Loyalty Flashcards

1
Q

Meinhard held that the opportunity came to Salmon as __ NOT __

A

role in a joint venture, personal capacity

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2
Q

Meinhard held that Salmon __

A

had a duty to inform M of the opportunity

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3
Q

Meinhard facts

A

S only one that speaks with landlord, M gave money for lease but S does all management, S renews lease alone with landlord without telling M

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4
Q

Cardozo in Meinhard says that the fiduciary must have

A

morals higher than the marketplace

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5
Q

Meinhard distinguishes between __

A

joint venture (not sharing all obligations) vs. partnership

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6
Q

The core issue in Meinhard is whether ___

A

S breached duty of loyalty by not involving M in discussions of new lease

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7
Q

Meinhard court says more like joint venture because M __

A

equally shared in the losses

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8
Q

Meinhard court says venture vs partnership determined not by ___ but by __

A

what landlord thinks, internal relations of the venture

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9
Q

Meinhard court says that like a fiduciary because __

A

S has more de facto power

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10
Q

Meinhard court says M did not have to ___ but should have ___

A

continue the venture, notified partner

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11
Q

Meinhard court says partnerships are __

A

indefinite and S allowed M to believe it would extend without giving notice of termination

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12
Q

Andrews Meinhard dissent says that the relationship between landlord and S ___

A

changed so new K

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13
Q

Andrews Meinhard dissent says that M & S venture ____

A

ended with lease and relationship would have to be renewed

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14
Q

Andrews Meinhard dissent says that the new lease was ___

A

different property

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15
Q

Andrews Meinhard dissent says that there is no need to notify partner only ___

A

not defraud them (level expected in a contract)

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16
Q

Andrews Meinhard dissent says that it was more efficient for __

A

S to get rid of M

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17
Q

A joint venture ___

A

binds two coadventurers in some way, less strict than partnership

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18
Q

Guth is fundamentally about __

A

corporate opportunity

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19
Q

Guth key facts

A

M offers G recipe but doesn’t give it to Loft. Instead takes $ from Loft and uses company resources for personal ventures so derivative suit Loft harmed by G.

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20
Q

Agents are not allowed to put ___

A

themselves in adversarial relationship with the principal

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21
Q

Corporate opportunity is a subcategory of ___

A

loyalty, type of theft

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22
Q

Three elements of corporate opportunity

A

1) taking something offered to company for personal use
(2) must be something company has interest in
(3) must be something company has capacity for

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23
Q

Loyalty is implied whenever ___

A

agent in conflict with the principal

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24
Q

Guth court says that key problem that ___

A

Loft put resources while getting none of the returns (all went to G personally)

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25
Guth court says Loft should have had opportunity to get Pepsi recipe because ___
had capacity and interest as soda syrup retailer AND wholesale manufacturer
26
Guth remedy
Loft gets shares in Pepsi, disgorge profit to principle, fashioned in equity
27
Loft gets future returns in Pepsi not just ___
payments for past theft
28
DCGL that deals with corporate opp
122:17
29
Under 122:17, you can get around corporate opportunity if ___
announced in certificate or go to BOD
30
How could Guth have healed his conflict?
Truly disinterested majority of BOD says not interested in corporate opp makes a bylaw
31
Renouncing a corporate opportunity ___
does NOT require SH approval
32
SHs can't bring derivative suit for corporate opportunity if __
BOD renounced it
33
If there is not a majority of disinterested BOD, corporate opp conflict can be healed by __
informed SH vote
34
Under DGCL 144, a K is not void just __
because there was a conflict
35
Under DCGL 144, person with a conflict should __
Not vote, ideally step out of room OR disclose their relationship to BOD
36
Weinburger standard for loyalty
entire fairness (fair dealing + fair price)
37
A controller need not __
own more than 50% of shares if other factors at play
38
The refined understanding of Weinburger is __
fair process + fair outcome
39
The standard of review for duty of care is generally __
BJR
40
Under BJR, presume __
directors did right thing unless P can prove they were not informed
41
Rationale behind BJR
don't want to second guess every business decision with hindsight
42
The certificate can renounce ___
corporate opp doctrine
43
SInclair facts
Sinclair US parent and Siven Venezuelan subsidiary. SInclar gives Sinven slow death by paying out dividends proportionate to holding
44
The minority SHs in Sinven claim that ___
Sinven was deprived of opp to survive as a company in Venezuela
45
Sinclair holds that there was no ___ so Sinclair's decision __
self-dealing, protected by BJR
46
If Sinclar had sold no shares to the public, ___
it could do whatever it wanted
47
Why might dividends be a slow death?
deprive company of revenue
48
___ are not enough for loyalty breach
Bad decisions
49
Dividends are NOT __
optional (may have negative tax consequences)
50
Sinven SH couldn't argue that they as SHs were hurt because __
dividends paid out proportionately (everyone in same class got same amount)
51
Why wasn't Sinclair found to be asset stripping?
Stayed within law, paid out dividends from profit of last year only
52
A controlling SH breaches their fiduciary duties to minority SHs in a self-dealing action when ___
obtains benefit to exclusion and at exoense of subsidiary
53
The Sinclair court did find that Sinclair's act of contracting with dominated subsidary was __
self-dealing (never paid on time, forced subsidiary to contract with them)
54
A conflicted transaction is not void if ____ AND ___
transaction disclosed, approved by disinterested BOD or SHs (144)
55
A director ____ will be assumed to be self-dealing
on both sides of transaction where he stands to benefit (Guth)
56
Sinclair says that controlling corp must prove that causing dominated sub ___
to not enforce K was entirely fair to sub's minority SHs
57
Tornetta was a derivative suit to ___
rescind Musk compensation package
58
Torneta held that there was a breach of loyalty because __
Musk controlled the transaction AND conflict not healed by SH vote (uninformed)
59
Tornetta only holds that Musk is a controller ___
in this particular transaction (procedural control + outsized board influence)
60
Tornetta the decision was made by __
not entire BOD, just compensation committee of Musk friends
61
Tornetta said SH vote didn't heal because ___
didn't have all material info
62
Tornetta focuses on the ___
personal relationships and absence of negotiation
63
Tornetta didn't require Musk to ____ to be disloyal
sit in on the meeting or sign own package
64
Tornetta said that here the stock option package ___
not tied to actual operations at Tesla because no requirement to spend more time at Tesla vs. other companies
65
If Musk wasn't a controller it would be easier to __
establish healing through BOD
66
What is the problem with an indepedent BOD?
don't have all the info that the CEO does
67
What is material SH info?
anything needed to buy/sell shares
68
Tornetta gives some indicators of control including
1) ownership of significant equity stake (less than majority) 2) right to designate directors 3) ability to exercise outdue influence through high status roles like CEO, Chairman or founder