Long Questions Flashcards
An impatient driver who was fed up with jaywalking pedestrians drove straight at one of them, leaning on the horn and intending to make her jump. She did not hear him or change her pace, however, because her music player was turned to full volume. A bystander on the curb rushed out to pull her to safety. She tripped as she was being pulled to the curb, fracturing her kneecap. If the pedestrian sues the driver for assault, what will be the likely result?
The driver is not liable for assault because he did not cause the pedestrian to reasonably apprehend an immediate harmful contact. For there to be apprehension, plaintiff must be aware of defendant’s act at the time that it is occurring. Here, because the pedestrian was oblivious to the driver’s attempt to scare her, the driver is not liable for assaul
A golfer and her instructor were playing golf in a foursome when the golfer became very annoyed with critical comments made by the instructor. To show the other golfers in the group how annoyed she was with her instructor, the golfer stood a few yards behind him while the instructor was teeing off and swung a club at him. The instructor, who was focusing on his shot, was not within range of the club but unfortunately the club slipped out of the golfer’s hands and struck the instructor in the head, injuring him. If the instructor brings a battery action against the golfer, will he recover?
No, because the golfer did not intend to cause harmful or offensive contact. The instructor may be able to recover against the golfer in a negligence cause of action if the golfer acted unreasonably in swinging the club, but this does not establish intent for a battery action.
A nonunion carpenter went to work on a construction project that was involved in a labor dispute. Every morning when he arrived at work, he would be accosted by the picketers who would try to persuade him not to continue to work. One morning while the carpenter was trying to get to work, one of the union workers stopped him at the gate and told him that he should not go to work. When the carpenter insisted that the striker get out of the way, the striker said, “Try to make me, scab!” The carpenter, intending to frighten the striker, swung his hammer at him. The head on the hammer, however, was defective and it flew off, hitting the striker in the face. If the striker sues the carpenter for battery, is he likely to prevail?
Yes, because he was struck by the hammer head. The facts state that the carpenter swung the hammer at the striker “intending to frighten” him. Thus, the carpenter did an act with the intent of causing the apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact, i.e., an “assault.” Because the striker was actually hit by the hammer head, the trial court would utilize the transferred intent doctrine to supply the necessary intent for battery.
On the way home from a nightclub, a passenger began yelling at the designated driver claiming that he was not taking the best route back to her house. The driver disagreed and contended that his route was the quickest. The passenger impulsively grabbed the steering wheel, causing the car to swerve and strike a pedestrian, injuring him. At trial, the pedestrian established that the driver’s license had expired the day before the accident. The driver’s traffic record qualified him for an automatic renewal of his driver’s license, but he had forgotten to submit it in time. A statute in the jurisdiction makes it an offense to drive a vehicle on any public road in the state without a valid driver’s license.
The pedestrian will not prevail because the passenger’s grabbing of the wheel is the negligent conduct that caused the pedestrian’s injuries. Here, the driver’s actions were an actual cause of the pedestrian’s injury because, but for the driver’s driving and the passenger’s grabbing the steering wheel, the injury to the pedestrian would not have happened. However, the driver’s actions were not a proximate cause of the injury because the passenger’s grabbing of the steering wheel was a superseding intervening force. A superseding force is one that serves to break the causal connection between the initial wrongful act and the ultimate injury, and itself becomes a direct immediate cause of such injury. Thus, the first actor would be relieved of liability from the consequences of his antecedent conduct. The passenger’s conduct in suddenly grabbing the steering wheel was an unforeseeable intervening force creating an unforeseeable harmful result, and thus constituted a superseding force. Consequently, the driver would be relieved of any negligence liability since the passenger’s actions were the proximate cause of the accident.
The statute probably does not apply here because it is intended to keep unsafe drivers off the streets, and there is no indication that the driver is an unsafe driver, or that any driver could have prevented the injury when the passenger grabbed the steering wheel. Even if the statutory standard were applicable, a violation means only that plaintiff will have established a conclusive presumption of duty and breach of duty. It does not, however, establish causation or damages. Here, the fact that the driver does not have a valid license is not the proximate cause of the pedestrian’s injury, as discussed above
A bolt of lightning struck a tree, causing it to fall on a farmer’s fence which enclosed a pasture containing the farmer’s large bull. The bull escaped through the broken fence and entered the neighbor’s property. It gored a hiker who was crossing the neighbor’s property without permission.
