Meta-Ethics Flashcards

1
Q

What are the arguments for: ‘Evolutionary forces have played a large role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes.’ Assuming this is true, how should it change how we think about ethics?

A
  1. Street’s Darwinian Argument
  2. Against Street’s Constructivism
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2
Q

What is Street arguing against?

A

Moral Realism

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3
Q

What is Realism?

A

That there are at least some normative truths that are true independently of facts about any (real or fictional) person’s (actual or hypothetical) attitudes towards them.

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4
Q

What distinction can we make between Realism and Anti-Realism?

A

Realism as stance-independent
Anti-Realism as stance-dependent

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5
Q

What is Street’s argument against Realism?

A
  1. Natural selection has influenced our normative judgements.
  2. Either it pushed us to these judgements because theya re true, or it pushed us to them for another reason.
  3. If not because they are true (and Realism being true), then we get normative scepticism.
  4. It is highly unlikely that they were naturally selected because those judgements are true.
  5. So, if the cognitivist wants to avoid normative scepticism, she should not be Realist.
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6
Q

Why would it be highly unlikely that our normative judgements were selected because they are true?

A
  • It would need to be a near miracle.
  • This assumes that unless the causal explanation for a belief is that it is true then it is unlikely to be true (Is this appealing?).
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7
Q

What are the different accounts of why we got the normative judgements we do, and which one does Street endorse?

A

Adaptive Link Account: that we have our normative beliefs because they aid us in passing on our genes (Street).

Truth-Tracking Account: that we have our normative beliefs because they are true.

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8
Q
A
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9
Q

What is Scanlon’s objection to Street’s Constructivism?

A

Even if Street is correct about evolutionary pressures, this does not entail Constructivism

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10
Q

How does Street’s argument not entail Constructivism according to Scanlon?

A

Street assumes that the Adaptive Link Account and the Truth-Tracking Account are incompatible.
- But this needn’t be the case.

  • Poison instincts are selected (by EPs) because they help pass on genes.
  • Poison instincts are selected because they track truths.

This does not seem to be competing.

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11
Q

What is a potential issue with the Adaptive Link Account and Truth-Tracking Account being compatible?

A

What if they come to differing conclusions?
- Which one do we stick with?
- It seems as though we would stick with the Adaptive Link Account.

What if tracking moral truths does not help with passing on our genes?
- Whilst having a standard of behaviour has helped us evolutionarily, it doesn’t necessarily seem as though it would impact whether these were true or not.
- The function of morality in our evolutionary progress would seem to be the same.

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12
Q

Why would we prefer the Adaptive Link Account over the Truth Tracking Account?

A

It is more parsimonious.
- We are committed according to our best science.
- Science does not contain moral truths.
- Therefore we should accept the Adaptive Link Account.

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13
Q

What is Scanlon’s response to the prioritisation of science?

A

This privilaging is unjustified.
- Why should we have to explain normative truths in terms of science?
- We do not accept the scientific standards for maths, why with morals?

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14
Q

What is the issue with Scanlon’s comparison between morality and maths?

A

It doesn’t seem as though maths and morality are similar enough.
- According to Scanlon, morality is not purely deductive, maths is.
- We verify them differently
- Maths is descriptive and explanatory, morality is normative.

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15
Q

What is your conclusion for: ‘Evolutionary forces have played a large role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes.’ Assuming this is true, how should it change how we think about ethics?

A

Whilst there are issues with Scanlon’s objection to Street, it doesn’t seem as though it is clear that Street’s dilemma leads to Constructivism.
- Therefore, not much change.

Even if it does entail Constructivism, we can still have moral objectivity, as proposed by Street.
- Therefore, all we would need to rid ourselves of is the idea that moral truths are stance-independent.

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16
Q

Why do we assume that evolution influences our moral decisions?

A

Because they it seems to have influenced our other decisions and systems of doing things.

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17
Q

Why does Street claim it is a near miracle that the Truth Tracking Account could be correct?

A

Adaptive Link Account is more parsimonious.

Moral Truths do not seem to cause us to have better success in reproduction.

It does a better job at explaining our moral beliefs, TT seems to fail to give an explanation for why treating our kids well is something so widespread.

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18
Q

Why does Moral Realism need the Truth Tracking account?

A

Because if our moral cognition’s etiology has no relation to moral truths, our judgements would be unjustified.

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19
Q

What are the arguments for: Can we have a substantive objective morality even if our ontology contains no mind-independent moral properties?

A
  1. Background
  2. Gibbard’s Expressivism
  3. Issues
20
Q

What is the background for: Can we have a substantive objective morality even if our ontology contains no mind-independent moral properties?

A

Both Constructivist and Expressivist theories have no mind-independent moral properties.

  • We will focus on Gibbard’s Expressivism
21
Q

What is Gibbard’s analysis of meaning, and what is it contrary with?

