meta ethics Flashcards
what is cognitivism ?
moral statements have the capacity to be true or false
what is non-cognitivism?
moral statements do not have the capacity to be true or false
what is realism?
morality is about facts that can be verified in the world
what is anti realism?
morality is about values which aren’t objective and can’t be verified in the world?
outline the argument for error theory using the conceptual truth and substantive claim
conceptual truth : if agents are required to A in C , then there is a requirement of rationality for all agents to A in C.
Substantive claim: there is no requirement for all agents to A in C as there is clear evidence of moral cultural diversity e.g. many different religions, slavery used to be considered morally sound etc…
C - agents are not morally required to A in C
how might Aristotle be used to reply to the substantive claim?
what argument could you use to reply to this?
Aristotelian ideas of cardinal virtues remain relatively unchanging over time - e.g. honesty and loyalty - fundamental idea of morality remains, so it could be argued that there is a moral requirement of agents to live in line with the cardinal virtues
reply - queerness
how might moral instinct be used to reply to the substantive claim?
response?
most of us have the common moral instinct that infanticide is wrong. despite minority mistreatment, the fact that most of us can categorise this as ‘mistreatment’ shows at least a slight unity against immoral behaviour - leans towards moral realism.
not enough to justify a purely objective morality.
why might it seem that cognitive -realism is correct in appeal to realising you were wrong?
what argument could you use to reply to this?
the idea of ‘making a moral mistake’ e.g. realising it was wrong of you to do x, points to the idea of an objective morality.
reply - queerness
what claim does mackie’s queerness defend?
substantive claim
how is mackie a cognitivist- anti-realist?
moral statements make claims about the world that aim to be true, but because of a fundamental error, that there is nothing in the world to which these statements match up, they fail and are false
what is mackie’s arguments from epistemological queerness? and argument from metaphysical queerness?
epistemological queerness -
1 - if there exists objective moral properties this must be known to us somehow
2 - objective moral facts would be epistemologically queer - not like other things that exist. this is because they cannot be known to us by known methods of gaining knowledge - deduction, hume’s copy principle
3 to say that the objective can be planted in us through an unknown method is unsatisfactory - paralleling Descartes’ unverifiability.
c there cannot be mind- independent moral facts
Metaphysical queerness
1 - if objective moral facts exist, then they must exist in the world somehow
2 - if they did exist, these objective moral facts would be metaphysically queer - not like other things that exist as moral facts are ACTION-GUIDING, when descriptions of the world are not
3- only mind dependent properties of the world can motivate us to act -e.g. desires
c- there cannot be mind independent facts
how might you use religious doctrine to reply to epistemological queerness ?
god put objective morality in your head
what is Brink’s reply to mackie’s metaphysical queerness arguments?
1-Mackie’s argument assumes internalism: the view that moral facts effect our actions
2- Externalists deny this view - the existence of moral facts may not affect our actions (an amoralist standpoint), e.g. believing murder is wrong may not mean we don’t commit it
3 if you refute internalism and favour externalism, you are not committed to saying that moral facts must be action-guiding.
what is the FT reply to Brink’s response to Mackie?
what does Garner say in response to Brink’s criticism of Mackie?
if you really believed in a moral fact, then it would affect your actions
Garner - distinguishs between motivating and normative reasons. normative reasons are subconscious reasons for our actions that we do not realize. if moral facts even give normative reason to act, then they are metaphysically queer and mackie’s argument works
what is the action guiding argument? what arguments can this be used to support?
1 - internalism is true :moral judgements are action guiding
2 - the humean view of reasons: beliefs alone can never motivate action - you need desire :)
c- so judgements are not beliefs
reply - Nagel - desires are a part of the reasoning process, so reason is enough to motivate us
response - mackie’s queerness.
can be used to support emotivism and mackie.
