lecture 8 Flashcards

1
Q

sometimes social coordination would lead to a better payoff than what is achieved with self-interest pursuit.so how to coordinate?

A
  • altruism → willingness to bear costs to benefit others
  • government policies → taxes or subsidies directed to change payoffs
  • institutuions (formal or informal) that take dicisions based on the “common good”
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2
Q

how to solve repeated games?

A

when the number of repetition is known by the players, we use backwards induction

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3
Q

what is backwards induction?

A
  • iterated process to determine a sequence of optimal actions
  • solve on repetition at a time
  • start from de last repetition of the game, and identify what woud be the optimal strategy at the last point of the game
  • using this information, determine what would be the optimal strategy ate the second-to-last time that the game is played
  • keep going backwards until the first round of the game
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4
Q

what happens with the games with a unknown number of repetitions?

A

they end up with the same
equilibrium strategy as one-shot games
there is the possibility of sustaining the cooperative outcome:
- tit-for-tat strategy → each participant mimics the action of the other player after cooperating in the first round

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5
Q

what is a public good?

A

good that is:
- non-rival in consumption→ use by one person does not inhibit use by others
- non-excludable→ cannot exclude from use

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6
Q

what is a sequential game?

A

a game in which players do not choose their strategies at the same time, and players that choose later can see the strategies already chosen by the other player.
Framework:
* Game tree→ a graphical representation of a dynamic game
* Nodes (except final)→ decision makers have to make a choice
* Edges→ actions at the decision nodes
* Final nodes→ payoffs

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7
Q

when the games are played sequentially, how can you solve them?

A

using backwards induction
- start at the last node
- at each node, the player picks the action that maximixes her own payoff
- only consider actions on the optimal path
- threats become credible

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