L7 - deep dive liberty: Hannah Arendt Flashcards
intro
Go on with critique liberalism
e.g. maybe rooting in individualism -> can’t handle with differences (e.g. multiculturalism)
Eg. Maybe idealism not good
e.g. neutrality: maybe we should weigh different conceptions goods (maybe we should say something about what is good rather than just about what is right)
Arendt: German Jew that fled to the US
Gives critique of liberalism
liberalism core = neutrality, individualism, idealism
Arendt: critique Berlin, using same words
Arendt: what is the problem of freedom?
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), “What is Freedom?” Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Classics (1961).
What is the problem of freedom?
Arendt: we made a philosophical problem = the question of freedom has a preceding question about the free will, which is rooted in thinking of predetermination -> there is no answer to this, we can’t figure out if it resorts back to predeterminism
- notion of freedom always been mistrusted = idea of making someone free is making them free from predeterminism (from God)
- the question/problem mostly via God
problem = we locate freedom in the will: we linked freedom and the will
- Philosophically it can can never be proven, because free will cannot be established in the world.
- Kant’s mistake was to push it internally, into the inner recesses of the will.
Instead, it should be taken into the public sphere.
In other words, it should be political.
Have to take freedom out of the will: relocate it outside of the self: into the public = there has to be a space where people act together politically and we have to conceptualize what freedom means vis a vis our relations with others
Arendt: why freedom is a matter of politics (quote)
“The field where freedom has always been known, not as a problem, to be sure, but as a fact of everyday life, is the political realm … [Freedom] is not only one among the many problems and phenomena of the political realm properly speaking, such as justice, or power, or equality; freedom, which only seldom – in times of crisis or revolution – becomes the direct aim of political action, is actually the reason that men live together in political organization at all. Without it, political life as such would be meaningless. The raison d’etre of politics is freedom, and its field of expertise is action” (144-45).
Quote means: we don’t think of freedom being internal, if you’re on an island on your own, you have “freedom of speech?” freedom already pressuposes others
Putting it in side the will means losing its power, it doen’t have any meaning
Freedom is meaningful when you’re among others -> can’t just be the state of willing
Arendt: problem = when freedom becomes the escape from the political domain rather than a commitment to it
= internal critique liberalism (using same language as Berlin did to defend it)
She suggests that freedom-as-escape might make you feel free, but this is not real.
“The freedom which we take for granted in all political theory … is the very opposite of “inner freedom,” the inward space into which men may escape from external coercion and feel free. This inner feeling remains without outer manifestations and hence is by definition politically irrelevant … The experiences of inner freedom are derivative in that they always presuppose a retreat from the world … into an inwardness to which no other has access” (145).
- liberalism is per definition anti-political = you’re free when you can’t be coerced = freedom from politics
- Berlin defense liberty = defense of the self over the other = freedom as escape: freedom of being alone
- Berlin is conflating freedom from feeling free (inner freedom)
- quote sounds like Berlin: have place/fortress of the self in which others don’t have access
So where did this come from?
- Augustine and early Christian thinkers that rose during the fall of the Roman empire, and the stoics.
- The retreat from the world of sinners; the retreat from politics
- idea that there is something good in retreating from the world
- deep privileging the body = body is a place of sin, it sets you back into earthly shackles -> you want to be outside it
-> philosophy thinks the body is dumb: for eating, reproducing, it is the animal part of us, the mind/brain is raised above
!Arendt: freedom should not be retreated from politics, from the world bc then it becomes meaningless
what is freedom for Arendt?
Freedom needs political organization.
A space for politics – i.e. a polis:
- “Freedom needed … the company of other men who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them – a politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men could insert himself by word and deed … Without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance” (147).
