Lectures (2020) Flashcards
What are the agency problems in capital budgeting if a manager has a fixed salary?
- Reduced effort
- Perks
- Empire building
- Entrenching investment (choosing lower NPV projects just because the manager not qualified enough to do higher NPV projects)
- Avoiding risk
- Increasing exposure (building a good reputation for himself)
What are the methods of reducing agency costs?
- Monitoring
- Market for corporate control (e.g. legal environment for hostile takeovers)
- Managerial compensation based on input (effort) or output (returns)
- Issue stock options to management
- Accounting based measures of performance (accounting earnings do not necessarily translate to shareholder value).
What are the disadvantages of stock options as remuneration (solution for agency problems)?
- They reward absolute, not relative performance
- Create incentives for managers to withhold bad news from the market
- Create incentives to manipulate earnings
- Option backdating
- Insider trading
- Short-termism (increase stock value now at the expense of the future
- Markets are forward-looking (new information is immediately incorporated into prices –> to incentive to do well on long-term projects, if positive NPV projects immediately increase the stock value).
When a firm is in financial trouble, what are the 5 “games” often played by the managers at the expense of creditors?
- Overinvestment (take on risky bets (NPV<0) since equity owners face unlimited upside, and the downside is only observed by debt holders).
- Underinvestment (equity owners do not invest in a positive NPV project because since the firm is already in distress (shareholders unlikely to get anything), all gains from the project would go to debt holders).
- Cashing out (shareholders withdraw money from the firm- sell all the assets ASAP- cheaper than their actual worth –> deadweight loss (wealth destruction & wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders)
- Playing for time (creditors would like to salvage what they can quickly, but shareholders want to delay the process in hope that the firm might recover and they might get something back from equity).
- Bait and switch (start with issuing a small amount of safe debt, then suddenly switch and issue a lot more equally senior debt–> all debt becomes riskier and the old bondholders lose, while equity owners gain from the old debt being locked in at low rates).
A company is worth less by the expected value of these games
Who and how gets hurt from the “games” played when a company is in distress?
- Debt holders - conditional on the game being played
- Equity owners- they had already paid ex ante for the bankruptcy costs (debt holders had already incorporated the bankruptcy information into prices, hence paid less for the bonds).
Leverage can encourage managers and shareholders to act in ways that reduce firm value. When a firm adds leverage to its capital structure, what two effects it has on the share price?
- Share price benefits from the equity owners ability to exploit debt holders in times of distress
- Debt holders recognize that and pay less for the dent when it is issued.
Debt holders lose more than shareholders gain –> net effect is a reduction in the initial share price of the firm.
How can debt holders reduce the possible “games” played in distress? How does that hurt the company’s value?
Debt holders might impose debt covenants on shareholders (restrictions on management).
If there are many constraints, then the management loses flexibility –> cannot borrow at their optimal capital structure level, cannot achieve the most efficient outcome for the company.
Less debt due to covenants–> forgone tax shields –> EV decreases
What are the benefits of leverage in the reduction of agency costs?
- Ownership concentration (more debt–> less equity issues–> concentration of less shareholders–> no free riding and agency costs decrease).
- Free cash flow hypothesis/ debt discipline (if a firm has debt, then managers must pay to the debt holders, hence less money for managers to waste)
- Leverage can reduce the degree of managerial entrenchment (managers worried about repaying debt–> take less entrenchment (same as debt discipline)).
- When a firm is highly levered, creditors themselves will closely monitor. (more oversight for managers).
What are the three trade-offs in financial systems?
- Innovation vs volatility (more innovation creates more volatility)
- Deregulation vs Risk-taking (less regulation–> more risk taking)
- Reduced cost of intermediation vs lack of monitoring
What are the two types of financial systems?
