Median Voter Theorem Flashcards
How does the rational voter choose how to vote? (2)
1) Compare how far each party is from her preferred position (ideal point) on the left-right scale.
2) Vote for the party that comes closest of her ideal point.
What is the median voter theorem?
In a single-dimensional policy space, the ideal position of the median voter will beat all others in a majority vote.
If decisions are adopted by simple majority, the ideal point of the median voter will become the chosen policy.
What are the main implications of the median voter theorem for electoral outcomes and strategies? (3)
1) Parties are not ideologically/programmatically oriented, but
only care about winning.
2) They know that the closer they are to the median voter’s
ideal point, the more likely they are to win.
3) So they will move towards the median voter’s ideal point.
How does the median voter theorem affect electoral strategies?
As said, parties in Down’s model only care about
winning.
So, they can modify their ideologies, shifting their
position on the ideological spectrum to appeal to as
many voters as possible.
Ultimately, then, a party would choose a position that
maximises the number of votes
i.e., the number of voters who prefer that position to the
position being put forward by any other party.
In sum what is the overriding implication of the median voter theorem?
No matter what the distribution of political
opinions/preferences in a society, in a two-party
system with a single ideological dimension
(division, cleavage) all parties will converge
towards the position of the median voter.
How does the distribution of political opinions affect the conclusion of the median voter theorem? (4)
1) Therefore, the distribution of political opinions in the
electorate (i.e., whether voters are generally more left or right-wing) will affect the content of the policies
adopted.
2) i.e., will affect whether policies are more liberal or conservative.
3) In other words, convergence does not need to be
to the middle of the political spectrum.
4) But convergence will always take place: the chosen policy will be the policy preferred by the median voter.
What are the limitations of the median voter theorem? (3)
The convergence result in the median voter theorem
relies on some strong assumptions:
1) parties can freely chose any position on the left-right scale
2) There are only 2 competing parties
3) There is only 1 policy dimension: left-right
Relaxing these assumptions limits the degree of
convergence that can be achieved
Why might the assumption that parties can freely change their policy positions be unrealistic? (3)
1) A party that is left-wing today, center-left tomorrow and centrist the next day would not be credible, this would undermine voters’ confidence in the parties and politicians may fear losing votes.
2) Furthermore, party labels are used by voters as cues or
informational short-cuts. Voters typically don’t read party platforms, but have a certain idea of what to expect from Labour or Conservatives:
party labels facilitate voting.
3) If the party has no clear agenda, it may lose the backing of donor s and workers.
What is the issue with the assumption of a single policy dimension?
What are the implications of more dimensions?
It is unrealistic.
With more dimensions,
1) It is more difficult for parties to know where the
median voter (across all dimensions) lies.
2) It is more difficult to know if moving in one
direction will not result in more losses than gains.
1 & 2 are accentuated the larger the number of
dimensions
Thus, the trend towards convergence will be
attenuated with more policy dimensions
How do electoral rules affect the median voter theorem?
The kind of electoral rules in place and the
characteristics of the party system will also influence
tendencies towards party convergence or divergence
in PR systems, there may be less incentive for convergence
than in first-pass-the-post
