MEE Essay Flashcards
Is an engineer’s report discoverable if (1) part of the builder’s claim is that he properly constructed the foundation, (2) was part of ongoing negotiations with the client, (3) the purpose was merely trying to discover the reason for the flooding?
Yes, b/c (1) an engineering report is relevant to the builder’s claim that the foundation was properly constructed, (2) the report does not necessarily need to be admissible in evidence to be discoverable, (3) the report was not prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, and (4) even if it was prepared in anticipation of trial, the report may still be discoverable if the builder had (a) a substantial need for the report to prepare his case and (b) cannot, without undue hardship, obtain its substantial equivalent by other means
Is the builder at fault for destroying emails if (1) despite hoping to avoid litigation, the builder clearly anticipated that litigation was possible when it hired an attorney on July 10, (2) the builder knew the litigation involved the foundation, (3) the builder knew that the emails may be relevant to either the customer’s claim or its own defense, (4) yet the builder still failed to preserve the emails on 8/2?
Yes b/c (1) the customer can request the other party to produce and permit the inspection of any discoverable documents or electronically stored information, (2) the emails are discoverable because they relate to the foundation and may be relevant to the litigation, and (3) the builder is subject to sanctions for failing to take reasonable steps to preserve the emails that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation
Is the builder subject to sanctions if (1) the customer can present other evidence that the foundation of the house was poorly constructed, (2) the contents of the emails are unknown, (3) the emails were destroyed pursuant to the builder’s standard document retention plan, (4) it is unclear that the builder acted deliberately in preventing discovery?
No severe sanctions b/c (1) no prejudice b/c (a) the customer can present other evidence that the foundation of the house was poorly constructed and (b) contents were unknown, (2) builder didn’t act with intent to deprive customer of emails b/c (a) emails were destroyed pursuant to the builder’s standard document retention plan, and (b) no evidence that builder acted deliberately in preventing discovery, (3) less severe sanctions possible though
Is Lois’s claim against Brian barred by the judgment in Chris v. Brian if (1) Chris borrowed Lois’ car, (2) Brian was found to be negligent when he rear ended Chris, (3) Chris was severely injured and Lois’ car was damaged beyond repair, (4) Lois was not a party to the Chris v. Brian, (5) Lois and Chris are both adults, and (6) Chris brought the claim for his personal injuries, and did not include Lois’s interests in recovering for the total loss of her car?
No b/c the doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata) although (1) Chris v. Brian was a valid, final judgment on the merits, and (2) the facts were close in time, space, origin, and motivation to the point where they form a convenient trial unit conforming to expectation of Lois, Chris and Brian, (3) only Brian and not Lois was present and in the same roles in both the original action and the subsequently filed action - further, Lois and Chris are both adult and there is no indication that Chris was representing Lois’ interests in his case
Is Lois prevented from litigating the issue of her negligence in ensuring the brake lights on her car were working properly if (1) the jury found Lois to be negligent in maintaining the brake lights properly in Chris v. Brian, (2) that judgment was a final one, (3) Lois was neither a party nor in privity with a party to Chris v. Brian, (4) there is no suggestion that determination of the issue of Lois’ negligence was essential to the prior judgment against Brian?
No b/c although the doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) would preclude Lois from relitigating her negligence b/c this had been necessarily determined by the jury as part of Chris v. Brian, Lois was not a party to Chris v. Brian - furthermore, Lois’ negligence only meets 3/4 of remaining requirements for collateral estoppel: (1) Lois’ negligence was the same issue as that involved in Chris v. Brian; (2) the issue of Lois’ negligence was actually litigated in Chris v. Brian; (3) Lois was found negligent by a valid and binding final judgment; however (4) there is no evidence that Lois’ negligence was essential to the judgment in Chris v. Brian.
Is Brian prevented from litigating the issue of his negligence in rear ending Chris if (1) the jury found Brian to be negligent in driving in Chris v. Brian, (2) that judgment was a final one, (3) Brian was a party to Chris v. Brian, and (4) Brian’s negligence was essential in the determination of Chris v. Brian?
