Knowledge Flashcards
knowledge by acquaintance
Knowledge by acquaintance involves being familiar with something, for example, the taste of sugar. If you assert you ‘know’ the taste of sugar then you are not making a factual claim about sugar itself, for instance that it is sweet, you are merely claiming that due to previous experience, you can distinguish it from something else, such as salt.
practical (or ability related) knowledge
Practical knowledge involves knowing how to do certain things, like tying your shoelaces. Again, if you assert you ‘know’ how to tie your shoelaces then you are not making a factual claim about shoelaces, rather you are claiming you possess the ability to carry out a specific task.
propositional (factual) knowledge
A proposition is a declarative statement. A declarative statement asserts (or declares) an alleged fact, for example, that Fremantle is south of Scarborough. Propositional (factual) knowledge differs from other types of knowledge because it involves holding beliefs. A belief is an attitude (mindset) that something is (or is not) the case. Another way to express this would be to say beliefs aim to correspond to the way things really are.
TRADITIONAL PLATONIC TRI-PARTITE ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE
If a list of conditions is individually necessary and jointly sufficient, this means (1) you need each of them (they are individually necessary) and (2) if all conditions are met, then nothing more is required (they are jointly sufficient).
Plato is asserting a subject will possess knowledge if the following conditions are met:
(1) A subject (S) believes a proposition (p)
(2) The proposition (p) is true
(3) The subject (S) is justified in holding their belief about the proposition (p)
What is epistemology
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Epistemologists study the nature of knowledge, epistemic justification, the rationality of belief, and various related issues. Epistemology is considered one of the four main branches of philosophy, along with ethics, logic, and metaphysics.
GETTIER STYLE COUNTER-EXAMPLES TO PLATO’S TRI-PARTITE ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE
Gettier outlined two scenarios where an individual may hold a justified true belief, but the reason they held this belief resulted from coincidence, so they cannot be said to possess knowledge. Gettier’s examples are long and complicated so here are two simple examples:
(A) Suppose I believe there is a police car in the road outside because I can hear a police siren. There is in fact such a car outside, but the siren I hear is on my son’s music system in the next room.
· I believe there is a car outside = belief condition met
· There is a car outside = truth condition met
· I have good justification for believing there is a car outside = justification condition met
(B) I believe I will roll a number six on the dice because it is a loaded dice, but someone has switched the dice I was going to use, and it happens to land on number six by chance.
· I believe I will roll a number six on the dice = belief condition met
· I do roll a number six on the dice = truth condition met
· I have good justification for believing I will roll a number six = justification condition met
In both cases all three requirements are met. A belief is held, it is true, and it is well justified. Yet, we feel uneasy saying the person possesses knowledge because the justification is the result of coincidence.
NOZICK’S CONDITIONAL (TRUTH-TRACKING) THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Nozick claims, that for S to know p we require S would not have believed p if p had been false. In other words, the subject must hold more than a merely coincidental justified true belief.
Nozick retains two familiar conditions
(1) S believes p
(2) p is true
But he replaces the justification condition with two new conditions:
(3) If p were false, then S would not believe p
This condition rules out individuals holding justified true beliefs as a result of coincidence.
(4) If in changed circumstances, p was still true, then S would still believe p
The third and fourth condition ensures beliefs ‘track’ the truth.
Consider a different example:
(1) S believes p
Jon (the subject) believes Julie loves him (the proposition)
(2) p is true
Julie does love Jon
(3) If p were false, then S would not believe p
If Julie did not love Jon, then Jon would not believe Julie loved him
(4) If in changed circumstances, p was still true, then S would still believe p
If the changed circumstances involved Julie marrying Derek (perhaps against her will under pressure from her parents) but secretly still loving Jon, then we could imagine Jon no longer believing Julie loves him.
GLOBAL SCEPTICISM
We have established that if the conditions listed below are satisfied, then a subject can be said to possess knowledge.
(1) S believes p
(2) p is true
(3) If p were false, then S would not believe p
(4) If in changed circumstances, p was still true, then S would still believe p
THE DREAM ARGUMENT
P1 When dreaming it is not uncommon to have perceptions similar to those when not dreaming
P2 It is not always possible to distinguish between the experiences of dreams and waking consciousness
C Thus, I cannot rule out the possibility that right now I am dreaming, which may make my perceptions false
THE EVIL DEMON ARGUMENT
P1 If an evil demon existed who is capable of completely deceiving us in our beliefs about the external world, then we would not know anything about the external world
P2 We cannot rule out the possibility that such an evil demon does exist
C Therefore, we cannot be said to know anything about the external world
THE BRAIN IN A VAT ARGUMENT
Modern philosophers have also used hypothetical thought-experiment to make the same point as Descartes. Hilary Putnam’s brain in a vat argument re-states the argument from global scepticism as follows:
P1 If I know p then I must know I am not a brain in a vat
P2 I do not know I am not a brain in a vat
C Therefore, I cannot know p
The brain in a vat (BIV) argument claims if we cannot reject the possibility of being a BIV, then we cannot reject the possibility our claims to knowledge about the external world are false.
The Matrix argument runs as follows:
P1 If I know p, then it follows I know I am not locked within the computer-generated illusion of the matrix
P2 I do not know I am not locked in the computer-generated illusion of the matrix
Therefore
C I cannot know p
INFALLIBILISM
P1 If I know a belief about the external world is true, then it follows I must be certain I am not being deceived
P2 I cannot be certain I am not being deceived
Therefore
C I cannot know if any of my beliefs about the external world are true
