Licences and Proprietary Estoppel Flashcards
Robson v Hallett [1967]
CA
Bare licence
CA made clear that a householder gives an implied licence to any member of the public coming on lawful business and the licences to come onto the householders property and to ask for permission to carry out his/her lawful business. It covers milkmen. Any genuine lawful cause, not burglars (they are not lawful)
James Jones v Earl of Tankerville [1909]
Licence coupled with an Interest
Concerned contract for sale of timber which grew on the land. Timber whilst growing on land is part of that land so a license is granted to take timber. Practically you have to go onto the land to get the timber. The grants of the profit was of necessity include the grant of a license to enter land to get the timber because without that license the profit is worthless. This would also apply to timber which is cut but kept on the land.This would not be an interest in land but there would be a proprietary right in cut timber. It is essential to have a license in land to get this timber.
Hurst v Picture Theatres Ltd [1915]
CA
Licence coupled with an Interest
suggested that it might be coupled with the right to watch a film, seems unlikely.
Tanner v Tanner [1975]
CA
Usually a contractual license is expressly created. Contrast Tanner v Tanner, Court implied the creation of a contractual license.
Facts: claim by woman who had been in a relationship with owner of flat, she gave birth, relationship then broke down but the landowner brought a flat (in his name only) and pursued his ex partner to move in, she agreed and gave up a rent controlled flat. Later, he got married and evicted his ex partner to bring his new wife and family to live with him.
CA implied from circumstances that she had a contractual licence to remain in the property while the children were of child age and the property was reasonably required for their occupation. Held: licence may be revocable if circumstances change.
For contractual licence there need to be consideration, this was found by the woman giving up her rent controlled flat because this is what the landowner asked. By time of courts the woman did not want to move back in because she found alternative accommodation so she was awarded £2000.
Southwell v Blackburn [2014]
CA
Opposite conclusion to Tanner v Tanner
where proprietary estoppel was established on similar facts. More modern than Tanner v Tanner. Courts are more likely to establish proprietary estoppel rather than contractual license.
Wood v Leadbitter (1845)
Authority - The common law view was that a licence could in fact be revoked at any time although the licensee could subsequently sue for damages for breach of contract if the revocation was contrary to the terms of the licence.
Hurst v Picture Theatres Ltd [1915]
CA
equity will imply a term which may prevent, restrict or regulate the revocation of a contractual licence. It will imply this term where appropriate in circumstances, as approved in HL Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions Ltd [1948] Equitable approach prevails.
Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions
HL
Licence to use a theatre to stage plays, concerts and ballets for an indefinite period to continue as long as licensee paid. There was a right for the licensee to determine the licence by giving notice but no provision for the theatre owners to give notice. No provision in license for theatre owner could revoke the licence.
HL – crucial point was that the licensee was a company. HL said IF they implied a term preventing revocation then the licence was potentially perpetual, licensee would not die (it was a company), licensor could not bring it to an end. HL said this was clearly not what the licensor intended. HL were prepared to conclude that the licence was revocable, but only upon giving reasonable notice.
Hurst v Picture Theatres Ltd [1915]
Ticket to see a film performance. Short term licence, the courts said licence could not be revoked until the end of the film. It was irrevocable.
Verrall v Great Yarmouth BC
Licence granted to use a hall for a meeting. This was held to be irrevocable.
Winter Gardens [1946]
An injunction was granted because the licence was revocable
Verrall v Great Yarmouth BC [1980
An order for specific performance can occur.
Owner indicated the licensee could not use the hall, so court ordered specific performance.
Thompson v Park [1944]
The remedies are discretionary and various factors will be relevant. Courts will not force people to live together if they do not want to.
This is the justification for decision in Thompson v Park. The agreement was for two schools to share the same building and the licensee sought a remedy where licensor sought to revoke the licence. Court would not grant an injunction, justification was that it would have forced the schools to share the building.