- diff from idea of space/fortress of negative liberty where freedom is just what I will alone
- freedom is a thing that needs to be performed, I alone on my island can say I have freedom of speech but it means nothing, in the polis it has meaning
Freedom is a thing that is performed, akin to a performative art, on the political stage:
- “Freedom as inherent in action is perhaps … best rendered by “virtuosity,” that is, an excellence we attribute to the performing arts (as distinguished from the creative arts of making), where the accomplishment lies in the performance itself and not in an end product” … [The Polis] was precisely that “form of government” which provided men with a space of appearances where they could act, with a kind of theater where freedom could appear … [If] we understand the political in the sense of the polis, its end or raison d’être would be to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as virtuosity can appear” (151-3).
- virtuosity = performative
- ideal political terms, ideal political organization = fair terms of cooperation: requires a space where we can perform our freedom in tandem
she idealizes the polis as model of freedom
Arendt: what isn’t freedom = quick critique of liberalism
Here is her mocking re-statement of the liberal position:
“We are inclined to believe that freedom begins where politics ends … Is it not true, as we all somehow believe, that politics is compatible with freedom only because and insofar as it guarantees a possible freedom from politics?” (148).
- much of liberalism can be distilled to this freedom from politics alone
So why do we think of freedom and politics as opposed? …
… She blames liberalism for this association of freedom and the will
“Every attempt to derive the concept of freedom from experiences in the political realm sounds strange and startling because all our theories in these matters are dominated by the notion that freedom is an attribute of the will and thought much rather than of action … This, of course, belongs among the fundamental tenets of liberalism, which, its name notwithstanding, has done its share to banish the notion of liberty from the political realm. For politics, according to the same philosophy, must be concerned almost exclusively with the maintenance of life and the safeguarding of interests” (153-4).
- !!reread it: how much of liberalism, once you take interests out of politics, does it just become
Q: are politicians more free? Yes: choosing representtives reduces our freedom. Deeper level No: politicians aren’t free either, stuck in the same world in which all politicians do now is just safeguarding individual interests)
Arendt - the core problem
= the dominance of the I-Will
The will was discovered in part because of its own impotence, not its strength.
- “Historically, men first discovered the will when they experienced its impotence, and not its power, when they said with Paul: “For to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not” … Hence, the will is both powerful and impotent, free and unfree” (160).
- if I will my hand to go out, it will do that = freedom
- but willing the self to be good (to not sin, to be who you want to be) = the will is impotent/powerless
the will is powerful and impotent, both free and unfree AND THAT IS JUST WITHIN THE SELF
The problem is the will’s paralysis vis-à-vis the outside world:
- the self among others = you can’t will that others do something, they won’t
- “The relation of mind to body was for Augustine even the outstanding example for the enormous power inherent in the will: “the mind commands the body, and the body obeys instantly; the mind commands itself, and is resisted” … Christian will-power was discovered as an organ of self-liberation and immediately found wanting. It is as though the I-will immediately paralyzed the I-can, as though the moment men willed freedom, they lost their capacity to be free” (160).
- Once we think of ourself as freedom is willing, you can only free on your own alone
problem of freedom of the will = you can never be free among others (you can’t will them) OR you have to dominate them (you can force/coerce it)
We should have instead foregrounded potential action in the world (I-can).
- the greeks: freedom to make sense is a diff power entirely: actually being able to do something
- say: i want you to put out your arm
- Freedom is doing things, willing it has no bearing
Arendt flips Berlin’s logic on its head
It is actually narrow (liberal) views of freedom that tend towards totalitarianism …
… because this is the manner of thinking that believes in the sovereign power of the individual over all else.
- In the political world we have no sovereignty over ourselves: if you make the individual the core of freedom -> individuals need to be sovereign but they can’t be in the context of others
- Quote 1: if my will is that everyone jumps, they need to be coerced if it is not their will
“In the deadly conflict with worldly desires and intentions from which will-power was supposed to liberate the self, the most willing seemed able to achieve was oppression. Because of the will’s impotence, its incapacity to generate genuine power … the will-to-power turned at once into a will-to-oppression … [This is] why even today we almost automatically equate power with oppression or, at least, with rule over others” (160-1).