In the hiker’s action against the farmer based on strict liability, is the hiker likely to prevail?
- No, because a bull is a domestic animal.
- Yes, because bulls have known dangerous propensities.
- Yes, because the bull caused harm while trespassing on another’s property.
- No, because the hiker was a trespasser.
The hiker will not prevail because strict liability does not apply to a bull, which is a domestic animal. The owner of a domestic animal, including a farm animal, is not strictly liable for injuries it causes, as long as the owner has no knowledge that the animal has abnormally dangerous propensities (i.e., propensities more dangerous than normal for that species). A bull is a domestic animal, and nothing in the facts suggests that the bull was more dangerous than normal for that type of animal. Hence, strict liability will not apply. (A) is incorrect because the rule for trespassing animals does not apply. The owner of a trespassing animal is strictly liable for harm done by the trespass as long as it was reasonably foreseeable. Here, the bolt of lightning caused the fence to break and allowed the bull to escape. This unforeseeable intervening force was the cause of the trespass; hence, the strict liability rule for trespassing animals does not apply here. (B) is incorrect because, as discussed above, strict liability does not apply for domestic animals with normal dangerous propensities. Only domestic animals with propensities more dangerous than normal for the species may subject the owner to strict liability. (D) is incorrect because the hiker’s status as a trespasser on the neighbor’s land is irrelevant as to the farmer’s liability
A motorist driving his new sports car was stopped at a red light when he was struck from behind by a truck. The truck was driven by a driver who had negligently failed to stop. On impact, the door on the driver’s side of the car flew open because of a latent defect in the latch that could not have been detected by the car manufacturer during the ordinary assembly process. The motorist, who was not wearing a seat belt, fell out of the open door and was injured. The jurisdiction retains traditional contributory negligence rules; however, evidence of nonuse of a seat belt is not admissible in a civil action to show contributory negligence.
If the motorist asserts a claim against the car manufacturer, will the motorist prevail?
- Yes, because the car he was driving was dangerously defective.
- No, because the car manufacturer did not know or have reason to know of the defect.
The motorist will prevail because the car was dangerously defective. The motorist’s claim against the car manufacturer, as a commercial supplier of the product, likely would be based on strict liability in tort. As such, he would only need to establish that the car was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users in order to recover. A defective door latch would be a dangerous defect.
- is incorrect because the car manufacturer would be strictly liable even though it did not know or have reason to know of the defect.
A homeowner purchased a ladder from a home supply retailer. While he was using the ladder, an improperly installed bolt fastening one of the rungs gave way, causing him to fall and break his leg. The homeowner sued the manufacturer of the ladder to recover damages for his injury.
If it is established at trial that the home supply retailer could have discovered the defectively installed bolt if it had conducted a reasonable inspection of the ladder, what is the effect of the retailer’s failure to inspect?
It has no legal effect on the manufacturer’s liability.
The failure of the home supply retailer to inspect the ladder has no legal effect on the manufacturer’s liability, regardless of whether the plaintiff is suing in negligence or strict liability. Under either theory, an intermediary’s negligent failure to discover a defect is not a superseding cause, so the defendant who supplied the defective product will still be liable. Thus, even if the home supply retailer were negligent in not discovering the defect, it would not relieve the manufacturer of liability.
A shopper was in a large department store that was remodeling its menswear department and had hired a contractor to do the work. A carpenter employed by the contractor was working on the remodeling job. When the carpenter left the store to take a break, she left a carpenter’s level projecting out into one of the aisles, unbeknownst to any store employees. Shortly before she returned 15 minutes later, the shopper came down that aisle and tripped over the level. He fell and struck his head on the sharp corner of a display case. The shopper required hospitalization and sued the store for his injuries.
Will the shopper prevail in his suit against the store?
- Yes, because the contractor’s employee left the level in the aisle.
- Yes, because the store’s employees had a reasonable time to discover the level before the shopper fell.
