LA BAR EXAM NON-CODE TOPIC 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CONSTITUTIONAL Flashcards
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence - was the right against incriminating statements waived?
Under Miranda v. Arizona (U.S. 1966), a statement obtained by police officers through a “custodial” interrogation may not be used against a suspect in a criminal trial unless the suspect waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel after being so informed by the police.
Here, John admitted to committing various crimes after the police arrested him and read Miranda rights to him. He agreed to waive those rights. Although this was a custodial interrogation, his statement complied with Miranda, was not coerced, and thus was voluntary. Note that the fact that police officers lied to John about Ashley having already confessed does not change this analysis. Therefore, John’s voluntary statement is admissible.
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence - did police stop questioning after Miranda was invoked?
Under Edwards v. Arizona (U.S. 1981), once a suspect invokes his Miranda right to counsel during a custodial police interrogation, all questioning and interrogating by the officers must immediately cease.
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence - was the statement made during an interrogation?
Under Miranda v. Arizona (U.S. 1966), a statement obtained by police officers through a custodial interrogation may not be used against a suspect in a criminal trial unless the suspect waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel after being so informed by the police. Here, Adam’s spontaneous statement to the booking officer was not the product of a police interrogation. Therefore, Miranda rights were not required. This statement is admissible.
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence - search incident to arrest exception applicable?
The photos that the police seized from Adam’s phone without a search warrant are inadmissible. The Fourth Amendment provides that “It]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated …
.” In Riley v. California (2014), the Supreme Court
unanimously held that a warrantless search and seizure of the contents of a mobile phone incident to an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment. The search-incident-to-arrest exception did not apply because a search of the phone was unnecessary either to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence. Here, the officers found evidence on Adam’s phone without first obtaining a warrant or Adam’s consent to the search. For that reason, the photos should be suppressed.
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence - - did police have consent to search?
The Fourth Amendment provides that “It]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated …
.» Under the Fourth Amendment, police officers must have a search
warrant, an exception to the warrant requirement, or consent for a search of a person’s residence to be “reasonable.” Here, the police obtained the consent to search John’s home from a co-occupant, namely, John’s mother. However, John was also present at the time and “vigorously opposed” the warrantless search. Under Georgia v. Randolph (U.S. 2006), a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to consent renders a subsequent warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to the objecting occupant.
Because John was physically present and objected to the search, all items subsequently seized by the officers from within John’s residence must be suppressed at his trial.
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence - - did police have an exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles?
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
.” Under the “Automobile Exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement, if the police had probable cause to believe that Ashley’s car contained fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of the crimes for which Ashley had been detained aggravated assault, driving while intoxicated, possession of marijuana, etc. then the police had the right to search without a warrant any part of the car where such fruits, instrumentalities or evidence may have been hidden. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States (U.S. 1925); United States v. Ross (U.S. 1982). Here, the officers’ search of Ashley’s car was supported by probable cause that she had committed crimes and that evidence of those crimes would be found in her car.
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence - - admissibility of favorable evidence regarding one’s character?
Under Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(A), evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character, such as a moral quality, is generally not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. See La. Code Evid. Art. 404(A). However, under Article 404(A)(1), evidence of a pertinent trait of his character, such as a moral quality, offered by an accused is admissible, provided that the evidence bears on “moral qualities pertinent to the crime with which he is charged.” Id. Here, Zak’s character for
“being peaceful and non-violent” is “pertinent” to the violent crimes with which the DA has charged Zak. Therefore, the favorable character testimony from Zak’s supervisor at the Auto Repair Shop should be admissible.
Justification for an Arrest - Pursuit Based on Reasonable Suspicion
In order to detain Nathan and Kimberly for any period of time, the officers must have at least “reasonable suspicion” to believe that the two committed a crime. That is, the officers must have a belief that the suspects have committed a crime, and the officers’ belief must be based on more than a “hunch.” Rather, it must be based on “articulable” facts.
Here, the officers had more than sufficient facts to justify pursuit and detention of Nathan and Kimberly. They had information from Heather’s next door neighbor that there was “commotion” in Heather’s apartment. They saw Nathan and Kimberly run, jump into an SUV and “speed away” from the scene of the commotion. They saw that Nathan and Kimberly would not stop during the police chase. They saw Nathan “ram” his SUV into a police cruiser, continue to
“speed away,” and stop only upon hitting a police “tire spike.” There is no doubt that both the pursuit and the detention were premised on both “reasonable suspicion,” and “probable cause.”
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence - - search of vehicle incident to arrest?
