Meta-ethics - Arguments Flashcards
Give Moore’s argument that good is a simple notion.
Who:
Moore
What:
Good is a simple notion since it cannot be further defined. More specifically, by treating good as a complex notion and attempting to define it into simpler notions it has become apparent through our failed attempts that good cannot be defined further without contraversy and therefore must be a simple notion.
Why:
1) Our attempts to define good have failed.
This can be demonstrated to be plausible through the very discussion of meta-ethics; if we were able to define good then a consensus would have been reached on the matter of what good is and the meta-ethical problem would have been solved. Since meta-ethical discussions still have not reached a consensus, our attempts to define good have failed.
2) If 1) then good is a simple notion.
This is plausible through assuming the negation. If good were a complex notion we would have been able to define good in a way where there would be a universally agreed upon definition for good - in the same way there is an agreed definition for the cardinal points.
3) Thus, good is a simple notion.
Give the argument that good is immediately knowable.
Who:
Moore
What:
Good is immediately knowable through our intuition. More specifically, we can observe that other simple notions, such as the colour yellow, are immediately knowable to us - you intuit something is yellow just by looking at it. Likewise, we can apply that logic to argue that good is immediately knowable through the same faculty of intution.
Why:
1) It is often obvious when something is good.
This is plausible through example. When you hear that there was a charity group in town fundraising for breast cancer research you don’t need to perform an internal calculus to decide whether fundraising for charitable causes is good - it is obviously good.
2) If 1) then good is immediately knowable.
This is plausible by considering other immediately knowable things. Yellow, for example, is considered a simple notion that is immediately knowable through intuition and it is often obvious whether something is yellow. Likewise, if it is often obvious that something is good we should be able to apply the same logic to say that good is also an immediately knowable simple notion.
3) Thus, good is immediately knowable.
Give Prichards argument for obligation.
Who:
Prichard
What:
We intuit the obligation to do moral things. More specifically, in the same way that we intuit that something is good because good is a simple notion that is immediately knowable, we also intuit the urge to do that moral action - an obligation.
Why:
In a nutshell, moral duty is indescribable and irreducible - a simple notion that is immediately knowable - and therefore in the same we intuit other simple notions such as yellow we also intuit obligation.
Give the argument through Ayer’s verification principle on ethical language.
Who:
Ayer
What:
Ethical language does not pass the verification principle and is therefore literally meaningless. More specifically, the verification principle posits that for something to be literally meaningless it must be either an analytical statement or an empirically verifiable claim - ethical language is neither and therefore it is literally meaningless.
Why:
1) The verification principle is a good principle of meaning.
This is plausible because it agrees with our intuitions of meaning. For example, the verification principle would claim that “Puppy’s are baby dogs” is literally meaningful since it is analytic - truth by definition of the word ‘puppy’. This judgement agrees with our intuitions.
2) If 1) then ethical language is literally meaningless.
This is plausible since ethical language is not truth by definition - therefore it is not analytical - and ethical language is not empirically verifiable. As such, the judgement of the verification principle which we know is plausible through the first premise concludes that ethical language is meaningless.
3) Thus, ethical language is meaningless.
Give Hume’s argument from motivation and emotion.
Who:
Hume
What:
Ethical judgements are simply expressions of emotion. More specifically, ethical judgements motivate us to do actions - we are motivated to do good things by the sheer judgement that it is a good thing to do. As such, ethical judgement is an expression of emotion.
Why:
1) All motivation comes from emotion.
This is plausible since by example we see that we are motivated by emotional urges to act. For example, we experience the urge to eat because of the discomfort caused by hunger. This demonstrates that we are motivated to eat because of the emotion caused by discomfort from hunger.
2) if 1) then ethical judgements express emotion.
This is plausible since through example we see that ethical judgements motivate us. For example, we often donate to charity as the notion “charity is good” gives us the urge to be charitable - this demonstrates that ethical judgements express emotion.
3) Thus, ethical judgements express emotion.
Give the argument of naturalism from science.
Who:
Scientists
What:
Science has the explanatory power to explain what good. More specifically, there have been many phenomena in the past that we were unable to explain once and yet science discovers an answer. Likewise, even though science hasn’t explained good yet we can rest assured that science has the capability to one day explain what good is.
Why:
1) Everything can be known through science.
This is plausible through many examples. People didn’t understand why we had reflexes, such as moving our hand away from something very hot, but through science we know that electrical impulses go from our sensory neurons straight to the motor neurons, bypassing the brain in what is known as a reflex action. As such, it is evident that even stuff we cannot initially explain may over time be explained through science.
2) If 1) then moral properties can be known through science.
This is plausible as science has been demonstrated to have the explanatory power to do so - it is simply a matter of time before we are able to explain the complex property of good. The argument can be made that we are narrowing on an answer, such as good being maximal utility according to hedonic naturalism.
3) Thus, moral properties can be known through science.
Give Phillipa Foot’s argument for aristotelean naturalism.
Who:
Foot
What:
Moral facts are simply what helps bring us to our telos and achieve eudaimonia. More specifically, we can observe aposteriori what helps bring us to our telos. This can be demonstrated with the analogy of an oak tree, which highlights that we can see what is good for the oak tree - that which brings it to its telos.
Why:
1) What is good for a human is a natural property.
This is plausible as demonstrated with the analogy of an oak tree. We can observe which things help the oak tree grow and fulfill its purpose, for example we will see the tree grow when supplemented with nutrients and recieving ample sunlight. Likewise, we can observe what things help humans grow and fulfill our purpose and help us achieve eudaimonia - rational and morally lead lives through being virtuous.
2) if 1) then moral goodness is natural property.
This is obviously plausible since moral goodness would be good for a human and according to the logic of the first premise, that would also make it a natural property.
3) Thus moral goodness is a natural property.
Give Moore’s open question argument [INCOMPLETE]
Who:
Moore
What:
A naturalist definition of good cannot be true since to ask if it is would be an open question. More specifically, Moore draws a distinction between open and closed questions - closed questions are obvious through definition and thus make no sense, whereas open questions are not obviously answered through definition. Since we can ask if good is what helps us achieve eudaimonia and it is an open question, naturalism must be wrong.
Why:
In a nutshell,