So, freedom-of-the-will became will-to-power and finally will-to-sovereignty:
“The fact that the I-will has become so power-thirsty, that will and will-to-power have become practically identical, is perhaps due to its having been first experienced in impotence … Because of the philosophic shift from action to will-power … the ideal of freedom ceased to be virtuosity in the sense we mentioned before and became sovereignty, the ideal of free will, independent from others and eventually prevailing against them” (161-2).
main point = will-to-sovereignty (ideal of free will indepdnent from others and eventually prevailing over them)
Quote 2: if I want to get my will I have to options:
Go on an island alone and freedom becomes meaningless
Or I make you do as I want and then freedom becomes oppression
Arendt: sovereignty means:
Sovereignty means that individuals can be meaningfully considered as things that exist on their own.
“Politically, this identification of freedom with sovereignty is perhaps the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of freedom and free will. For it leads either to a denial of human freedom – namely, if it is realized that whatever men may be, they are never sovereign – or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be purchased only at the price of freedom, i.e., the sovereignty, or all others … Under human conditions, which are determined by the fact that not man but men live on the earth, freedom and sovereignty are so little identical that they cannot even exist simultaneously. Where men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must submit to the oppression of the will, be this the individual will with which I force myself, or the “general will” of an organized group. If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce” (162-3).
So: sovereignty is not identical to freedom but its opposite.
!important she uses same images as Berlin when criticicizing it: in your forcefield you are sovereign
Liberalism is based on fatasy on an individual sovereignty
In a group no one is sovereign
Sovereignty can’t work amonst others -> freedom ahs no meaning ore there can never be freedom in the collective
“not man but men live on the earth” = crucial: not person but people
Critique liberal assumption you are most free when you are sovereign, when you have your force field around yourself -> this only works in a world where we don’t make politics together
To be free amongst others you need to get rid of sovereignty: we are free when we are not sovereign but acting together
so what do we make of this?
- Freedom requires a space, the polis, where the I-Can triumphs over the I-Will.
there needs to be a space in which we can act freely, you’re not meaningfully free on an island on you own - Where we recognize that no one is sovereign over anyone else.
Thus to be free, others must be free too.
- we are not sovereign at all: we are not sovereign in the sense that we dominate others - to be free means others must be free to: So freedom is about action. This is the magical capacity of humanity:
“History, in contradistinction to nature, is full of events; here the miracle of accident and infinite improbability occurs so frequently that it seems strange to speak of miracles at all. But the reason for this frequency is merely that historical processes are created and constantly interrupted by human initiative, by the initium man is insofar as he is an acting being … It is men who perform them – men who because they have received the twofold gift of freedom and action can establish a reality of their own” (169).
(he didn’t read the quote)
Miller on Arendt
1) He argues that Arendt makes a strong case for why republican ideals still matter, harkening back to the Greek polis
2) But he critiques Arendt as being narcissistic, insubstantial and pessimistic:
- how can freedom be sustained?
- And is freedom-as-virtuosity really freedom?
3) And he pits a dichotomy between the thought of Pettit (who de-politicizes republicanism) and Arendt (who foregrounds politics).
Arendt and Pettit are both republican, but have different conceptions of republicanism
Q&A
Will is impotent internally + amongst others
Will is either domination or not satisfied
If we’re being dominated, we can’t be free -> this is why liberalism fails -> Arendt: with republicanism you can at least avoid being/feeling dominated
Arendt’ freedom really rare: in most situations we are not free, it is not a state, it requires a lot of things
Does domination have to be formal?
Norms and laws are both dominating in both liberal and republican sense
Liberal sense wants to make things overly formal, republican doesn’t really care
How to get rid of sovereignty?
We don’t, we need to get rid of the idea that sovereignty leads to freedom
Arendt: freedom happens the moment we realize we are not sovereign and thus actually have to do among others rather than will in ourselves
Idea of the polis:
- Space in which people come together and act together
- When we think something requires others: the more solidaristic we are, the more free we are
- More basic: say you can only bring a suitcase uby cooperating ,you are free
