Lecture 8 - Earnings Management Flashcards
Define earnings management.
The intentional bias of GAAP through:
- Accounting choices
- Discretionary accruals
- Accounting policy choice
- ‘real’ cash flows
With the purpose of misleading stakeholders, in regards to the underlying economic value of the firm.
Or
To influence contractual outcomes.
Real Decisions
3 different levels of decisions.
Alter transactions to bias financial reports. Affect real cash flows.
- Operating Decisions:
- Delay R&D expenditure
- R&D is expensed (but is often Pos. NPV)
- Maintenance expenditure (benefit in the long run)
- Delay or accelerate sales
- ↑ Credit terms -> ↑bad debt, ↑sales
- Delay R&D expenditure
- Financing Decisions:
- Premature repaying debt ->↓interest in SR
- Investment decisions:
- Sales of securities -> report a gain
- Proceeds>CV
- Sale of fixed assets to affect gains and losses
- Sales of securities -> report a gain
Accounting Choices
- Accounting Policies
- No ‘first-order’ cash flow effect, but second-order.
- Not widely used earnings management: due to disclosure.
- E.g. type of depreciation, useful life, capitalisation, FV vs HC.
- Timing and estimation of accruals
- When to recognise accruals
- E.g. write-offs, write downs, non-performing assets.
- Recognitions vs disclosures
- Lawsuits – contingent liabilities.
- Classification decisions
- Operating or non-recurring (underlying earnings)
- Hide operating expense in ‘restructuring charges’
- Move non-operating income to operating.
- Preference shares à equity not debt.
- Underlying earnings – bias with non-recurring transactions
- E.g. Impairment à once off = transoryà ↓deprecation in future
- ↑NI in future, ↓Equity è ↑ROE in future.
- Operating or non-recurring (underlying earnings)
4 Incentives or motivations for EM.
- Contracting Incentives
- Reported earnings are made by agents.
- Pay aligned with reported earnings
- Debt covenants à manage debt vs equity
The bonus plan hypothesis:
Good: efficient contracts
Bad: opportunistic
Floor or ceiling for bonus
Theorises that management will move future earnings to this current period à increase bonus, through choice of accounting policy.
- Change in CEO
- Opportunity for excessive write down à blame prior CEO
- ‘big bath’
- Political – avoid industry regulations
- Mining boom tax à incentive to bias downwards revenue.
- Valuation Method
- Offer shares à IPO, incentive to increase earnings
- Beat market expectations.
Insider trading.
Conservative vs neutral vs aggressive accounting
Conservative – overly aggressive recognition of provisions (e.g. provision for doubtful debt)
- Overvaluation of R&D
- Overstating of restructuring charges and asset write-offs.
Aggressive – understatement of provisions
Drawing down provisions.
4 patterns of earnings management
Why might this be the case (reasons)?
Income maximation
Income smoothing
- Look like a low risk firm
- E.g. High operating leverage (ratio changes with)
Earnings bath
- Already writing off, no harm in writing off more (inefficient market).
Income minimisation
- Less extreme than earnings bath
7 forces mitigating/limiting earnings management.
- High quality auditors
- Contract restrictions
- Increased regulation à less space for opportunistic discretion.
- E.g. AASB 138 – intangibles
- Strong corporate governance (oversight)
- Ethics, disclosure
- Reversing effect of accruals
- Over the life of the firm, accruals will have the opposite effect in following periods.
- Reputational costs
- Regulatory scrutiny - ASIC
2 reasons why earnings management is beneficial
- Signalling
- GAAP bias à overcome bias (more informative)
- Esp. firms with high operating leverage, or systemic risk.
- ‘Smoothly’ reveal earnings (earnings are “sticky”à creates expectation)
- ↓ Contracting costs à technical breach (e.g. change in GAAP) à increase cost for firm.
- Incomplete contracts à new standard impact
- Compensation
- Possible breach of debt covenant
- Incomplete contracts à new standard impact
4 reasons why earnings management is negative
- Self interest (transfer of wealth to management – through contracting)
- Misallocation à share price no longer accurate.
- Second order à all firms assured EM à increase à lower amount of capital generated.
- If detected à reputational loss, more regulation