Lecture 8: Social Cognition Flashcards
(wasn’t here for this lecture so may be missing some things)
The story so far with communication
Communication occurs when one person intentionally sends another person a signal and it is processed
Although it is not clear if infants intentionally send other people signals from birth, attachment research suggests they are (cumulatively) affected by the signals they receive
From around 12 months, the production of points (together with gaze alternation) offer clearer evidence for intentional signal sending
Moreover, 12 month olds act appropriately on other peoples’ referential signals, giving the impression that they see the other person as a communicative agent
Behaviourally 12-month-olds show explicit awareness of other people (sending and receiving signals), but does this evidence suggest that infants infer that other people have minds like their own?
Why does communication occur?
-mostly questions
How do infants profit from exchanging signals?
Why is this profit potentially important for communication debate?
If communication is built through reinforcement or innate learning rules, we might question the level of intentionality involved
Communication COULD function on an automatic basis
Social Cognition
Regardless of communication debate, when children become aware of their own and other people’s minds (intentions, desires, beliefs) is an important social development
Today: How can we tell when children begin to REASON about other people’s minds?
Evidence of thinking about other’s intentions and desires from referential communication
Evidence of thinking about other’s beliefs
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
Referential communication definitely makes > 12-month-olds LOOK like mind readers (they can engage with other people and follow their signals) but are they frauds?
Recall communication session, D’Entremont, Hains & Muir (1997) 3 to 6-month-olds follow adult head turns to look at puppet
Seems they are tracking other’s visual attention (communicative intent?)
BUT infants may automatically orient in same direction as social partners……this would be an evolutionarily adaptive mechanism (either learnt or innate)
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
- Any evidence that infants responses to other’s signals function on an automatic basis?
- Caron et al 2002
- other studies
Caron et al (2002) compare gaze following when eyes open and closed………
Younger infants follow head turns even when the adults eyes are closed.
Older infants understand that head turns are only a valuable signal if the adults eyes are open (12 months vs 14 months)
They distinguish between communicative and non communicative signals
Problem with this study?
-Caron et al’s (2002) study lacks ecological validity, people with their eyes closed are usually still, not turning their head.
-Studies which introduce more ecologically valid barriers to vision in the context of communication may give more valid results
Recall communication session,
- Moll and Tomasello (2004) 12-month-olds orient behind barriers to find what adults are looking at
- Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello (2005) 14- to 24-month-olds can follow adult’s points and looks to find toys hidden in boxes
- Csibra & Volien (2008) 8- to 12-month-old infants expect adults to look at referents behind barrier (violation of expectation when don’t)
These studies imply that, at least by 12 months, infants understand that there is a link between where other people look and interesting events
The infants don’t simply track the adults point/line of sight to the boring barrier (an automatic orienting system) they reason that something interesting is likely to lie behind it
12-month-old infants expect adults to be looking at or communicating about interesting referents, and they will search in the salient area to find them
Including a natural barrier to vision is meant to allow us to infer that infants EXPLICITLY expect a referent to be associated with overt communicative signals like points and/or gaze alternation, they aren’t just orienting automatically
This would imply that they understand the adult has communicative intent
BUT is automatic or learnt behaviour REALLY ruled out?
Might infants have learnt over time that adults points/gaze alternation are usually associated with a nearby interesting referent?
Might the innate (evolutionarily adaptive) rule be follow others signals, and terminate search only when interesting referent found?
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
- How could we decide if children are really reasoning about communicative intent?
- Behne, Carpenter and Tomasello 2005
How could we decide if children are really reasoning about communicative intent?
From communication session: Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello (2005) Study 1, 14- to 24-month-olds can follow adults looks and points to find toys hidden in boxes.
Study 2, What happens when the adult doesn’t overtly try to help the infant, but gazes absent mindedly between target box and infant, or points but looks at their hand rather than the box?