King v David Allen [1916]
HL
A licence is a purely personal interest
Contractual license is a personal licence
A licence to put posters on the walls of a cinema. The land was then leased to a third party. The lease made no reference to the licence but the tenant did have actual notice of it. The licensor had intended to assign the burden of the licence to the tenant but had failed to do so. The licensee sued the original licensor for damages for breach of an implied undertaking not to put it out of his power to comply with the licence. The licensor had to pay damages for breach of contract because tenant was not bound by the license, so the licensor could no longer ensure that it was no longer complied with.
Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd [1936]
CA
concerned front of house rights at a theatre. Took same view as HL in King v David Allen, that a licence could not bind a successor.
Errington v Errington and Woods [1952]
CA
Denning - Contractual licence is a proprietary interest
A father bought a house for the occupation of his newly married son and told his son and daughter-in-law that if they paid the mortgage instalments he would transfer ownership of the house to them. Father died leaving property to widow. Father’s widow sought possession against daughter-in-law (the son had moved out). CA refused to grant possession, Lord Denning and Lord Somerville agreed, they held that the daughter in law had a right to remain in possession so long as she paid the instalments and this right would bind all successors in title. Apart from the bona fida purchaser without notice. Denning expressed the view that contractual licences has acquired a course and validity on their own and the reason they had acquired a course and validity of their own is because they had become irrevocable.
Problems with errington v errington
1) Lord Denning said that the contractual licence acquired a course and vality of its own because it became irrevocable. But irrevocability deals between the licensor and the licensing, the fact the licensor cannot revoke the licence does not necessarily mean that his successors have to be bound – there are two separate issues.
2) Also there was no reference to King v David Allen or Clore v Theatrical properties
3) Also not clear in what capacity the widow was suing, was she suing on receipt of husbands will or suing as her deceased husbands heir. If she was suing as an executor, then she would be bound by contract as well because an executor steps into the shoes of the deceased.
National Provincial Bank Ltd v Hastings Car Mart Ltd
CA
Disagreement between Lord Denning and Russell LJ.
Concerned rights of a deserted wife in relation to her property. CA held that rights of deserted wife were comparable with rights of a contractual licensee. Lord Denning was a member of the CA in this case, he spotted that he failed to deal with King v David Allen and Clore v Theatrical Properties, so he tried to reconcile it that in Errington the licensee was in actual occupation. This will distinguish it from King v David Allen but not in Clore v Theatrical Properties.
Lord Russel held: A contractual licence cannot bind successors in title. Errington v Errington was wrong, actual occupation is irrelevant because it cannot change the nature of the right, it merely puts notice of the right, it does not change it to proprietary.
HL made no comment on the issue because they believed that the rights of a deserted wife were similar to a licensee.
HL left the issue open:
Binions v Evans
CA
The defendant’s husband had been employed by an estate which provided him with rent-free accommodation in a cottage. After his death the estate entered into an agreement with the defendant whereby she was allowed to remain rent free in the cottage for the rest of her life. She undertook, inter alia, to keep the property in repair. The estate was then sold to a purchaser expressly subject to the defendant’s rights and a lower price was consequently paid. Lord Denning took view that defendant had a contractual licence, he thought it bound successors, he said:
1) Contractual licence was an equitable interest which bound the purchase. He said it is an equitable interest because it is irrevocable.
2) In any way, the court would impose a constructive trust on the purchasers to give effect to the licence because it would be inequitable for the purchasers to evict the defendants. It is inequitable because they purchased EXPRESSLY consideration for the license and paid lower for the property as a consequence. Later in the judgment he then referred to the express stipulation without mentioning the lower price for the property as a consequence.
3) He also suggested that a sale could not only be expressed subject to a licence but impliedly subject to a licence giving rise to a constructive trust. He said there might be an implied subject to where licensee is in actual occupation and the purchaser knows of her existence.
He dealt with King v David Allen and Chore – he said that this case is distinguished because there was no express stipulation. Denning was the only person in CA who dealt with the case on a contractual licence. The other members of CA held that she has a life interest. Everything said by Lord Denning was obiter.
Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold
CA
everything said was obiter because the decision of CA was that a lease bound the purchasers
Fox LJ expressed the view that a contractual licence is purely personal and cannot of itself bind successors in title (King v David Allen) king v David Allen is correct, therefore Errington v Errington is insupportable, decision in Errington is correct but it was unjustifiable on lord Dennings arguments. Although a licence is a personal interest so cannot bind successors. However, a constructive trust can be imposed on a purchaser whose conscience is affected. A purchaser has acted in such a way that it would be inequitable if he was not bound.
