meta ethics 3 and 5 markers Flashcards
what is moral realism (3)
- The view that ‘ethical language makes claims about mind-independent reality that are true’.
- The view that moral judgements can be true (or false), and they are made true (or false) by something in the real world outside our (human) attitudes/opinions.
what is naturalism (3)
ethical naturalists claim that ethical properties/facts are reducible/identical to (non-ethical) natural/physical properties/facts
or
moral judgements are based on our experience of the empirical world and that they describe the world
thus moral judgements can be reduced to non-moral facts about the world
what is non naturalism
ethical non-naturalists claim that ethical properties are not reducible/not identical to (nonethical) natural properties/facts
or
argument that moral terms such as ‘goodness’ are not natural properties but still exist as intuitions
moral properties aren’t natural properties
what is the difference between naturalism and non naturalism (5)
- naturalism refers to moral judgements being based on our experiences of the empirical world and that they describe the world, for example, saying ‘good’ can be reduced to pleasure, and ‘bad’ can be reduced to ‘pain.’ therefore, moral judgements can be reduced to non-moral, natural facts about the world
- on the other hand, moral naturalism is the argument that moral terms such as ‘goodness’ are not natural properties but still exist as intuitions. therefore, moral properties aren’t natural properties
outline the open question argument and then naturalistic fallacy (5)
it supports intuitionism
moral properties cant be reduced to non-moral properties
moral properties are of its kind
-oqa canty be decided by the meaning of a concept, but cqa can
p1: for all concepts in the place of x (it is x, but is it morally good?) that is an open question
p2 no other concept has the same meaning as that concept
p3 property of moral goodness is neither identical or reducible to other property
what is intuitionism (3)
a form of cognitivism that holds that moral statements can be known to be true or false immediately through a kind of rational intuition
explain why utilitarianism is a realist theory (5)
explain why virtue ethics is a realist meta ethical theory (5)
outline the distinction between cognitivism and non cognitivism about ethical language (5)
moral cognitivism is the view that moral judgements:
- are factual/descriptive claims
- express propositions
- say something that is truth-apt
- express beliefs with propositional content
moral non-cognitivism is the view that moral judgements:
- are not factual/descriptive claims
- do not express propositions
- do not say something that is truth-apt
- do not express beliefs
define cognitivism in ethics (3)
cognitivism argues that moral statements are truth apt: they express propositions that can be true or false
define non cognitivism in ethics (3)
ethicall entences are neither true or false, that is, they lack truth value: they are not truth apt
outline hume’s fork (5)
outline ayer’s verification principle (5)
explain hume’s argument that moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us (5)
p1: beliefs, by themselves, never motivate us to act (and nor do they necessarily cause any other states that do)
p2: sincere moral judgements (e.g lying is wrong) by themselves motivate us (to some extent) towards actions ( or necessarily cause another state that does )
c1; moral judgements are no (or at least do not express) beliefs
- beliefs are statements about the world that may be true/false. but knowing whther something is true or not doesn’t make us take action by itself. something else drives us to action- our emotions
explain how hume’s is-ought gap raises an issue with moral realism (5)
p1: judgments of reason describe what is the case
p2: judgements of value prescribe what ought to be the case
p3: judgements of reason and value are: entirely different from each other- there’s a gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’
C: you cannot draw conclusions about value (ought) based on premises about reason ‘is’ - you can’t derive an ought from an is
— this is evidence for non-cog. the reason we can is because the former type of the statement is non-cog. ‘is’ are capable of being true/false whereas ‘ought statements aren’t - THEY EXPRESS EMOTIONSSSSS SS SIUDWIWDBIBW
what is anti-realism (3)
- the view that there are no mind-independent moral properties/facts
- the view that there are no objective moral facts/properties
- the view that moral properties/facts do exist but are mind-dependent
what is the naturalistic fallacy (3)
- an informal logical fallacy which argues that is something is ‘natural’ it must be good
- arguments that used nature, or natural terms like ‘pleasant’ ‘satisfying’ or ‘healthy’ to make ethical claims, are unsound
- Moore argued that it is a mistake to try to define the concept “good” in terms of some natural property. Defining the concept “good,” Moore argued, is impossible since it is a simple concept; a concept that cannot be defined in terms of any other concept.
what is the is-ought gap (3)
- a fallacy that attempt to make conclusion about the way that things should be based on the evidence about the way things are.
- however, there is no logical connection between facts about the world and ethical claims
what is error theory (3)
- the error theorist is a cognitivist: maintaining that moral judgement consists of beliefs and assertions. however the error theorist thinks that these beliefs and assertions are never true
- moral judgements are never true because the properties that would be necessary to render them true - properties like moral wrongness, moral goodness, virtue, evil etc - simply don’t exist
what is emotivism (3)
- non cognitivist argument: the view that moral judgements do not express beliefs - i.e the view that moral judgements are not assertions
- when we make a moral judgement we are expressing certain feelings, such as approval or disapproval
what is prescriptivism (3)
- non cognitivist argument: the view that moral judgements do not express beliefs - i.e the view that moral judgements are not assertions
— moral judgements are really veiled commands whose true meaning should be captured using the imperative mood: someone who says ‘stealing is morally wrong!’ is really saying something like ‘do not steal!’. hare restricted this to commands that one is willing to universalise
what is the verification principle (3)
a proposition is meaningful if and only if either:
- it is analytically true or false
or
- its truth or falsity can be empirically verified (it is factually meaningful)
what is moral nihilism (3)
- nihilists assert that there are no moral values, principles, truths
- we cannot know moral realities for the very simple reason that there is nothing to know
- that means we have no moral duties, commitments or obligations. there are no values worth defending