Yes - Lois can seek to use collateral estoppel offensively and preclude Brian from relitigating the issue of his negligence, which had already been decided against him - the basic elements of issue preclusion have been met: (1) Brian was a party to Chris v. Brian, (2) Brian’s negligence is the same issue (3) already actually litigated in Chris v. Brian action, (4) nothing in the facts suggests that there was not a valid and binding final judgment there, and (5) the determination of Brian’s negligence was at the core of the action and therefore, essential to the judgment
Despite being eligible to use collateral estoppel offensively against Brian, should the court allow Lois to do so if (1) both Chris’ claim for personal injury damages and Lois’ claim for property damages to her luxury car were >$75K, (2) both occurred from the same car accident, (3) Lois and Chris are both citizens of Rhode Island and Brian is a citizen of Massachusetts?
No - the judge should deny Lois’ use of offensive collateral estoppel b/c Lois could’ve easily joined the first action - (1) her claim and Chris’ claims were each in excess of $75,000, (2) Lois and Chris are both citizens of Rhode Island while Brian is a citizen of Massachusetts, thereby preserving diversity, (3) both claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence, (4) both claims raised a common question of law and fact related to Brian’s negligence - the federal district court would have diversity jurisdiction over these claims and their joinder in the first action would have promoted judicial efficiency and economy
Can Restorer remove the case from Shanxi local court to Shanxi federal court if (1) Owner is a citizen of Shanxi and Restorer is a citizen of Shaanxi, (2) Owner is seeking a return of the Y100K paid to Restorer, (3) the Y100K is calculated from Owner’s good-faith assertion, (4) there is no legal certainty that Owner can’t recover the amount?
Yes - Restorer has the right to remove from Shanxi local court to Shanxi federal district court b/c the civil action by Owner to recover the 100K paid to Restorer is within the original jurisdiction of the Shanxi district court - (1) the Owner is from Shanxi while the Restorer is from Shaanxi, and (2) the amount that the Owner is trying to recover is Y100K, and therefore more than the required Y75K and (3) the Y100K is not being challenged as having a legal certainty that this is not recoverable
Can Restorer’s motion to change venue from Shanxi federal court to Shaanxi federal court be granted if (1) Shanxi doesn’t enforce forum selection clauses ousting jurisdiction of Shanxi courts, (2) Shaanxi always enforces forum selection clauses, (3) Shanxi would allow rescission but Shaanxi would not, instead allowing recovery of damages, (4) both Shanxi and Shaanxi conflict of laws rules apply their own laws to resolve both forum selection and rescission issues, (5) Restorer lives in Shaanxi, (6) contract signed and drafted in Shaanxi, (7) restoration performance was done in Shaanxi?
Yes - for the convenience of the Owner and Restorer and in the interests of justice, the Shanxi federal court can transfer this civil action to Shaanxi federal court b/c this action could have been brought in Shaanxi - (1) Restorer resides in Shaanxi and (2) a substantial part of the contract upon which the claim is based occurred in Shaanxi b/c (a) it was signed and negotiated there, and (b) the Restorer did most of his restoration work in Shaanxi
Is the forum selection clause valid if (1) the contract, which was drafted and signed in Shaanxi, contained a forum selection clause, (2) there was no fraud or any other exceptional circumstances that undermines the validity of the forum selection clause, (3) Shaanxi conflict of law rules permits the forum selection clause to be enforceable?
Yes - transfer of venue sought on the basis of a forum selection clause in a contract are accorded respect - the URC Supreme Court held that a forum selection clause should be given “controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases,” even if the clause is unenforceable under applicable state law - (1) there are no facts to indicate fraud, overreaching, or any other exceptional circumstances that would cause a court to not adhere to the forum selection clause contained in the contract, (2) while there appear to be valid arguments on both sides of the convenience issue overall, the forum selection clause should be given controlling weight here
Would a change of venue affect the law to be applied in resolving the rescission issue if (1) the original venue in Shanxi federal court was proper, and (2) the transfer of venue was based on a valid forum selection clause?
