian moral naturalism)
what is Moore’s open question argument?
this is an argument against moral naturalism
- Moore argues that it is an open qestion whether pleasure and good are the same thing:
- closed question: ‘ is good good’ or ‘is pleasure pleasure’
- open question: ‘ is pleasure good’
Moore argues that if goodness and pleasure really were the same thing it would be a closed question to ask is pleasure good
- Moore is arguing that if naturalism was true and good meant the same thing as pleasure, it wouldn’t make sense to ask is pleasure good because it would be like asking is pleasure pleasure
what is a response to the open question argument?
Moore’s argument here clearly doesn’t work because there are plenty of examples where two things are in fact the same thing but it is still an open question whether they are
- water an H2O refer to the same thing, but it is still an open question to ask is water H20
what is intuitionism?
intuitionism is Moore’s answer to the question of how we acquire knowledge of non-natural properties
- naturalism can explain our knowledge of moral properties as similar to knowledge of other natural properties.
- there is nothing spooky about how we know torturing people causes pain because pain is a natural property (if pain is bad, then there is nothing spooky about how we can know tortuing people is bad so we have a natural explanation for knowledge) BUT non-naturalism cannot make this same move because non-natural properties are not like physical properteis and so we cannot explain knowledge
how does intuitionism answer the question of how knowledge is gained?
he argues that we can directly reflect on the truth of moral judgements such as murder is wrong
- the truth or falsehood of such moral judgements is said to be self evident because of this intuition
what is a response to intuitionism?
Mackie rejects Moore’s intuitionism specifically - he says it is a lame answer to the question of how wer acquire knowledge of moral properties because it doesn’t really explain anything
Mackie argues that to say we acquire knowledge of moral properties via intuition is just to say it is different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else
what is error theory?
error theory says that when we make moral judgements we express cognitive (true or false) beleifs about the external worlds
- however, because error theory claims that moral properties don’t exist, all these moral judgements are false
it is cognitivist and antirealist
what does murder is wrong express for error theory?
murder is wrong expresses a cognitive belief that murder has the property of wrongness BUT wrongness doesn’t exist and so the statement is false
what are the arguments the Mackie used for error theory?
- arguments for cognitivism
- arguments for relativity
what is the argument for cognitivism?
Mackie begins by defending a cognitivist interpretation of moral language and gives various examples to suggest that moral discussion is cognitivst
- Mackie argues that moral philosophy throughour history has tended to assume objective moral values
Plato didn;t argue that morality was subjective of a matter of feeling and they argued that certain moral claims are objectively true or false
what are the two arguments for anti-realism?
- argument from relativity
- arguments from queerness
what is the argument from relativity?
this points out the variation in moral beliefs between cultures:
- some cultures are polygamous, other cultures think this is wrong
- some cultures think eating animals is wrong, other cultures eat those animals
if moral realism is correct, there would be on objectively correct answer to all of these issues, but there is so much disagreement on them.
- every culture agrees that 1+1=2
these disagreements can be explained in one of two ways:
1) one culture has discovered objective moral reality while the others hasn’t
2) each culture has different conditions and a different way of life and has developed their own moral beliefs in response to that
Mackie argued that number 2 is more plausible
what are the arguments from queerness?
mackie is attacking the idea of non-natural moral properties and he says non-natural moral properties would be:
- metaphysically queer
- epistemically queer
what is metaphysical queerness?
if mind-independent moral properties exist, they would need to have intrinsic prescriptivity
- for example, good things would need to somehow have to-be-doneness built into them and bad things would have not-to-be doneness built into them
what is epistemical queerness?
if mind-independent moral properties exist, then it is a total mystery how we would acquire knowledge of them.
- whereas, natural knowledge can be explained naturally, moral knowledge can’t be explained in the same way and instead requires spooky hypotheses such as Moore’s intuitionism
what would moral properties be like metaphysically?
moral properties would be unlike any other properteis. if we are to believe that certain actions have the mind-independent property of being good then those actions must have a TO-BE-DONENESS built into them
- Mackie asks how this is possible as it seems impossible to make sense of how ordinary, natural properties of the world could relat to subjective human motivations
how do moral properties relate to natural ones?
how does the natural fact that someone stole something relate to the moral fact that they did something wrong
- imagine someone stealing from a shop
- imagine someone stealing from a shop and that this action has the property of wrongness
the second scenario has the property of wrongness added to it.
what would moral properties be like epistemically?
epistemically moral properties would also be weird - it’s a mystery how we could know about them
- whereas knowledge of natural properties and facts can be explained naturally, knowledge of moral properties seems somehow spooky
how do we know that stealing is wrong - do we SEE wrongness
what are the responses to error theory?
