Mens Rea - Intention (Cases) Flashcards
DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 House of Lords
A policeman tried to stop the defendant from driving off with stolen goods by jumping on to the bonnet of the car. The defendant drove off at speed and zigzagged in order to get the police office off the car. The defendant argued he did not intend to harm the policeman. The policeman was knocked onto the path of an oncoming car and killed. The judge instructed the jury to apply an objective test when making their decision. The defendant was convicted of murder.
Principle – The jury convicted of murder and the defendant appealed on the grounds that there was a mis-direction and that a subjective test should apply. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction for murder and substituted a manslaughter conviction applying a subjective test. The prosecution appealed to the House of Lords who re-instated the murder conviction and held that there was no mis-direction thereby holding an objective test was applicable.
R v Hyam [1975] AC 55 House of Lords
The appellant had been having a relationship with a Mr Jones. Mr. Jones then took up with another woman Mrs Booth and they were soon to be married. On hearing this news, the appellant drove to Mrs Booth’s house at 2.00am and poured petrol through the letter box and ignited it with matches and newspaper. She then drove home and did not alert anyone of the incident. Mrs Booth and her young son managed to escape the fire but her two daughters were killed. The trial judge directed the jury: “If you are satisfied that when the accused set fire to the house she knew that it was highly probable that this would cause (death or) serious bodily harm then the prosecution will have established the necessary intent.” The jury convicted of murder. The conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The appellant appealed to the House of Lords on the grounds that knowledge that a certain consequence was a highly probable consequence does not establish an intent to produce that result but is only evidence from which a jury may infer intent.
Principle – The appellant’s conviction for murder was upheld as there was no misdirection.
R v Maloney (1985) 2 WLR 648
D and V (D’s stepfather of whom D was very fond) had a contest as to loading and firing a shotgun. D a serving soldier shot V without aiming. V taunted D to fire the gun. Incident occurred during a late night of drinking.
Principle – Lord Bridge: ‘foresight of consequences, as an element bearing on the issue of intention in murder, or indeed any other crime of specific intent, belongs, not to the substantive law, but to the law of evidence … In the rare cases in which it is necessary for the judge to direct a jury by reference to foresight of consequences, I do not believe it is necessary for the judge to do more than invite the jury to consider two questions. First, was death or really serious injury in a murder case (or whatever relevant consequence must be proved to have been intended in any other case) a natural consequence of the defendant’s voluntary act? Secondly, did the defendant foresee that consequence as being a natural consequence of his act? The jury should then be told that if they answer yes to both questions it is a proper inference for them to draw that he intended that consequence.’
Not guilty of murder
Hancock and Shankland (1986) 2 WLR 257
In the midst of a miner’s strike in which they were participating, H and S pushed a concrete block and post from a bridge over the road along which V was driving M; the latter was killed in the collision.
Principle – Lord Scarman: The issue of probability regarding death or serious injury is critical to determining intention, yet Moloney omitted any reference in its guidelines to this issue. ‘[T]herefore, the Moloney guidelines as they stand are unsafe and misleading. They require a reference to probability. They also require an explanation that the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and that if that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that that consequence was also intended.’
H & S were Not Guilty of murder
R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 Court of Appeal
The appellant held a grudge against Viola Foreshaw. He went to her house in the middle of the night poured paraffin through her letter box and set light to it. A child died in the fire. The trial was held before the judgment was delivered in Maloney. The judge directed the jury as follows: “If when the accused performed the act of setting fire to the house, he knew that it was highly probable that the act would result in serious bodily injury to somebody inside the house, even though he did not desire it - desire to bring that result about - he is guilty or murder.” The jury convicted of murder and the defendant appealed on the grounds of a mis-direction. Principle – There was a clear misdirection. The Court of Appeal reviewed the cases of Maloney and Hancock and Shankland and formulated a new direction from the two decisions. Lord Lane CJ: “the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions AND that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.”
D was guilty of manslaughter not murder
Woollin (1997) Cr App R 97 CA
D threw his 3 month old baby son on to a hard surface. The baby suffered a fractured skull and died. The trial judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied the defendant “must have realised and appreciated when he threw that child that there was a substantial risk that he would cause serious injury to it, then it would be open to you to find that he intended to cause injury to the child and you should convict him of murder.” The jury convicted of murder and also rejected the defence of provocation. The defendant appealed on the grounds that in referring to ‘substantial risk’ the judge had widen the definition of murder and should have referred to virtual certainty in accordance with Nedrick guidance. Principle – The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal holding that there was no absolute obligation to refer to virtual certainty.
R v Matthews & Alleyne [2003] 2 Cr App R 30 (461) CA
DD appealed against their conviction for murder following the death of a young man (a non-swimmer) whom they had thrown from a bridge into a river.
Principle – The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, which it did not consider unsafe in the light of the evidence, but expressed concern that the Nedrick/Woollin evidential rule should not be treated as if it were a rule of law. A defendant’s foresight of virtually certain death does not automatically require the jury to find that he intended that
result: it is merely evidence (albeit often very strong evidence) from which the jury may draw that conclusion.