THIS IS NOT BINDING AUTHORITY, but seems to be compatible with the cases.
Lyus v Prowsa Developments Ltd;
A purchaser’s conscience will be affected when he has undertaken a new obligation to give effect to the licence
The vendors (sellers were mortgagees) could have sold free of the interest (a contract to sell), but the sale was expressed to be subject to the interest, a copy of the contract was provided to the purchasers and there had been some previous assurance by the purchasers in connection with the contract. In the circumstances, since the seller could have sold free of the interest, the only reason for referring to it was that the purchaser intended to be bound. There was no lower price here. However, it was clear that the property was only for sale on certain terms, purchaser would only buy by the contract.
supported by authority in Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold
Binions v Evans
The sale was expressed to be subject to the licence, at a lower price and the seller would otherwise be liable to the licensee in damages for breach of contract.
Gillett v Holt [2001]
CA
PE
The fundamental principle is to prevent unconscionable conduct
Willmott v Barber
J Fry
set out five requirements for liability:
For liability to arise in acquiescence, Fry said there were 5 requirement:
1) The plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights
2) The plaintiff must have expended some money or must have done some act (not necessarily upon the defendant’s land) on the faith of his mistaken belief.
3) The defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff.
4) the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the plaintiff’s mistaken belief of his rights.
5) Lastly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money or in the other acts which he has done, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right.
Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd
Oliver J advocated a more flexible approach than Willmott v Barber.
There should be a broad approach.
The courts should ascertain whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which , knowingly, or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment.
Whereas in Willmott v Barber – it was essential if the landowner knew, Oliver thought that it was just one factor.
He did go onto accept that all the factors in Willmott v Barber might be necessary in cases of acquiescence.
Three principles of proprietary estoppel
1) A representation or assurance made to the claimant
2) Reliance on it by the claimant
3) Detriment to the claimant in consequence of his reasonable reliance
Gillett v Holt [2001]
There are three basic requirements (assurance/reliance/detriment) but these all relate together and the strength of one can vary due to the strength of each other, in the end you look at whether the three elements add up to unconscionability.
Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008]
HL
The fact you can establish the 3 requirements may not be enough, there may be an extra factor of unconscionability
Thorner v Major [2009]
HL
1) Any representation or assurance need only be “clear enough” in the circumstances. It must be identified property.
2) HL suggested that despite having promise to the farm to someone, the farmer could probably sell at least some of that farm before his death if he needed the money for medical treatment/care in old age.
3) Reliance of PE must be reasonable.
4) The belief must relate to identified property that the landowner owns or possibly is about to own:
When looking for representation/assurance they will look at statements/conducts of parties over a period of time and what might be sufficient is statements which might be unclear but to the claimant they were “clear enough”.
Facts: Promise related to a farm, that cousin son would inherit farm on death of farmer. The extent of this farm could change between time promises were made and his death, he might have brought more land etc. Scope of land would change. HL regarded the promise as related to the farm as existed at death of farmer so this was fine, but it required the farm to be identified.
This threw doubt on Re Basham
MacDonald v Frost [2009]
The judge took the view that a promise relating to the whole of an estate will not be sufficient unless you can interpret it relating to specific property.
Inwards v Baker
CA
D wanted to buy a plot of land and build a bungalow but it was too expensive. At his father’s suggestion, he built on his father’s land. The trustees under his father’s will sought possession. CA believed that although no agreement for a specific interest, the son had an expectation that he could stay for as long as he wished, this was sufficient for proprietary estoppel to arise.
Southwell v Blackburn [2014]
CA
A woman with 2 daughters from a previous relationship left a secure tenancy after having spent a considerable amount of money on that property (£15,000) to move into a house purchased by her partner in reliance on a promise of a home for life or such security as a wife would have this does not relate for specific interest. The relationship broke down and she was evicted. But this was sufficient for proprietary estoppel to arise.