- 14, 18 and 24 months
- on both pointing and looking trials when intentional greater percentage look at correct location versus incorrect, when unintentional, looks are same for correct and incorrect locations
-It seems 14-month-olds aren’t simply using a basic orienting system, leading Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello (2005) to claim they understand other’s communicative intent (have TOM)
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
- same in normal social interations
- hypothesis suggested
However, in normal social interactions there are a host of external cues which could become associated with whether a signal is worth following (Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello’s (2005) study makes use of this fact)
This had led to lean interpretations of early social interaction such as the “orienting and engagement hypothesis” (See D’Entremont and Seamans (2002) for discussion)
An innate orienting function directs infants’ attention to the location that the adult is looking toward
Later, a learnt engagement function allows infants to determine whether adults are engaged and so can be expected to act meaningfully. For example, the evidence we have covered suggests by 14-months infants have learned that adults are more likely to be engaged with them if their eyes are open or if they do not appear distracted
From this point onwards, the engagement function determines whether the infant will act on the signal to find an interesting referent. The idea is that signal following in certain situations has been extinguished over time
According to orienting and engagement hypothesis 14-month-olds don’t have a mentalistic understanding that seeing = knowing. They have simply learnt that closed eyes cancel out signal value
Evidence that mentalistic understanding comes later?
Moll and Tomasello (2006) Adult enters room “Where is it?” Two objects, one out in open, other visible for the child but behind a barrier from the adult’s perspective
Which object should the child infer the adult is searching for?
Hidden object. Adult most likely to be searching for object can’t see because if adult can SEE it, they KNOW where it is (seeing = knowing)
24-month-old children, but not 18-month-old children, handed adult the hidden object more often than the visible one
Suggests young children don’t appreciate the link between seeing and knowing
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
-counter evidence of the orienting and engagement hypothesis
Counterevidence?
Tomasello and Haberl (2003) 12- and 18-month-old infants engaged in interaction with experimenters 1 and 2, experimenter 1 leaves room, so misses play session with object 1, but returns for play with objects 2 and 3. At the end of the session, all three objects are put on the table. Experimenter 1 exclaims “wow!!! Look at that!! Give it to me please!”
Which of the three test objects should the infant infer experimenter 1 wants in the experimental condition?
Adult most likely to be interested in seeing an object novel to them (object 1)
Children as young as 12-months hand over object 1 more than other objects
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
- past two experiments
- how can we explain the conflicting evidence?
These paradigms look very similar, how can we explain the conflicting evidence?
Moll and Tomasello (2007)
Joint engagement condition= infant, experimenter 1, and experimenter 2 play with objects together (as in Tomasello and Haberl (2003))
Onlooking = Experimenter 1 takes on role of observer
In both conditions Experimenter 1 leaves room during presentation of one object, later sees all objects on table, and says “wow!!!Look at that!! Give it to me please!”
14- and 18-month-olds above chance in joint engagement condition only!!
Younger infants may equate joint or overt engagement with knowing, rather than seeing (only later realising seeing is the minimum condition)
Nevertheless, they appear to be understand something about other minds…..
It is difficult to see how the infants would be able to ‘predict’ what the adult was looking for in these situations without a representation of their mental state
Hypothetically, I may have learnt over time to respond to your communicative overtures by handing you an object I had never seen you engage with
BUT the opposite situation, where you WANT an object I have previously seen you engage with, would occur just as often………
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
- Liszkowski et al 2006
- and summary of results from all experiments on this
Recall from communication session: Liszkowski et al (2006; Exp 2)
Experimenter used object (e.g. hole punch) in front of infant, distracter object also present
These objects were then displaced (dropped by accident or moved by E2)
E1 looked around for the object and said, where is it?