Yes - (1) original venue in Shanxi federal court was proper b/c the amount >Y75k and Owner and Restorer had diversity of citizenship, meaning that normally Shanxi law would be applied; (2) However, the transfer was based on a valid forum selection clause so the Shaanxi federal court must apply the law, including the choice-of-law rules, of Shaanxi - the Shaanxi court should not apply Shanxi law because the parties have contractually waived their right to the application of Shanxi law by agreeing to be subject to the laws of Shaanxi
Does Inner Mongolia federal district court have subject matter jurisdiction if (1) Plaintiff is seeking damages of Y500K against Tortfeasor’s estate, (2) Plaintiff and Tortfeasor are both citizens of Shaanxi, and (3) Tortfeasor’s executor is a citizen of Inner Mongolia?
No, the Inner Mongolia federal court lacked jurisdiction b/c there was not complete diversity between Tortfeasor’s estate and Plaintiff, even though Plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages in excess of Y500K, which was not made in bad faith - although Executor, the named defendant, itself is a citizen of Inner Mongolia, for diversity purposes, Executor is deemed to be a citizen of Shaanxi, which was the place of citizenship of the Tortfeasor - therefore, since Plaintiff and Tortfeasor were both citizens of Shaanxi, they were not diverse from each other, Inner Mongolia federal court doesn’t have jurisdiction
Was Executor precluded from raising issue of subject matter jurisdiction if the Executor’s motion to dismiss was raised 1Y after it answered the complaint and admitted jurisdiction?
No - the defense of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable - Executor may properly raise the lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time - therefore, the court was obligated to consider the merits of the motion to dismiss
Is the Shaanxi local court required to enforce the Inner Mongolia federal judgment if (1) there was no diversity between the Plaintiff and the Tortfeasor, (2) the Inner Mongolia federal court held a jury trial and rendered verdict for Plaintiff for Y80K, (3) no appeal was taken, (4) Executor challenged Plaintiff’s attempt to get Shaanxi local court to enforce on the basis that Inner Mongolia lacked subject matter jurisdiction?
Yes - the Shaanxi local court is required to give full faith and credit to the judgments of other national sub-divisions under the URC constitution, including non-local federal judgments - in this case, the Executor cannot collaterally challenge the Inner Mongolia judgment based on lack subject matter jurisdiction because (1) although Executor didn’t waive the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the federal court action by challenging it after 1Y thereby allowing the issue to be heard and decided, albeit in error by the court, (2) the Executor never appealed so the Inner Mongolia court’s judgment became final - Executor should have appealed but since it didn’t, the Inner Mongolia judgment became final and must be enforced by the Shaanxi local court
Is the logging company (LGC) permitted to intervene as a matter of right if (1) the United China Forest Service (UCFS) accepted LGC’s and has decided to issue a permit to the company, (2) the nonprofit’s immediate purpose in this lawsuit is to prevent the issuance of that permit, (3) if the nonprofit wins the suit, the UCFS will have to prepare an environmental impact statement, which might delay or even eliminate LGC’s ability to receive the permit, (4) the UCFS is principally concerned with proper management of national forests, and (5) the LGC is ultimately concerned with earning a profit?
Yes- under R24, the LGC has the right to intervene in an action when, upon timely motion b/c (1) the LGC has a strong interest in the subject of this action - (a) the UCFS accepted the LGC’s bid and has decided to issue a permit to it, and (b) the nonprofit’s immediate purpose in this lawsuit is to prevent the issuance of that permit; (2) the LGC’s interest in receiving the permit may be impaired by the outcome of the lawsuit b/c if the nonprofit wins the suit, the LGC will be at a clear disadvantage in protecting its interest in the logging permit since the report could delay or even eliminate the permit altogether; and (3) UCFS does not adequately represent the logging company’s interest b/c while the interests of the UCFS and the LGC might be parallel at first, those interests could easily diverge throughout the litigation b/c the UCFS is ultimately concerned with proper management of national forests while the LGC is ultimately concerned with earning a profit.
