L5 - Licences (cases) Flashcards
Winter Garden Theatre v Millennium Productions (1948) (HL)
Main point: contractual licence is enforceable against licensor according to its terms
=> if terms make it clear that not intended to be perpetual, can be revoked giving reasonable notice + reasonable time to leave premises after revocation
Summary: D theatre granted C theatre company 6m licence to use theatre, w/ option to renew periodically & rent payable weekly – after C exercised option to renew, D served notice to terminate licence = breach of contract bcs no term allowing D to do that => C ag that licence was perpetual
=> HL held that licence was not perpetual
intention of the parties (inferred from doc) = upon D indicating their decision to withdraw licence, C were to have reasonable time to withdraw, after which they would become trespassers
≠ CA : construed contract as granting a licence which was not revokable by D – equity could grant injunction to restrain purported revocation in breach of terms
Hill v Tupper (1863)
Main point (here) a contractual licence is not binding on a stranger to the contract
Summary: Canal Co granted H exclusive right to put pleasure boats on canal (adjacent to land leased to H). T = 3P local tavern O also put pleasure boats on the canal, H sued T for infringing his exclusive right
Court held in favour of T, who was not bound by H’s right (not an easement nor any recognised proprietary right, and NC so no new proprietary right)
National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth (1965) (HL)
Main point (here) Lord Upjohn’s ag that W not a licensee of husband: allowed = has a right (and duty) to be in the house bcs of marriage / her status as a wife
Summary : family home registered in sole name of H, who deserted, leaving W & children in occº - H borrowed money from bank & defaulted, bank sought possession, W resisted, claiming that her ‘deserted wife’s equity’ = an OI under s70(1)(g) LRA 1925
HL held in favour of bank : deserted wife’s rights were of a personal nature, and only proprietary rights could be made overriding by AO under s70(1)(g)
Lord Upjohn : “She is not a trespasser, she is not a licensee of her husband, she is lawfully there as a wife, the situation is one sui generis.”
Manchester Airport v Dutton (2000) (CA)
Main point: a licence can give licensee standing to evict a 3P where that is necessary to give effect to his rights under the licence (even if licensee not in possession yet)
/!\ controversial decision
Summary : National Trust granted MA a licence to go on their land and cut some trees in the way of new runway, 3P protesters entered the land to get in the way of tree-cutting a couple of days before grant of licence, MA seeking to evict them
CA held in favour of MA – licensee in occupation had right to evict trespassers, shouldn’t be any different for licensee not yet in occupation => had standing to evict trespassers in order to give effect to his rights under the licence
Manchester Airport v Dutton (2000) (criticism)
Chadwick LJ (dissenting) : “the plaintiff must succeed by the strength of his title, not on the weakness (or lack) of any title in the defendant.”
Swadling : what gives licensee in possession standing to sue trespassers = fact of possession, not the licence – licence itself is a personal / contractual right = not enforceable by itself against anyone not privy to its creation
King v David Allen (1916) (HL)
Main point: orthodox position = contractual licence is not binding on successors of the licensor (but possible to sue licensor in contract for breach)
Summary: D gave P written permission to put advertisement poster on wall of cinema for 4y + promised that while licence remained, wouldn’t let others put posters on that wall. D leased premises to cinema company, which refused permission granted by ag to P (lease made no reference to it)
HL held the ag did not create an interest in land, merely a personal oblº on the part of licensor to allow licensees to use the wall for advertisements => licensor put it out of his own power to fulfil his oblº (by leasing the cinema), so was lb for breach
Errington v Errington (1952) (CA) (main point)
Lord Denning asserting that, bcs intervention of equity, “contractual licences now have a force and validity of their own and cannot be revoked in breach of the contract”
=> “Neither the licensor nor anyone who claims through him can disregard the contract except a purchaser for value without notice”
Errington v Errington (1952) (CA) (Summary)
Summary: F brough house for son & DIL, promised them it would be theirs if they repaid the mortgage. S & DIL moved in & duly paid mortgage, but F died before could be fully repaid => house passed to his widow – relº broke down btw S & DIL, S moved in w/ W and W sought to evict DIL
CA held that DIL and S were licensees entitled to occupy the house under personal ag, so long as paid instalments - BUT promise gave rise to an equitable interest capable of binding W
Somervell LJ : oral ag so pb under s53 LPA but doctrine of part performance applies
Denning LJ : licensees w/ contractual / equitable right to remain as long as paid installments, which would grow into ‘good equitable title’ (under estate contract?) to the house as soon as mortgage was paid ??
=> idea that since merging of CL and Equity, licensor will not be permitted to eject licensee in breach of contract -> means that contractual licences “now have a force and validity of their own” = can’t be revoked in breach of contract
=> only equity’s darling can disregard the contract
National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth (1965) (HL)
Main point: wife’s personal right (/!\ not really a licence) not capable of binding H’s successor in title (bank) => to be overriding, interest must be proprietary – notice of a personal right not enough by itself to make it binding against a successor in title
Summary: family home registered in sole name of H, who deserted, leaving W & children in occº - H borrowed money from bank & defaulted, bank sought possession, W resisted, claiming that her ‘deserted wife’s equity’ = an OI under s70(1)(g) LRA 1925
=> HL held in favour of bank : deserted wife’s rights were of a personal nature, and only proprietary rights could be made overriding by AO under s70(1)(g)
Binions v Evans (1972) (CA)
Main point: possible for the court to impose a CT which makes rights under licence binding on 3P – eg where 3P acquired title at a reduced price because he undertook to give effect to the licence tries to go back on his word
Summary: O of cottage allowed D widow “to reside in and occupy” the cottage “as a tenant at will of them free of rent for the remainder of ger life or until determined” (4w notice in writing) – O sold cottage to P, sale included clause protecting D’s occupation (which meant P paid lower price) – P tried to evict D the following year
=> CA held: P took cottage on CT to permit D to reside there during her life or as long as she desired (applying Bannister v Bannister)
Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold (1989) (CA)
Main point : (Rostill lecture) bringing contractual licences back in their box = they are not proprietary / binding on purchasers (unless their conscience is sufficiently affected to impose a CT)
Summary : D sold leasehold in shopping premises to P1, ag included undertaking by P1 (i) to let D remain for 7m (no rent), and longer unless P1 gave a quarter’s notice, and (ii) that once property dvp P1 would give D a lease of a shop on the site – 10y later, P2 brought freehold of premises and sought to evict D
=> CA held in favour of D :
- Tenancy analysis: ag btw D and P1 granted D exclusive possession for a term = created a tenancy (even though no rent) – D2 was in actual occupation of the land so interest under the tenancy = an overriding interest under s70(1)(g) LRA 1925 => D2 couldn’t restrain P from proceeding w/ dvp not providing shop premises, but could compel P to offer a shop on the land if shop premises were in fact constrctued
- if no tenancy (/!\ obiter) : mere contractual licence to occupy land not binding on purchaser, even w/ notice of it BUT appropriate facts might give rise to CT => Court would not impose a CT unless satisfied that conscience of O affected so that it would be inequitable to allow him to deny C his interest – available evidence insufficient for CT here
