Lecture 7 Flashcards

1
Q

in a game of perfect information, the player with the move knows…?

A

the full history of the play of the games thus far

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2
Q

What is the central issue in dynamic games?

A

Credibility

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3
Q

The extensive form of a game is a complete description of:

A

the set of players, what players know when they move, who moves when and what their choices are, and the player’s payoffs as a function of the choices that are made

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4
Q

what is a unique node?

A

beginning of a game tree, also called root

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5
Q

what is a decision node?

A

end of each branch within an extensive form game, this is where one player has to make a decision

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6
Q

if a node has no branches merging from it then it is called?

A

terminal node

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7
Q

what is an information set?

A

made up of nodes that are indistinguishable from the decision maker’s standpoint

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8
Q

What are the consistency requirements for a game tree?

A

no single starting point, no cycles, and no single immediate predecessor

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9
Q

What is a strategy?

A

a complete contingent plan

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10
Q

How is a strategy contingent?

A

it tells a player which branch to follow out of a decision node if the game arrives at that node

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11
Q

How is a strategy complete?

A

it tells him what to choose at every relevant decision node

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12
Q

What is a game of perfect information?

A

one in which all information sets are singleton sets. if at least one information set in the game contains more than one node, the game is one of imperfect information

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13
Q

What is the Kuhn and Zermelo Therorem?

A

every game of perfect information with a finite number of nodes has a solution by backward induction. indeed, if for every player it is the case that no two payoffs are the same, then there is a unique solution to backward induction

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14
Q

Backward induction in the extensive form of a game turns out to be exactly the same as

A

solving the game by IEDS in the normal form

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15
Q

What is one major motivation for studying backward induction?

A

Nash equilibria not always credible

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16
Q

Within the stackelberg model, why is firm 1 able to make a higher profit than in the cournot-nash equilibrium?

A

by committing to produce more than it would in the nash equilibrium, firm 1 forces firm 2 to cut back its own production. This keeps price high and yields firm 1 2/3 of market, instead of half in nash equilibrium