L6: Finalising judicial interpretation Flashcards
Four rules of statutory interpretation
Purposive Rule- Categories overlap, not rigid
Literal Rule- Rules of Construction
Golden Rule- Derived from verb to construe’ meaning to interpret
Mischief Rule- Not really strict rules but sometimes referred to as ‘canons of interpretation’
The Limitations of Statutory Interpretation
R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood (1997)
‘The roles of the judges are interpret what parliament has laid down and is irrelevant whether the judges agree or disagree with the policy of the Act’. (Lord Burrows)
In this case, the coirt concluded that the wording of the Act was clear and so the sample couldn’t be used. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the COA agreed too.
Purposive Rule
Based on the mischief rule, butr arguably goes further by looking at what situation parliament siought to adress in a wider sense
Key Case- R (Quintavelle) v Secretary of State for Health (2003)
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
- Application for judicial review that Cell Nuclear Replacement organisms were not ‘embryos’ within the definition of section 1(1) HFEA 1990: ‘a live human embryo where fertilisation is complete’.
- The applicants, a Pro-Life Alliance opposed the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority being given permission under the Act to carry out work using embryos created by CNR.
Case History-
R (Quintavelle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003]
- 1st instance-judge allowed the application
COA- heard Secretary of State’s appeal and the Claimant’s cross appeal: - Set aside judges declaration at first instance
- Concluded s3(3)(d) prohibition didn’t apply to CNR
- Allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and dismissed the claimant’s cross appeal
HOL’s heard the claimant’s appeal: - Dismissed the claimant’s appeal
- Affirmed the COA decision
- ‘Dicta of Lord Wilberforce in RCN of the UK v DHSS[1981] applied
- Embryos created via CNR fell within the definition of s1(1)
Key Phrasing
‘Such is the skill of parliamentary draftsmen that most statutory enactments are expressed in language which is clear and unambiguous and gives rise to no serious controversy. But these are not the provisions which reach the courts, or at any rate the appellate courts’- para 7, Lord Bingham
‘The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. It isn’t to say that attention should be confined, and a literal interpretation should be given to the particular provisions which give rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only encourages immense prolixity in drafting, since the draftsman will feel obliged to provide expressly for every contingency which may possibly arise. It may also (under the banner of loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the frustration of that will, because undue concentration on the minutiae of the enactment may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve when it enacted the statute….
Quintavelle Judgement
‘…Every statute other than a pure consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the national life. The court’s task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament’s purpose. So, the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment.’ [para 8, Lord Bingham]
‘There is, I think, no inconsistency between the rule that statutory language retains the meaning it had when Parliament used it and the rule that a statute is always speaking. If Parliament, however long ago, passed an Act applicable to dogs, it could not properly be interpreted to apply to cats; but it could properly be held to apply to animals which were not regarded as dogs when the Act was passed but are so regarded now. The meaning of “cruel and unusual punishments” has not changed over the years since 1689, but many punishments which were not then thought to fall within that category would now be held to do so.’ [para 9, Lord Bingham]
Aids to interpretation used in Quintavelle
Extrinsic aid: ‘The target of section 3(3)(d) is in my opinion made plain by paragraph 12.14 of the Warnock Report, which need not be quoted but which was directed to a particular form of genetic manipulation, replacement of the nucleus of a fertilised human egg.’ [para 18, Lord Bingham]
Intrinsic aid: ‘The White Paper referred, at para 36, to “techniques aimed at modifying the genetic constitution of an embryo” and proposed that legislation “should clearly prohibit all such activities, but with a power for Parliament itself, by affirmative resolution, to make exceptions to these prohibitions if new developments made that appropriate”. Section 3(3)(d) was, I infer, enacted to give effect to this recommendation. [para 18, Lord Bingham
Key Quote
‘The pendulum has swung towards purposive methods of construction… nowadays the shift towards purposive interpretation is not in doubt. The qualification is that the degree of liberality permitted is influenced by the context, e g social welfare legislation and tax statutes may have to be approached somewhat differently. For these slightly different reasons I agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that section 1(1) of the 1990 Act must be construed in a purposive way.’ [para 21 Lord Steyn]
