Lecture 2 - Voting Flashcards

1
Q

Features of unanimity voting

A
  • leads to Pareto-improving decisions
  • time-consuming if many alternatives
  • vulnerable to strategic behaviour (<=> veto to get an even better outcome)
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2
Q

3 Criteria for good collective decision-making mechanism

A

1) Achieves a clear-cut stable decision
2) Should be the efficient outcome
3) A reasonable balance b/n the costs and quality of decision-making

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3
Q

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem - definition

A

Impossible to devise a social choice rule that meets some fairly basic requirements. Hence, we need to weigh up the relative advantages and disadvantages of different decision rules.

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4
Q

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem - requirements (5)

A

INPUT

1) Independence of irrelevant alternatives
2) Non-dictatorship: decision not determined by the preferences of one individual
3) Pareto criterion: the collective ranking should coincide with the unanimous individual ranking (if it exists)
4) Unrestricted domain: should accommodate any possible individual ranking
5) Transitivity

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5
Q

Condorcet paradox

A

Transitive preferences at the individual level do not necessarily imply transitive majority-voting outcomes.

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6
Q

When do voting cycles arise?

A

When voter preferences are NOT single-peaked.

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7
Q

Single-peaked preferences + Black’s conclusion

A

For each voter there is an optimum amount of the public good, utility declines with distance from it.

Black: majority rule produces an eq. outcome when prefs are single-peaked.

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8
Q

Cases where preferences are NOT single-peaked

A

1) All-or-nothing prefs (eg. spending to stage an Olympics)
2) Multi-dimensional choices
3) Opt-out alternatives (eg, private education or health care)

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9
Q

Condorcet winner

A

An option which would win successive majority votes if considered in pairwise votes against all others

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10
Q

Agenda-setting & manipulation

A

When no Condorcet winner exists, the person deciding the sequence of pairwise votes has real power.
May lead to manipulation, with people misrepresenting their preferences.

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11
Q

Log-rolling - when is it useful and what effects does it have on welfare?

A

When preference intensities are unevenly distributed, some may benefit from ‘vote-trading’. This can increase community welfare but imposes costs on non-vote-traders.

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12
Q

Borda voting - procedure, which outcomes does it favour, and important result

A

Voters rank all options, they get points depending on their position in each individual ranking.

  • > consensus-orientated, i.e. favours outcomes with broad support, which is not necessarily the pref of the majority
  • > violates IIA requirement
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13
Q

Plurality voting

A

‘First-past-the-post’, only first preference is recorded (parliamentary elections)

  • > encourages tactical voting, i.e. voting for an option forecasted to be likely to win
  • > can fail to select Condorcet winner.
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14
Q

Approval voting

A

Ranking of as many options as voters wish, cutoff b/n ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable

  • > generally does better than plurality voting, but may still fail to pick a Condorcet winner
  • > large strategic implications of the cutoff
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15
Q

Run-off voting

A

French election mechanism

-> can fail to select a Condorcet winner

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16
Q

Citizen-candidate models

A

Solving by BI, voters will choose candidates with preferences close to theirs (as winner implements her preferred policy), either sincerely or strategically (vote for one standing a chance)
-> complex outcomes, depend on cost of running, typically multiple equilibria