The items seized from Nathan’s SUV should be suppressed. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires an actual and continuing threat to officer safety posed by an arrestee, or the need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle’s recent occupants have been secured. Here, Nathan was “in handcuffs;” thus, a warrantless search incident to arrest is prohibited. Finally, there was no probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence pursuant to the
“automobile exception,” given that the police stopped the car only for traffic violations and general suspicious behavior.
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence – admissibility of a statement against implicating someone else?
Kimberly’s out-of-court statement is not admissible against Kevin if Kimberly refuses to testify at Kevin’s trial. The introduction of Kimberly’s out-of-court statement under those circumstances would violate not only the evidentiary rule against hearsay, but also Kevin’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the state’s witnesses. Given
Constitutional Bases To Exclude Certain Evidence – admissibility of identification, suggestive, photograph?
An identification procedure is “suggestive” if it involves either the use of (a) a single suspect, or (b) distracter/fillers who have a very different appearance from the suspect. This is so because the procedure suggests to the eyewitness that the subject is the perpetrator. In this case, detectives presented a single photograph of Kimberly to an eyewitness - the neighbor of Heather. Given the totality of these circumstances, the identification procedure was suggestive. Moreover, given that it was not conducted close in time and place to the crime, it was “unnecessarily” suggestive. As a result, it should be excluded from evidence pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is likely to result in an “unreliable” identification. It is unclear whether the witness’s identification here would be unreliable.
Admissibility under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement?
The marijuana plant is admissible. A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in objects held out to the public. Although the entry to a home is within the curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches, a police officer may approach a home in hopes of speaking to its occupants, just like a private citizen. Furthermore, under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, the police may make a warrantless seizure when they: (i are legitimately on the premises; (ii discover evidence, fruits or instrumentalities of crime, or contraband; (iii) see such evidence in plain view; and (iv) have probable cause to believe that the item is evidence, contraband, or a fruit or instrumentality of crime. In this case, Kyle kept a small marijuana plant in a planter on his front porch. Kyle has no reasonable expectation of privacy in things kept on his front porch that are visible from the public street or to anyone who might come onto his porch in the hope of speaking to him.
Alternatively, the police officers’ seizure of the marijuana plant falls under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. The officers had a right to be outside of Kyle’s home on his porch, saw the planter with the marijuana plant in plain view, and it was immediately apparent that the plant was marijuana, which is evidence of crime. Thus, the officers’ seizure of the marijuana plant was proper, and it is admissible.
Admissibility of sworn, testimonial statement?
Sean’s sworn statement is not admissible. The Sixth Amendment grants to the defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to confront adverse witnesses. Under the Confrontation Clause, prior testimonial evidence (e.g., statements made at prior judicial proceedings) may not be admitted unless (i) the declarant is unavailable and (in) the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the time the statement was made. In this case, the introduction of Sean’s out-of-court statement under these circumstances would violate Kyle’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Sean’s statement was testimonial because it was given in response to police questioning. Although Sean, the declarant, is unavailable, Kyle did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Sean at the time he made the statement. Thus, Sean’s statement is inadmissible against Kyle.
Admissibility under an exception by probation officers?
The methamphetamine seized from within Kyle’s home is admissible. In Louisiana, a probationer has a reduced expectation of privacy which allows a probation officer to conduct unannounced visits to verify that the probationer is in compliance with the provisions of his probation. Further, as a condition of probation, a probationer agrees to searches of his person, his property, his place of residence, his vehicle, or his personal effects, at any time by the probation officer or the parole officer assigned to him, with or without an arrest warrant or search warrant, when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the probationer is engaged in or has been engaged in criminal activity. Thus, in Louisiana, it is not a Fourth Amendment violation to conduct a warrantless search of a probationer’s home under these circumstances. In this case, investigators had Kyle’s probation officer accompany them for a search of Kyle’s home. The information that the investigators could give to Kyle’s probation officer would cause the officer to have reasonable suspicion to believe that Kyle was engaged in criminal activity. Since the seizure of the methamphetamine did not violate Kyle’s Fourth Amendment rights, it is admissible.
Admissibility of spontaneous statement not made in response to interrogation?
Kyle’s statement to the arresting officer is admissible. Anyone in police custody and accused of a crime must be given Miranda warnings prior to interrogation by the police. However, Miranda does not apply to spontaneous statements not made in response to interrogation. In this case, Kyle made the statement at issue prior to receiving complete Miranda warnings.
However, Kyle’s statement was spontaneous and was not given in response to interrogation by the police. Thus, Kyle’s statement is admissible even though it was made without Kyle having first been given a complete set of Miranda warnings.
