Mens Rea cases Flashcards
Moloney (1985) – (foresight of consequences)
D and his step-father had drunk a considerable amount of alcohol at a family party. After the party, they were heard talking and laughing, then there was a shot. D phoned the police saying he had murdered his step-father. D said that they had been seeing who was faster at loading and firing a shotgun, he had loaded his faster than his step-father. His step-father then said that D hadn’t got ‘the guts’ to pull the trigger. D said ‘I didn’t aim the gun. I just pulled the trigger and he was dead’. D was convicted of murder but this conviction was quashed on appeal.
Hancock and Shankland (1986)
D’s were miners who were on strike. They tried to prevent another miner from going to work by pushing a concrete block from a bridge onto the road in which he was being driven to work in a taxi. The block struck the windscreen of the taxi and killed the driver. The trial judge used the Moloney guidelines to direct the jury, and the D’s were convicted of murder. On appeal, the CofA quashed their convictions. This was upheld by the HofL.
Nedrick (1986)
D had a grudge against a woman. He poured paraffin through the letter box of her house and set it alight. A child died in the fire. D was convicted of murder but the CofA quashed the conviction and substituted one of manslaughter.
Woolin (1998)
D threw his three-month-old baby towards his pram which was against a wall and the baby ended up hitting the wall and suffered head injuries which resulted in his death. The trial court ruled that the jury could convict if D was aware of a ‘substantial risk’ of serious injury. On appeal to the HofL, the Nedrick test was affirmed – ‘virtual certainty’ was required. Woolin’s murder conviction was quashed and manslaughter substituted. The jury should always be directed according to the law as laid out in Nedrick but with 2 changes; 1) they changed the word ‘infer’ to ‘find’ 2) they removed a small part of the direction that did not add anything substantive.
Matthews and Alleyne (2003)
D’s dropped the victim off a bridge into a river after he had told them that he couldn’t swim. They watched him doggy paddle to the side but left before checking that he had reached the side safely – he drowned. The trial judge directed the jury that if the D’s appreciated that the V’s death was a virtual certainty (unless an attempt was made to save him) and that they did not intend to save him then there was necessary intent. The CofA held that this was wrong. An appreciation of a virtual certainty did not amount to intention. Nevertheless they were found guilty. At the time of throwing him over the bridge they did not attempt to save the victim and they had no intention of saving him. From these facts and circumstances the jury are entitled to find that the defendants did not intent to kill the victim. The CofA said this was hard to avoid.
Cunningham (1957)
recklessness
D tore a gas meter from the wall in order to steal money from it. In doing so he ruptured a pipe that leaked gas into the neighbouring property where the V was seriously injured.
D was charged with maliciously administering a noxious substance so as to endanger life, contrary to s23 OAPA 1861. He wasn’t convicted since he had not himself foreseen the risk of someone being seriously hurt.
Stephenson (1979)
D was a homeless schizophrenic who, in an effort to keep warm, had lit a small fire in a hollowed out haystack. The stack caught fire and spread to various pieces of farm machinery that were also damaged.
He was charged with criminal damage. In directing the jury the judge said that D was guilty if he had closed his mind to the risk and that schizophrenia was a reason for closing his mind.
The CofA disagreed; what matttered was whether the D himself had foreseen the risk.
Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell (1981)
D had a grudge against a hotel owner and when he was drunk he set fire to the hotel. He was charged with arson under s2(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971
D claimed that he was so drunk that he had not realised that lives might be endangered.
The HofL said that recklessness covered 2 situations - the first where the D realised the risk and the 2nd where he had not thought about the possibility of a risk BUT a reasonable person would have realised there was a risk.
Elliot v C (1983)
The D was a 14 year old girl with learning difficulties. She set some paper on fire in a shed in order to keep warm. The evidence revealed that she could not have realised the risk even if she had put her mind to it.
She was, controversially, found guilty under the law from Caldwell: A reasonable, ordinary adult would have realised the risk.
G and another (2003)
The 2 D’s aged 11 and 12 entered the back yard of a shop, set fire to old newspapers and magazines and put them in a large wheelie bin outside the shop. The bin caught fire and it spread to the shop, causing a million pounds worth of damage.
They were charged with arson. Evidence showed that they did not appreciate a risk that the wheelie bin would catch fire. Applying Caldwell the jury convicted the boys since since an ordinary adult would have realised the risk.
The HofL returned the law to Cunningham - subjective recklessness and quashed the conviction.
Lidar (2000)
The D and his friends were asked to leave a pub after a row. They got into the D’s car and were about to drive off when the front seat passenger shouted something at the V (doorman). He came over and tried to grab the passenger through the open window. At this point D sped away out of the car park with the V hanging out of the window. He was dragged under the wheels and died.
D was convicted of subjective reckless manslaughter since he had foresight that there was a highly probable risk of serious injury or death to the V.