- Bank orientated (commercial banks are also owners of many firms, few IPOs, ownership closely held by the owners, weak minority protection, investors control orientated, universal banking) - Germany and Japan
- Market orientated (firms obtain financing through the issuance of securities, many IPOs- dispersed ownership, investors portfolio orientated, separation of investment banking from commercial banking, strong minority protection; hostile bids important) - UK and US
What are the challenges of corporate governance?
- Agency problem (incomplete contracts and PBOC)
- Management incentives (how to limit financial benefits)
- Financing without governance (e.g. reputation or excessive optimism)
- Legal protection (for minority shareholders and for all shareholders if managers not fulfilling fiduciary duty).
- Takeovers
- Benefits vs costs of large shareholders (more monitoring vs not diversified)
- State ownership
With what is better corporate governance associated?
- A better developed financial system
- More outside investors
- Higher growth and valuation
- Faster and more flexible response to new competitive challenges
- Easier and cheaper ways to attract new capital
What is corporate governance?
Corporate governance deals with agency problems at a micro (firm) level (ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on investment).
What are the approaches to corporate governance (how to measure agency problems)?
- Quantifying legal shareholder protection
- Measuring PBOC (Dyck and Zingales)
- Survey of institutional investors (McCahery, Sautner, and Starks)
- Measuring agency problems at dual-class companies (Masulis, Wang, Xie)
- Political economy view (Pagano and Volpin)
What are the characteristics of a system of ethical reasoning?
- Completeness- system applies to all cases
- Coherence- doesn’t change opinion depending on context
- Connection to the theory of ethics and beliefs
- Practicability- the system can be implemented
What are the CFA standards of practice?
CFA standards- rigorous ethic guidelines specific to the financial industry.
-> Professionalism
A. Knowledge of and compliance with the law
B. Independence and objectivity (e.g. can’t take bribes)
C. Honest in both representation and conduct (can’t knowingly misrepresent)
-> Integrity of financial markets
A. Insider trading (can’t act upon non-public information)
B. Market manipulation
-> Duties
A. Loyalty, prudence, and care to clients/ employees
B. Disclosure of conflicts of interest
C. Fair and objective dealings with clients
D. Accurate and complete performance
E. Preservation of client confidentiality
What is skewness? Kurtosis?
Skewness- a measure of symmetry, or the lack of symmetry. If negative- data skewed left. If positive- data skewed right.
Kurtosis- a measure of whether the data is peaked or flat relative to a normal distribution. (for normal distribution minus 3) –> then, if positive - peaked distribution. If negative- flat distribution.
What is APT (arbitrage pricing theory)?
If there is no arbitrage, then we can price assets relative to one another based on their co-movement with these factors.
What are the three types of investors? (in options (?) )
- Hedgers (protect themselves from price movements)
- Speculators (make bets that the price/ volatility will increase/ decrease)
- Arbitrageurs (lock in profits from mispricings by simultaneously entering into transactions in 2 or more markets)
What is immunization?
strategy to shield pverall financial status from interest rate flactuations –> matching duration of assets to the duration of liabilities (rebalance by changing the weights each period).
What are the three theories that explain why interest rates differ for bonds of different maturities ?
- Expectations theory (2 year rate must be equal to 1 year * spot rate, otherwise arbitrage)
Fisher theory: must account for inflation –> inflation premium - Liquidity preference theory (higher premium for long term bonds) –> i/r risk premium
- Market segmentation/ preferred habitat theory (different demands/ supplies for bonds of different maturities –> i/r adjust accordingly).
What is CDS? What is a naked CDS? What is a synthetic CDO?
Credit default swap- risk hedged by buying insurance against default
Naked CDS- when you do not own the underlying asset you are insuring for –> possible manipulation
Synthetic CDO- use CDSs to make CDOs
What is market microstructure?
Market microstructure is about making markets work well- studies how does trading actually occurs in markets and what determines the amount, liquidity & how do market arrive at prices.
What are the roles of markets?
- Match buyers and sellers to realize gains of trade
- Efficiently channel resources to their best use
- Provide information and efficient resource allocation
What makes a quality market?