Children as young as 12-months pointed more often to target (used object) than distracter (e.g. paper)
In this context, 12-month-olds infer adult is likely to be looking for object previously shown interest in – a familiar object
It seems that children as young as 12-months show evidence of REASONING about other’s communicative intentions
This is damaging for the orienting and engagement hypothesis, and supports the claim that early communication is intentional
If the communicative signals I send cannot be explained by automatic, learnt responses, it is reasonable to assume that I am sending them intentionally
If I act on other’s intentions, and this cannot be explained by automatic learnt responses, it is reasonable to assume that I understand that other people have communicative intent
If I understand that other people have communicative INTENT then I understand at least one type of intention (have theory of mind)
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
-need more evidence that young infants understand intentions?
Need more evidence that young infants understand intentions? Warneken & Tomasello (2006):
eg. out of reach (eg cloths pin), physical object (eg can’t open cabinet), wrong result (eg. books in stack), wrong means (eg flap)
-(However, the chimpanzees did not help the
human reliably in the other types of tasks—that
is, in those involving physical obstacles, wrong
results, or wrong means.)
When the same actions were performed in an intentional way (no referential signals of problem) 18-month-olds didn’t bother to help
We’ll consider WHY children may have been motivated to help in session four
And if other species do this in session five…..
- > look article
- > look videos
Can we use referential communication to tell us when children become emotional ‘mind readers’?
- Repacholi (1998)
It seems that as early as 12-months infants not only try to share their own goals with other people (see communication session), but begin to understand that other people have goals (this session)
Does that mean they understand other people’s emotional desires?
Emotional cues minimal in the studies discussed so far
Can we use referential communication to tell us when children become emotional ‘mind readers’?
Recall from communication session: Repacholi (1998) 14- to 18-month-olds
Visual task adult signaled happiness or disgust on opening a box (contents hidden to infant)
Tactile task adult signaled happiness or disgust when putting hand in closed box.
Infants then allowed to interact with boxes
Does this imply they EXPLICTLY understood that the adult was happy and disgusted about the contents of the box?
May have learnt overtime to avoid things other’s react to negatively, approach things other’s react to positively
Need situation where infant and adult reactions are mismatched to rule out this explanation…..
Can we use referential communication to tell us when children become emotional ‘mind readers’?
-Repacholi and Gopnik (1997)
Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) desire experiment.
Ask 14- and 18-month-old infants, which food item do you prefer?
In the mismatch condition the experimenter uses strong emotional expressions to express disgust for food item the child prefers (animal crackers) and liking towards the other item (broccoli)
In the match condition the experimenter uses strong emotional expressions to express liking for food item the child prefers (animal crackers) and disgust toward the other item (broccoli).
The experimenter then asks the infant for ‘food’………
14-month-olds hand over the animal crackers (their preference) regardless of the adults preference
18-month-olds take into account the adults preference, delivering broccoli when it is desired.
Suggests that by 18-months infants age are beginning to reason non egocentrically about other peoples desires (and communicative intent)
Summary of experiments
Can referential communication tell us when children become ‘mind readers’?
Provided you use an ambiguous situation where the infant has to PREDICT what a persons referential signals are about (rather than simply following their line of sight/point straight to an object) you CAN use referential communication to tell you when children become mind readers
Exact age of onset varies with methodology, but evidence from these studies suggests that children begin to reason about other peoples’ knowledge, intentions and desires from between 12- and 18- months of age
What about other people’s beliefs? And what makes these special?
When do children start to ‘mind read’ other’s beliefs?
-What makes beliefs special?
What makes beliefs special?
Intentions and desires are subjective, they have no basis in the onlookers reality and so cannot be disproved
Only beliefs make claims about current reality, and so their content can be disproved
If you are to successfully predict my behaviour, you will have to understand that my beliefs may be contrary to reality
This is the traditional way to measure theory of mind
It’s a good way to measure theory of mind because behaviours which run contrary to reality are relatively rare
If you PREDICT an uncommon pattern of behaviour, it is likely that you used reasoning rather than automatic/learnt response
eg I want to marry George Clooney
I intend to marry George Clooney
I am married to George Clooney
