M2 - U1 - Class 17 - Agency Theory and Shareholder Value Flashcards

1
Q

agency theory

A

Primary objective of corporation is to maximize shareholder value
An application of agency theory to corporate governance is known as “shareholder value principle.”..

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2
Q

stakeholder theory

A

Primary objective of corporation is to attend to the stakeholder interests
Supports Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)

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3
Q

discussion question

A
  1. Think of an asset of interest; e.g., the car
    Financial advisor investing stocks for you
  2. Who owns that asset?
    The person with the account
  3. Who controls that asset?
    Financial advisor
  4. What are the behavioral problems?
    The actions
    Lied to, mistreated, stolen from, deceived, overcharged for services
  5. What are the causes of the problems?
    They don’t invest right, lose your money/steal, not checking on accounts often enough
  6. How do you prevent the problems?
    Learn how to save/invest yourself
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4
Q

agency theory

A

A general economic theory that explains a wide variety of economic relations
Key assumptions about human nature:
Selfish, opportunistic, individualistic
Principals (owners) vs. agents (managers)
Key characteristics of publicly traded corporations: separation of ownership and control (“agency problem”)

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5
Q

why is there an agency problem

A

goal incongruence
In a control system, goal congruence is the state that leads individuals or groups to take actions that are in their own interest and the best interest of the entity.
Goal congruence can best be achieved, and the ‘agency problem‘ treated better, providing incentives to managers that are related to profit or share price. For instance, Performance-related pay, share options

Information asymmetry
Agency problems arise from incomplete and asymmetric information as principals attempt to motivate agents to act in their interest.
Informational asymmetry creates an imbalance between transaction partners with unfair results namely moral hazard

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6
Q

goal incongruence

A

In a control system, goal congruence is the state that leads individuals or groups to take actions that are in their own interest and the best interest of the entity.

Goal congruence can best be achieved, and the ‘agency problem‘ treated better, providing incentives to managers that are related to profit or share price. For instance, Performance-related pay, share options

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7
Q

information asymmetry

A

Agency problems arise from incomplete and asymmetric information as principals attempt to motivate agents to act in their interest.

Informational asymmetry creates an imbalance between transaction partners with unfair results namely moral hazard

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8
Q

agency cost

A

Agency cost: Inefficiencies created by agency problem

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9
Q

key players - principals

A

Principals

Those who own assets
Shareholders (investors, owners)
Pursue shareholders’ interest (maximize shareholder value)
Can diversify portfolio
Less risk averse

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10
Q

key players - agents

A

Agents

Those who control assets
Managers
Pursue managerial interest (career, pay, status, reputation)
Cannot easily diversify portfolio
More risk averse

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11
Q

agency theory: bottom line

A

Corporate governance in publicly traded corporations is fraught with “agency problem”

Agency problem creates inefficiencies (“agency cost”)

Therefore, corporate governance should mitigate agency problem by minimizing agency cost
By minimizing agency cost, corporations maximize the principal’s (owner’s or shareholder’s) wealth (or value)

Two approaches to minimize agency cost and maximize shareholder value …

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12
Q

monitoring discripline

A

= board of directors, shareholders, market

Monitoring discipline takes care of
info assymetry

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13
Q

incentrives

A

= compensation contracts, managerial ownership

Incentives takes care of
goal incogruence

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14
Q

milton friendman

A

The discussions of the “social responsibilities of business” are notable for their analytical looseness and lack of rigor. What does it mean to say that “business” has responsibilities? Only people have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial person and in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but “business” as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague sense. The first step toward clarity in examining the doctrine of the social responsibility of business is to ask precisely what it implies for whom.

If we wish, we may refer to some of these responsibilities as “social responsibilities.”
But in these respects he is acting as a principal, not an agent; he is spending his own money or time or energy, not the money of his employers or the time or energy he has contracted to devote to their purposes. If these are “social responsibilities,” they are the social responsibilities of individuals, not business

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15
Q

50 years since friedman

A

“I’ll never forget reading Friedman’s essay when I was in business school in the 1980s. It influenced — I’d say brainwashed — a generation of C.E.O.s who believed that the only business of business is business. The headline said it all. Our sole responsibility to society? Make money. The communities beyond the corporate campus? Not our problem.” (Marc Benioff, Salesforce CEO)

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16
Q

a friedman doctrine

A
  1. Can business have responsibilities?
    No. individuals can though
  2. What is the nature of a corporate executive? What is his or her fundamental duty?
    We as a society created corp. Corp did not create a problem. Manager’s responsibility is to make money.
  3. Does it mean that a corporate executive cannot exercise his or her individual responsibility to society?
    Its ok if they do it off duty and not for the company but as an individual.
17
Q

theoretical distinctions

A

“This process [CSR] raises political questions on two levels: principle and consequences.”

18
Q

theoretical distinctions - What is the political principle that CSR undermines?

A

Taxpayers fund public sphere
In business, individuals vote by purchasing stock

19
Q

theoretical distinctions - What are the consequences of CSR?

A

Shareholders will stop buying stocks
Employees will leave according to Friedman

Might get paid more at other companies who do not commit to CSR

20
Q

According to Friedman, what is the fundamental difference between market mechanism and political mechanism? Why does it matter?

A

Market you don’t have to conform and be unanimous
Politically you follow the leader

21
Q

shareholder value

A

Any economic value, profit, or wealth that is created by the corporation as a direct result of its business operations, and that is distributed to the owners of corporate equities (i.e., shareholders)

22
Q

shareholder value principle

A

A business principle that the primary objective of corporations is to maximize shareholder value

23
Q

five justifications (sundaram and inkpen)

A
  1. Maximizing shareholder value maximizes the value of the whole firm
  2. Stakeholder management distorts good risk-taking incentives
  3. Having more than one objective function is a recipe for confusion
  4. Non-shareholding stakeholders can become shareholders, but the reverse is not easy
  5. The law fills the judicial void for stakeholders
24
Q
  1. Maximizing shareholder value maximizes the value of the whole firm
A

A. Fixed claimants
B. Residual claimants
Who has the incentive to maximize the total value of the firm (fixed claim + residual claim)?

25
Q
  1. Stakeholder management distorts good risk-taking incentives
A

A. Who is more risk averse: shareholders or stakeholders? Why?
stakeholders

B. Who are the residual claimants: shareholders or stakeholders?
Shareholders can get more by taking more risk which is better in this case

26
Q
  1. Having more than one objective function is a recipe for confusion
A

Stakeholders are diverse

27
Q
  1. Non-shareholding stakeholders can become shareholders, but the reverse is not easy
A

A. How easy is it for a Google employee to buy a Google stock?
B. How easy is it for a Google shareholder to become a Google employee?
Which one is more difficult, A or B?
A is more difficult

28
Q
  1. The law fills the judicial void for stakeholders
A

Judicial void - stakeholders it is filled. Shareholders need to be taken care of

> Employment Law
Consumer Protection Law
Environment Protection Law