- Liquidity (large amounts can be traded quickly with no large impact on the price)
- Information efficiency (market aggregate disparsed information more accurately than individuals (residuals on avg are zero)
- Integrity (people want to take part in fair markets).
What are the different types of markets?
- Limit order (order driven) - list all unexecuted orders and wait for them to be executed –> can get a better price, but has to wait a long time and risk of the order not being executed at all
- Dealer (quote driven) markets) - can buy/ sell faster, but you pay more for the execution. Dealers post quotes and then traders decide whether to trade and with which dealer (intermediary) –> costly and less transparent
- Upstairs markets- dealers/ brokers negotiate traders directly with other brokers and only then report the trade–> otherwise the price would be impacted. Reporting delay can vary.
- Downstairs markets- trading on the market with other participants
- Floor/ open outcry markets- trading live on spot with the hand signals, etc. Trading “pit” or “floor” brings excitement & can see others’ emotions in real life.
- Electronic markets- trading on the internet
What is the difference between limit order and dealer markets?
- Limit order (order driven) - list all unexecuted orders and wait for them to be executed –> can get a better price, but has to wait a long time and risk of the order not being executed at all
- Dealer (quote driven) markets) - can buy/ sell faster, but you pay more for the execution. Dealers post quotes and then traders decide whether to trade and with which dealer (intermediary) –> costly and less transparent
What is the difference between downstairs and upstairs markets?
- Upstairs markets- dealers/ brokers negotiate traders directly with other brokers and only then report the trade–> otherwise the price would be impacted. Reporting delay can vary.
- Downstairs markets- trading on the market with other participants
What are the three types of traders?
- Informed- earned profits from price discrepancies
- Uninformed (‘liquidity’ traders)- trade because they want to diversify, invest (save) their money, gamble, etc
- Liquidity suppliers- designated market makers (obligation to provide quotes- they buy today if higher supply to sell tomorrow at a higher demand & earn a spread). Ask for a spread (compensation) due to high fixed costs, takes on market exposure (prices might change overnight),(inventory holding costs), risk on making loss to the informed traders. Adverse selection- liquidity suppliers earn money from uninformed traders, but lose money from informed traders (if suddenly too high demand, that means that his prices are too low).
What are liquidity suppliers? Why do they ask for a bigger spread? What is meant by adverse selection in this case?
Liquidity suppliers- designated market makers (obligation to provide quotes- they buy today if higher supply to sell tomorrow at a higher demand and earn a spread). Ask for a spread (compensation) due to high fixed costs, takes on market exposure (prices might change overnight) (inventory holding costs), risk on making a loss to the informed traders.
Adverse selection- liquidity suppliers earn money from uninformed traders, but lose money from informed traders (if suddenly too high demand, that means that the prices are too low).
When are markets less liquid?
- When inventory holding costs are high
- Adverse selection risk is high (many informed traders)
- Fixed order processing costs are high
- Lack of competition
Why do uninformed traders participate in trade if they are losing money to the informed traders?
- Behavioral biases (overconfidence)
2. Gains from trade (diversification, gambling, etc)
Why don’t more people become informed traders?
Information production is costly. Profits are just enough to cover their costs of producing information.
What is changing the trading landscape? What are the pros and cons of that?
Drivers: competition (more than 1 stock market per country) and technology (more complex markets)
Issues: market fragmentation, automation (AT), dark trading (e.g. brokers trading against their clients)
PROS: more competition–> trading costs decreased & more platforms to suit different interests
CONS: less participants per market (since more markets)–> difficult to match them –> decreased liquidity & increased search costs
What are the reasons for hedging?
- Reduce risk
- Mitigate agency costs (if risk hedged (no huge volatility), then can see if earning increased due to manager’s efforts and not just volatility)
- but by hedging you give up both - upside and downside (e.g. if huge earnings, you get only the fixed amount).