- moral naturalism
- intuitionism
- non-cognitivism
- moral nihilism
- moral progress
what is emotivism?
moral judgements express feelings and emotions of approval and disapproval
- the BOO!HURRAH! theory
murder is wrong = boo murder
what is the verification principle?
cognitive (meaningful) statements must be either:
- an analytic truth (a triangle has three sides)
- empirically verifiable (water boils at 100c)
any statements that do not fit either of these descriptions is non-cognitive (meaningless) according to the verification principle
why does ayer think that moral judgements fail the verification principle?
1) murder is wrong is not an analytic truth because there is not logical contradiction in the statement ‘murder is not wrong’
2) ayer also argues that murder is wrong is not empirically verifiable both naturalist and non-naturalist interpretations
how is murder is wrong not empirically verifiable on the naturalist interpretation?
naturalism would argue that we could prove that murder causes pain, anger… but ayer argues that this is not the same as proving murder is wrong
- ayer rejects naturalism: we can empirically verify that murder causes pain but we cannot empirically verify that murder is wrong
how is murder is wrong not empirically verifiable on the non-naturalist interpretation?
ayer also argues that there is no way to empirically verify the presence of non-natural properties
- even if the act of murder did possess the non-natural property of wrongness, how could we ever prove this because we can’t see or test for the non-natural properties and so their existence is not empirically verifiable
what is the response to the verification principle that it fails it’s own test?
the claim that a statement is only meaningful if it is analytic or empirically verifiable itself is neither an analytic truth or empirically verifiable.
- Ayer could respond that the verification principle was never intended as an empirical hypothesis or typical cognitive statement but is a definition of what a meaningful/cognitive statement is
what is the response to the verification principle that we accept the terms?
we can accept the verification principle as the criteria for cognitive/meaningful statements and argue that moral judgements are either analytically true or empirically verifiable
what is hume’s fork?
there are two types of judgements of reason:
- relations of ideas
- matters of fact
a judgement of reason is effectively the same thing as a cognitive judgement and so hume is saying that anything that is not a judgement of reason is a non-cognitive statement
why are statements that are not judgements of reason non-cognitive?
- they are not relations of ideas - if we deny murder is wrong there is not a contradiction and so it cannot be a relation of ideas
- moral judgements are not matters of facts either - matters of fact are true in virtue of experience, but here, hume is saying we have no experience of wrongness in the object itself but the only experience we have is of certain attitudes or feelings within ourselves
what is ayer’s argument ppcs?
p1) there are only two types of judgements of reason
p1a) relations of ideas (analytic truths)
p1b) matters of fact (empirically verifiable)
p2) moral judgements are not relations of ideas
p3) moral judgements are not matters of fact
c) therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason (non-cognitive)
what is the response to hume’s fork?
we can either reject the fork itself, or accept the fork and argue that moral judgements are either relatoins of ideas or matters of fact
how do moral judgements motivate actions?
judgements of reason don’t motivate us to act in any way
- my belief that today is monday doesn’t motivate me to act in any way - it is simply a belief that i have
but my desire not to be late to monday’s lesson might motivate me to leave the house and walk to class
- moral judgements seem more like the walking to class example
- my belief that murder is wrong will motivate me not to murder
what is hume’s ppc argument for moral judgements motivating action?
p1) moral judgements motivate action
p2) judgements of reason cannot motivate action
c) therefore, moral judgements are not judgements of reason
- if they are not judgements of reason, then they are non-cognitive judgements
what is a response to the argument that moral judgements motivate actions?
we can reject hume’s claim that moral judgements motivate action
- i could argue that my COGNITIVE belief that murder is wrong does not (by itself) motivate me to act in any particular way but it is my DESIRE to be a good person that motivates me not to murder people
what is the is-ought problem?
