Lecture 2-MR Flashcards
Subjectivist Theory
rests on the principle that moral guilt, and hence criminal liability, should be imposed only on people who can be said to have chosen to behave in a certain way or to cause or risk causing certain consequences.
Strict Liability Offences
Prosecution required to prove actus reus but in relation to one or more elements of the actus reus, there is no mens rea element to prove. This can lead to seemingly unjust outcomes.
Society of Great Britain v Storkwain (1986)
Intention
Lord Bridge in Moloney [1985]
The golden rule should be that, when directing a jury … the judge should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent and leave it to the jury’s good sense to decide whether the accused acted with the necessary intent
Intention- History of Cases
1.DPP v Smith [1961]
2.DPP v Hyam [1975]
3.Moloney [1985]
4.Hancock and Shankland [1986]
5.Nedrick [1986]
6.R v Woollin [1999]
DPP v Smith [1961]
Objective Intention-
The main complaint is that the learned judge was there applying what is referred to as an objective test, namely, the test of what a reasonable man would contemplate as the probable result of his acts, and therefore would intend, whereas the question for the jury, it is said, was what the respondent himself intended.
Criminal Justice Act 1967
Reversed the decision in Smith
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,—
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reasons only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.
DPP v Hyam [1975]
Reversed the decision of Smith
Subjective intention-still no distinction between motive and foresight.
Moloney [1985]
The clear effect of Moloney was to narrow down the broad approach to mens rea adopted in Hyam. In the leading judgment Lord Bridge of Harwich observed in Moloney with the approval of all the Law Lords (at 925H):
“But looking on their facts at the decided cases where a crime of specific intent was under consideration, including Reg. v. Hyam [1975] AC 55 itself, they suggest to me that the probability of the consequence taken to have been foreseen must be little short of overwhelming before it will suffice to establish the necessary intent.”
Hancock and Shankland [1986]
They also require an explanation that the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and that if that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that that consequence was also intended.
Nedrick [1986]
The jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.
R v Woollin [1999]
[I]n the rare cases where the simple direction is not enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.” (Lord Steyn)
Jury Discretion
Re A [2001] and
R v Matthews and Alleyne [2003] confirm that a jury retain discretion to find intention if they wish but do not need to do so.
Recklessness
Subjective v Objective Recklessness
Subjective Recklessness
Cunningham [1957]
(1) An actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (i e, the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it).
An alteration
Parker [1977]
A man is reckless in the sense required when he carried out a deliberate act knowing or closing his mind to the obvious fact that there is some risk of damage resulting from that act but nevertheless continuing in the performance of that act.
Does not require the foreseeability of the risk by the D.