McManus & Yarhi-Milo Flashcards
What is the main question McManus and Yarhi-Milo (2017) seek to answer?
Why do major powers sometimes send visible “frontstage” signals of support to protégés, while other times using less visible “offstage” signals?
What is a “frontstage” signal?
A highly visible, public signal like formal alliances or leadership visits that receives press coverage and public attention.
What is an “offstage” signal?
A less visible signal like arms sales or military aid—costly but less likely to trigger media or public attention.
Why might the U.S. prefer offstage signals for autocratic protégés?
To avoid hypocrisy costs, credibility issues, and to protect the autocrat’s regime stability.
What are “hypocrisy costs” in U.S. foreign policy?
Political backlash for publicly supporting regimes that contradict U.S. democratic values.
How do credibility concerns influence U.S. signaling?
When the U.S. publicly shows support for a dictatorship, people in the U.S. might get angry because the U.S. is supposed to support democracy.
If lots of Americans are upset, other countries might think the U.S. will back down and not actually help the dictatorship if there’s a conflict.
So basically:
👉 If Americans are mad, it makes U.S. promises look weak or fake.
Why might autocratic leaders not want frontstage U.S. support?
Public U.S. support could delegitimize their regimes domestically and provoke anti-American opposition.
What are the two main hypotheses of the article?
H1a: Democracies are more likely to receive frontstage signals.
H1b: Autocracies are more likely to receive offstage-only signals.
What evidence do the authors use to support their theory?
A statistical analysis of U.S. support signals (1950–2008) and a case study of U.S. relations with the Shah’s Iran.
What does the case study on Iran illustrate?
That even in strategically important relationships, the U.S. avoided frontstage support due to concerns about domestic backlash and the Shah’s regime stability.
How do McManus and Yarhi-Milo contribute to the literature on signaling?
They highlight the importance of domestic politics and introduce the concept of offstage signals as a strategic alternative to public commitments.
What does the data (1950–2008) show about U.S. support for democracies vs. autocracies?
The U.S. is much more likely to send visible (frontstage) signals to democracies and offstage-only signals to autocracies.
What counts as a frontstage signal in the study?
Defense pacts and leadership visits—these are public and get lots of media attention.
What counts as an offstage signal?
Military aid and arms sales—these are costly but don’t draw much public or media attention.
Why are offstage signals still useful?
Even though they aren’t public, they still show serious support because they cost money and resources.
What does the Iran case study show?
Even though Iran was important to the U.S. during the Cold War, the U.S. mostly used offstage signals to avoid upsetting Americans and Iranians.
What did the authors find about the U.S. and autocracies?
The U.S. often avoids public support for autocracies to prevent backlash at home and help the autocratic leader stay stable.
What’s the main takeaway about regime type and U.S. signaling?
A country’s regime type (democracy vs. autocracy) affects how the U.S. supports it—not if it supports it.
How does this study expand our understanding of international relations?
It shows that domestic politics—in both the U.S. and the protégé country—shape foreign policy decisions.