hume makes a distinction between two types of claim: statements about what is and statements about what ought
- claims about what is are factual claims about what is the case e.g. that is an act of torture
- claims about what ought to be are value judgements about what is good and bad e.g. ought not to torture
why does hume argue there is a gap between is and ought?
you cannot derive ought statements like ‘you ought to not torture’ from statements about what is such as ‘that is an act of torture’
- you cannot argue from is to ought because they are two completely different claims
how does the is ought distinction support non-cognitivism?
we might argue that the reason we cannot derive ought statements from is statements is because the former type of statement is non-cognitive while the latter is cognitive
- is statements like ‘smith murdered jones’ are capable of being true or false
- ought statements like ‘smith shouldn’t have done that’ are expressions of emotion that are not capable of being true or false
what is a response to the is ought problem?
we may respond that there are examples of valid moral reasoning that suggest you can derive value judgements from factual judgements.
p1) if murder is wrong, then you shouldn’t murder people
p2) murder is wrong
c) therefore, you shouldn’t murder people
what is presciptivism?
says moral judgements express prescripitive instructions that aim to guide behaviour
- the statement shut the door is neither true or false but is an instruction and thus they are non-cognitive statements
what did Hare argue about emotivism?
he agrees with emotivism but it misses the force of moral judgements - they do express emotions but the main point is to guide conduct.
- stealing is wrong = don’t steal
what does hare argue about the meaning of terms good and bad?
hare argues that the meaning of the words good, bad, right and wrong is to commend or criticise
- a good strawberry might reduce its meaning to sweet and juicy but this is not the only thing i mean because then it would be a good strawberry BECAUSE it is sweet and juicy
- but that would lead to this is a sweet and juicy strawberry BECAUSE it is sweet and juicy
according to hare good strawberry describes and also commends the strawberry.
what must we have to commend or criticise something?
we must assume a set of standards
- the strawberry has the standards sweet and juicy
however, these standards are not objective - i am assuming that is what good means for strawberries because there are no facts i can point to that determine the set of standards are correct or incorrect
what is moral argument and reasoning as an objection to non-cognitivism?
non-cognitivism is often at odds with how we typically use moral judgements because we often use them as a part of moral reasoning:
1) if murder is wrong, then paying to have someone murdered is wrong
2) murder is wrong
3) paying to have someone murdered is wrong
this seems right but if non-cognitivism is correct it is hard to see how this is a valid argument because of how murder is wrong changes between 1 and 2
2) murder is wrong is by itself and so should be understood as a non-cognitive statement
1) murder is wrong is presented as a cognitive statement, as something that if true implies something else
how is moral reasoning a problem for non-cognitivism?
people regulary embed moral judgements in statements like in p1 above - if murder is wrong then… - but if non-cognitivism is correct, it’s hard to make sense of why people do this
- if moral statements were neither true or false then why would they be used like this.
what is moral nihilism as an objection to moral anti-realism?
if anti-realism is true, it can be argued that his leads to moral nihilism: the vies that no actions are INHERENTLY wrong or right
- moral anti-realism means there is nothing true about moral judgements such as murder is wrong which raises the question of why anyone should bother to be moral at all
what is the response to moral nihilism that there are non-cognitive reasons to be moral?
non-cognitivists argue that just because there is no inherent right or wrong, people still have moral attitudes and feelings
- the realisation that moral values are just expressions of feelings doesn’t mean we should stop being moral
what is the response to moral nihilism that there are practical reasons to be moral?
cognitivist and anti-realist theories have a harder time responding but could respond by accepting moral nihilism and arguing that just because it is undesirable doesn’t make error theory any less true
what is the response to moral nihilism that who cares?
the anti-realist could accept that moral anti-realism leads to nihilism and so what - we may not want nihilism to be true but doesn’t mean that it is false
what is the objection of moral progress?
our moral values have changed over time
- it used to be morally acceptable to keep slaves in the 1700s but is not now
p1) if moral anti-realism is true, then there would be no moral progress
p2) but there has been moral progress
c) therefore, moral anti realism is false
what is an objection to moral progress?
this argument assumes the conclusion in it’s premises
- to say there has been moral progress asusmes that moral anti-realism is false - it assumes there are objective moral facts against which we can say our moral knowledge has progressed.
but why should anti-realists accept that there’s been objective moral progress, when he doesn’t accept the existence of objective morality in the first place
