Meta-ethical theories Flashcards
Meta-ethical theories - Introduction
> About the status of ethical statements and claims
>Discussions about what we mean when we call something right or wrong
Meta-ethical theories - Absolutism and relativism
> Absolutists - there are fixed, unchanging truths about right and wrong
Relativists - morals are flexible and not absolute. Right and wrong depend on what is right for the individual and society and the particular circumstances
Meta-ethical theories - Naturalism
> Absolutists - right and wrong are fixed features of the universe
There are facts about right and wrong, morals are not about opinion but facts of the natural world
Morals are not merely invented by humans - something could be generally accepted but still be bad
Ethical naturalism holds that we can tell what is right and wrong by looking at the world around us and using our reason
Aquinas was an ethical naturalist - we could use our reason and observation to assess the facts of what is moral and immoral - Goodness comes from will of God
Many ethical theories have elements of naturalism (UT, Kantian, Situation ethics)
Phillipa Foot said we can observe morality when we see peoples behaviour
Meta-ethical theories - Criticisms of naturalism
> Empiricists criticise naturalism on the grounds that right and wrong cannot be experienced with the senses.
Hume argued that moral judgements are like judgements about heat or sound or colour or temperature. They come from perceptions and arise in the human mind, they are not facts that exist by themselves
Hume - we can see what there is, but we cannot see what we ought to do. There is no justification for going from what is to what we ought to do (Humes law)
Meta-ethical theories - Intuitionism - G.E. Moore
> G.E. Moore - Naturalistic fallacy, it is a mistake to try to define good in terms of something else.
Goodness is a ‘simple notion’ Good is just good and that is all
Compared good with yellow, yellow can’t be defined or equated with something else, it is just yellow and we know it when we see it
We know good when we see it
Meta-ethical theories - Intuitionism - H.A. Prichard
> H.A. Prichard argued that it is a mistake to try and find reasoned arguments to support what we feel our moral obligations to be. Duty is not the same as the good thing to do.
Prichard - we know by intuition which of our moral obligations are more important than others
Meta-ethical theories - Intuitionism - W.D. Ross
> Prichard’s student - goodness cannot be defined by making reference to other things
Developed intuitionism by introducing the idea of prima facie duties - duties which seem the obvious course of moral action to take at first sight - followed unless there is an even more compelling duty which override
Ross listed 7 prima facie duties but didn’t think the list was complete:
1. Promise-keeping
2. Repairing harm done
3. Gratitude
4. Justice
5. Beneficence
6. Self-improvement
7. Non-maleficence
Meta-ethical theories - Intuitionism - Criticisms
> If we know what goodness is just through intuition and it is impossible to define them, then it becomes impossible to resolve arguments about what is right or wrong, good or bad
Intuition is not a faculty in itself but is the same thing as human reason. Intuition might be the way reason works when it needs a shortcut - we might need to justify our intuitions
Challenges to the idea that we ‘just know’ by pointing out that some people ‘just know’ moral rules which differ widely
Meta-ethical theories - Emotivism
> Ethics arise as the result of emotional responses
An ethical non-naturalist position, unlike naturalism emotivism holds that there are no facts about right and wrong.
When we say things like ‘stealing is wrong’ we mean that stealing evokes in us emotions of disapproval
Sometimes known as the hurrah/boo theory because our statements are expressions of our feelings, not based on any facts
Meta-ethical theories - Emotivism - A.J. Ayer
> Leading emotivist - statements about things being right or wrong can’t be facts because they cannot be tested using the senses. A statement is only ethically meaningful if it can be empirically proven (which Ayer’s own statement cant be)
Meta-ethical theories - Emotivism - C.L. Stevenson
> Developed Ayer’s thinking - moral language has an emotive element and also a ‘prescriptive’ element. When someone says ‘stealing is wrong’ they mean ‘i don’t like stealing and I encourage that you dislike it too’
Meta-ethical theories - Emotivism - Criticisms
> Challenges the idea that there is any good or bad beyond personal preference. This seems counter-intuitive to many people when faced with terrible crimes or acts of great heroism.
If emotivism is accepted then there is no compelling reason for people to act morally. There is no ‘bigger’ reason for why anyone should do anything
Meta-ethical theories - Emotivism - MacIntyre’s criticisms
> Emotivsts confuse meaning with use - what is important about moral language is the significance it has for those who use it.
Stevenson presents an unpleasant world where people are trying to force their beliefs on each other, MacIntyre doesn’t think that moral language and behaviour works like this
Emotivism is no help to us in making a distinction between morality and feelings about other things such as our tastes in music or food.