The shopper will prevail because the employee of the contractor hired by the store left the level in the aisle. The general rule that a principal will not be vicariously liable for the acts of its independent contractor’s agent is subject to several broad exceptions, including one for duties that are nondelegable because of public policy considerations. One of these duties is the duty of a business to keep its premises safe for customers.
- Is wrong. As part of the duty owed to customers, the store employees have a duty to make reasonable inspections of their premises to discover unsafe conditions (such as if a customer had spilled something slippery in an aisle). However, regardless of whether they had a reasonable time to discover the level, the store is liable because it is responsible for the carpenter’s conduct.
A statute requires that any pilot who flies passengers for hire must have a commercial pilot’s license. An experienced pilot who had only a private pilot’s license and not the commercial license required by statute was asked by an attorney to fly her to another city to close a deal. The attorney knew that the pilot did not have a commercial license but the only commercial flight to the city was at an inconvenient time. The pilot flew the attorney through bad weather and landed safely, but because of a minor navigational error he landed at an airport a few miles away from the airport he was heading for. As he was going to start taxiing toward the hangar, another plane struck the aircraft. The student pilot of that plane had ignored the control tower’s instructions and gone onto the landing runway instead of the takeoff runway. The attorney was injured in the collision.
If the attorney sues the pilot for her injuries, who will prevail?
- The pilot, because the attorney knew he lacked a commercial license and voluntarily assumed the risk of flying with him.
- The pilot, because the injuries to the attorney were caused by the negligence of the student pilot of the other plane.
- The attorney, because the pilot violated a statute designed to prevent persons without commercial licenses from flying passengers for a fee, and such violation imposes liability per se.
- The attorney, because the pilot landed at the wrong airport, and but for this mistake the attorney could not have been injured by the other aircraft.
The pilot, because the injuries to the attorney were caused by the negligence of the student pilot of the other plane.
The pilot will prevail because the conduct of the other plane’s student pilot constituted a superseding intervening force that relieves the pilot from liability. To establish a prima facie case for negligence, the attorney must show that the pilot’s breach of his duty to her was the actual and proximate cause of her injury. The attorney can establish actual cause because but for the pilot’s error, she would not have been injured. However, not all injuries “actually” caused by a defendant will be deemed to have been proximately caused by his acts. The general rule of proximate cause is that the defendant is liable for all harmful results that are the normal incidents of and within the increased risk caused by his acts. This rule applies to cases such as this, where an intervening force comes into motion after the defendant’s negligent act and combines with it to cause plaintiff’s injury (indirect cause cases).
Here, the pilot’s navigational error did create a greater risk of collision with other planes in the process of landing, but it did not increase the risk of a plane using the landing runway to take off in disregard of the control tower’s instructions once the pilot was safely on the ground. Hence, the student pilot’s unforeseeable conduct was not within the increased risk created by the pilot’s negligence and constitutes a superseding force that breaks the causal connection between the pilot’s conduct and the attorney’s injury, enabling the pilot to avoid liability to the attorney.
After picking up a load of hazardous chemical waste, a truck driver for a waste management company set out on the road to his next stop. However, he had failed to secure the latch on the back panel of the truck. Consequently, the panel opened while the truck was on the road, and a metal canister full of chemical waste fell onto the road. A car struck the canister, causing the car to veer off the road and injure the driver. The driver filed suit against the company for his injuries.
The jurisdiction in which the above events took place has adopted a rule of partial comparative negligence. At trial, the driver of the car admitted that he had momentarily taken his eyes off the road to look at his speedometer. When he had looked up again, the canister was there and he could not stop in time. The jury found that the company, through its truck driver, had acted willfully and wantonly and was 90% at fault, while the driver of the car was 10% at fault. The driver filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, seeking recovery for 100% of his damages.
If the judge grants the motion, what is the most likely reason?
- A plaintiff’s comparative negligence is not taken into account in cases of willful and wanton conduct by the defendant.
- A state ordinance mandating motorists to stay within the posted speed limit requires as a matter of law an occasional glance at the speedometer.
- The company was more than 50% at fault.
- The company was engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity.
A state ordinance mandating motorists to stay within the posted speed limit requires as a matter of law an occasional glance at the speedometer.
