materialism - functionalism Flashcards
what is functionalism?
mental states are functional states
mental states cannot be analysed in terms of their ontology but the functional role they play in a system
what is a function?
functions are inputs and outputs
any functional state can be described in terms of what typically causes it and what it causes in turn
2 examples of function states (independent of the mind)
eyes - different types of eyes work in different ways with different physical properties
what makes them eyes is what they do (their function) - convert light into neurological signals
poison - many different sorts of poisons (natural vs. man made eg) that work in different ways and are made of different chemicals
what makes them poison is their harmful effect on living beings
how Hilary Putnam understands the mind (as a functionalist)
mental states can be understood using a machine table (the turing table example)
this machine lists all inputs and outputs of a system
this stance is computational functionalism or machine functionalism
certain inputs will cause mental states/behaviours relating to pain - anything that is capable of receiving those inputs and giving certain outputs is functionally a mind
computational functionalism
also known as machine state functionalism, supported by Putnam
what is carbon chauvinism?
the view that only carbon-based life forms (such as humans) can have minds
there could be latex-based creatures or aliens capable of human thought
how does functionalism deal with carbon chauvinism
by defining minds by what they do, then minds are not limited to carbon - meaning minds could be found in computers theoretically?
how could we tell if artificial intelligence has a mind?
Turing test, according to Putnam, if a computer system generates outputs in response to inputs (acting human so much so that we cannot tell it isn’t one) then it effectively has conscious
how does functionalism deal with multiple realisability? (an issue faced by MBTI)
there is no one-to-one relationship between mental states and physical brain states in functionalism (unlike MBTI theory)
this allows for animals and even non-carbon life forms to have minds
how does functionalism avoid the circularity objection? (an issue faced by behaviourism)
functionalism acknowledges that mental states can cause other mental states
an input could be ‘i believe there is a spider nearby’ (mental state) and the resulting mental state could be fear of the spider
inputs can be other mental states
what is qualia?
the introspectively accessible subjective/phenomenal features of mental states
what it is like to undergo a certain mental state
intrinsic/non-representational properties of mental states
what is inverted qualia?
two functionally identical beings could experience different colours, with one being seeing blue and another seeing red, while they both call it red
they both would always act in the same way as one another
this inverted colour spectrum is conceivably possible
inverted qualia standard form
P1. it is conceivable that two functionally identical beings could have inverted qualia with respect to each other (eg experience different colours)
P2. one being with inverted qualia would always act in the same way as the other - saying all of the same sentences, picking out all of the same objects, give the same requests etc
P3. if something is conceivable then it is logically possible
C1. therefore this ‘inversion scenario’ is logically possible
P4. if the inversion scenario is logically possible, then phenomenal properties are not functional properties
C2. therefore phenomenal properties are not functional properties and so functionalism is not a complete account of the mind
what do functionalists claim if two things are functionally identical?
they must be mentally identical (they must have the same mental properties)
Ned Block’s china thought experiment
imagine a billion people (the population of China) who are able to communicate over radio, while a large satellite displays the mental states and they are connected to a body which can exhibit behaviour
the people are meant to represent neurons
there would be inputs and outputs which would make this system function as a mind. functionalists have to conclude this is a mind
due to the lack of fullness, can we argue that this has qualia?
why is it unintuitive to describe Block’s thought experiment as a mind?
our experience of having a mind is to have qualia.
the system might be functionally identical to a mind but it would not have qualia.
it is not enough for a system to be a functional duplicate as it would still differ from what we understand to be a mind
Standard Form Block’s China thought experiment
P1. consideration of the China thought experiment shows that it is possible for two functional duplicates to differ mentally such that one has qualia while the other does not.
P2. if it is possible for two functional duplicates to differ mentally such that one has qualia and the other does not then functionalism is false.
C. therefore functionalism is false.
what is the mary/knowledge criticism?
mary has studied everything about the colour red, she is an expert in the colour red. however, she only sees in black and white, she doesn’t have the experience of the colour red. if she then gets the phenomenal property of seeing in colour, does she learn something new?
are phenomenal properties different to physical facts? most people would say yes, so qualia gives knowledge in extra to physical facts, it is intimately tied to consciousness
she cannot have known all the facts before experiencing colour
Seale’s Chinese room experiment
