Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Question 1

Origins of liberal intergovernmentalism

Answer 1

Moravcsik combined liberalism and intergovernmentalism into liberal intergovernmentalism, because he claimed that neofunctionalism was overly comprehensive, incompletely specified and therefore non falsifiable. He also added to the pluralist idea of neofunctionalism (policies are the result of various pressure groups’ influence during the decision-making process) that this may be true, but that not all pressure groups have equal power and resources.

Question 2

Origins/idea of intergovernmentalism

Answer 2

Stanley Hoffmann in the 1960s:
1. States are unitary actors, meaning the entire government has the same opinion (on the international level);
2. State interests in negotiations are shaped by geopolitical and economic concerns
3. Individual decision-makers matter (head of governments/states)

Question 3

Liberal part of liberal intergovernmentalism

Answer 3

1. Came from David Ricardo’s economic liberalism and his theory of comparative advantage. Self-interested cooperation is beneficial for all participating states, even for economically weaker partners. The comparative advantage means an economy’s ability to produce particular goods or services at a lower relative opportunity cost than another economy. This meant that it is rational for both countries to specialise and trade with each other.
2. Putnam’s two-level game: governments are both on the international level in a game with other international actors, as well as on the domestic level with domestic actors.

Question 4

Four core assumptions/stages of liberal intergovernmentalism

Answer 4

1. National stage of preferencing
2. International stage of bargaining
3. International stage of delegating
4. National stage of selling

Question 5

National stage of preferencing in liberal governmentalism

Answer 5

Preferences are formed on the national level.
1.These preferences are shaped by issue-specific conflicts, meaning that there is no overriding policy concern that always prevails.
2. These conflicts are between societal groups vying for the attention of governmental elites

Question 6

International stage of bargaining liberal governmentalism

Answer 6

Governments rationally defend the interests of their state.
1. The state is a unitary actor once it operates on the international level
2. The interdependence between the states is asymmetrical, therefore there is an uneven distribution of benefits of an agreement
3. States have market power and the states with larger markets are more attractive partners
4. Exit power or the availability of outside options strengthens the bargaining position of a state, therefore states with larger markets can threaten non-participation
5. In conclusion: market power + exit power = political power

Question 7

International stage of delegating liberal intergovernmentalism

Answer 7

International negotiations are purely intergovernmental.
1. The supranational institutions have no role in the negotiating, but only in the delegation of these decisions so that neutral institutions can act on them.
2. The supranational institutions are efficient, for they lower transaction costs, by lowering information costs (expertise), coordination costs (resources) and enforcement costs (compliance)
3. The supranational institutions create credible commitment by having other countries giving away control and sovereignty to supranational institutions
4. Supranational institutions can facilitate, but not drive integration, they are passive actors because they have no power to push their preferences

Question 7

National stage of selling liberal intergovernmentalism

Answer 7

National governments employ a two-level strategy
with the aim of letting them to overcome domestic opposition more successfully.
1. Unpopular decisions are blamed on Europe.
2. Popular decisions are taken national political credit for.
This is Schelling’s paradox reversed

Question 8

Schelling’s paradox

Answer 8

In bargaining, weakness is often strength: the constrained negotiator can squeeze the range of indeterminacy to the point most favourable to him. A state with a domestic weak position can demand more in international negotiations, for it must present an agreeable deal at the domestic front.

Question 9

Schelling’s paradox reversed

Answer 9

Unpopular decisions made by national governments are blamed on the EU

Question 10

Empirical critiques of liberal intergovernmentalism

Answer 10

1. It is limited to big treaty reforms and there is no explanation for ordinary legislative procedures and how these supranationalist institutions function when it comes to European integration
2. LI is applied selectively (verification bias), Moravscik wouldn’t apply his theory to cases where it would disprove his theory.
3. Moravscik’s sources are not verifiable (mentioning documents/interviews that were never found)

Question 11

Theoretical critiques on liberal intergovernmentalism

Answer 11

1. Moravscik uses the outcome to explain what the interests of states were before a decision was made
2. LI does not cover supranational organisations and transnational interest groups properly
3. The two-level game does not reflect multilevel EU
4. Conception of state interests is mainly in economic terms
5. Influence of international bargains on domestic preferences is not covered