If the driver was effectively required by statute to take an occasional quick look at his speedometer to make sure that he was complying with appropriate speed limits, then his momentary glance at the speedometer in the instant case would, as a matter of law, not constitute negligent conduct. Because this is a matter of law, the judge would be authorized to correct this aspect of the jury’s verdict. If the driver is thus found to be not negligent in this matter, his recovery will not be reduced. (A) is incorrect because in most states that have adopted comparative negligence, the plaintiff’s negligence will be considered even in cases where the defendant has acted willfully and wantonly. (C) is incorrect because the fact that the defendant is more than 50% at fault does not mean that the plaintiff is entitled to receive 100% of his damages from the defendant in a partial comparative negligence jurisdiction. It only means that the plaintiff’s recovery is not totally defeated. (D) is incorrect because, although the transportation of chemical waste would probably be considered an abnormally dangerous activity, liability for conducting an abnormally dangerous activity attaches only if the harm results from the kind of danger to be anticipated from such activity; i.e., the injury must flow from the normally dangerous propensity of the activity. The canister falling from the truck is not the “normally dangerous propensity” of transporting chemical waste.
A proud grandfather who planned to take pictures of his grandson’s graduation purchased a camera from a camera store. He used the camera on several occasions over the next few weeks without incident, but when he used it on the day before his grandson’s graduation, it caught fire and exploded, burning him and destroying an expensive coat he was wearing. Although the grandfather was in a great deal of pain because of his injuries, he insisted on attending his grandson’s graduation. However, because he no longer had a workable camera, the grandfather hired a professional photographer to take pictures of the special day.
In a breach of warranty action, which of the following represents the most that the grandfather may recover?
- The difference between the value of the camera accepted and its value if it had been as warranted.
- The difference between the value of the camera accepted and its value if it had been as warranted, plus medical costs for treating the grandfather’s burns.
- The difference between the value of the camera accepted and its value if it had been as warranted, medical costs for treating the grandfather’s burns, and the cost to replace the grandfather’s coat.
- The difference between the value of the camera accepted and its value if it had been as warranted, medical costs for treating the grandfather’s burns, the cost to replace the grandfather’s coat, and the cost of hiring the professional photographer.
The difference between the value of the camera accepted and its value if it had been as warranted, medical costs for treating the grandfather’s burns, and the cost to replace the grandfather’s coat.
A driver and his passenger were involved in an automobile accident when the driver ran a red light and crashed into another car. Due to a manufacturing defect in the automobile’s airbag system, the passenger side airbag did not deploy. The passenger was killed on impact. The passenger’s estate brought suit against the driver and the airbag’s manufacturer. At trial it is established that the driver was negligent in running the red light.
What effect would such proof have on the claim of the passenger’s estate against the airbag manufacturer?
- It would reduce recovery by the estate if the action against the manufacturer is based on negligence.
- It would bar recovery by the estate if the trier of fact finds that the driver was the sole legal cause of the passenger’s death.
- It would bar recovery by the estate if it is shown that the driver is the sole legal heir of the passenger’s estate.
- It would have no effect on recovery by the estate as long as the action against the manufacturer is based on strict liability.
It would bar recovery by the estate if the trier of fact finds that the driver was the sole legal cause of the passenger’s death.
The driver’s negligence would bar recovery if it was the sole legal cause of the passenger’s death. Regardless of the theory that the plaintiff is using in a products liability action, actual and proximate cause must be established. If the driver’s negligence is the sole legal or proximate cause of the passenger’s death, it would preclude the estate’s suit against the airbag manufacturer because the defect was not a legal cause of the passenger’s death. (A) is incorrect because the driver’s contributory negligence will not be imputed to the passenger; hence, it will not reduce the estate’s recovery under comparative negligence rules. (C) is incorrect. A potential beneficiary who was negligent will be subject to the jurisdiction’s fault rules. Hence, his negligence will reduce his recovery under pure comparative negligence rules but will not bar it, even if he is the sole heir. (D) is incorrect. In most pure comparative negligence jurisdictions, the same comparative fault rules will apply whether the action against the manufacturer is based on negligence or strict liability. As discussed above, whether the estate can recover, and the extent of its recovery, depends on causation issues and the driver’s status as a beneficiary of the estate