A

To analyse what sentence p means, is to ask what state of mind p expresses.

This goes against truth-conditional analysis of meaning.

22
Q

What two concepts are closely linked for Gibbard?

A

Rationality and Morality

23
Q

How does Gibbard’s analysis of meaning extend to ‘rationality’ and ‘morally wrong’, and what notion of truth does he have?

A
  • To say, “X is rational”, is to express the belief that X is rational.
  • To say, “X is morally wrong”, is to express the belief that X is morally wrong.

This is truth-minimalist.

24
Q

What is truth-minimalism?

A

The view that the notion of truth is simple and unadorned.
- To say that something is true is, in some way affirm the statement itself.

25
Q

For Gibbard, what is it to believe that something is rational or morally wrong?

A
  • To believe X is rational is to accept a system of norms that permit X.
  • To believe X is morally wrong is to accept a system of norms for guilt and anger that would permit anger and if X were performed by a responsible agent.
26
Q

How can we explicate believing to be morally wrong in terms of rationality according to Gibbard?

A

To believe X is morally wrong is to believe that it would be rational to feel guilt/anger if X were performed.

27
Q

How does Gibbard explain what ‘accepting a norm’ is?

A

He doesn’t really.
- He claims we already have a ordinary notion of accepting norms.
- That it is a psychological norm that we do not understand yet.
- Accepting the norm is to avow it and recognise that it exposes you to the demands of consistency.

28
Q

What is a system of norms?

A

A coherent set of interconnected norms that regulate behaviour.

29
Q

Why do we accept a system of norms?

A

For our need for interpersonal coordination.
- To plan and warn

30
Q

What is the role of moral language for Gibbard?

A

To regulate, control, and coordinate behaviours according to the system of norms that we accept.

31
Q

How do we get objectivity according to Gibbard?

A

Through normative discussion.
- We have a commitment to be consistent due to our want to cooperate effectively.
- Therefore, we hold each other to be consistent.
- With enough normative discussion we can eventually reach a consensus.

32
Q

What is it for a system of norms to be consistent and complete?

A

For all actions to be one of the following:

  • N-forbidden, N-optional, N-required.

For it to be complete we must account for all acts.

33
Q

Why do we have moral disagreement according to Gibbard?

A

Most people accept either incomplete or inconsistent systems of norms.

34
Q

What are the two issues with Gibbard’s Expressivism?

A
  • Substantive?
  • Objective?
35
Q

How does Gibbard’s Expressivism have a substantive issue?

A

By accepting truth-minimalism, there is the fear that we are losing the substantive and complex nature of moral claims.

36
Q

What is a possible response to the substantiveness objection to Gibbard?

A

The complexities are in function, not metaphysics.
- Moral language is functional (to guide action) rather than describe a moral reality.
- This is because even if we were to find out that there was no rich metaphysical ontology of moral properties, we would not change how we use moral language.
(How does this compare to free will?)

37
Q

What is the objectivity objection against Gibbard?

A

Enoch claims that intersubjective consensus is impossible.
- Two rational people from different cultures.
- They want to achieve cooperation.

But they disagree on how to do so.

38
Q

What is your conclusion for: Can we have a substantive objective morality even if our ontology contains no mind-independent moral properties?

A

Agree with Gibbard that moral language’s function is to guide action.
Also agree that we can find a consensus.
- This is because we seem to already have some converging.

39
Q

What are the arguments for: ‘Torture would be wrong even if nobody thought so. Any theory which suggests otherwise is mistaken.’ Discuss.

A
  1. Realism
  2. Problems with Realism
40
Q

What does Shafer-Landau claim about moral truths?

A

That they are objective.
- They are discovered through rational thought and intuition.
- They are stance-independent.
- They would be true even if nobody thought of it.

41
Q

What does Shafer-Landau compare moral truths to?

A

Mathematical truths

42
Q

What are the benefits of Realism?

A

Allows us to criticise cultures and times era that have different morals.
- This is not possible with moral relativism.

43
Q

What does Shafer-Landau claim about moral properties?

A

They are non-natural

44
Q

What are the problems with Realism?

A
  • Best scientific understanding
  • Enoch’s moral disagreement objection.
45
Q

How does Enoch’s moral disagreement objection apply to Realism?

A

If moral truths are objective and knowable, who do rational people disagree?
- If we claim that it is inherent bias that cloud our rationality, then we have no evidence to suggest that we are not all clouded.

46
Q

What is your conclusion for: ‘Torture would be wrong even if nobody thought so. Any theory which suggests otherwise is mistaken.’ Discuss.

A

Moral Realism has its explanatory benefits.
- It suffers to issues of metaphysics and epistomology.

This does not refute Realism, but it shows that it is not a foregone conclusion that any Anti-Realist position is mistaken for not being Realist.