Justiciability Flashcards

1
Q

Constitutional Standing Requirements

A

Lujan/Allen

(1) Injury in fact
(2) Causation
(3) Redressability

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2
Q

Injury in Fact

A

(Lujan): invasion of legally protected interest that is (i) concrete/particularized and (ii) imminent (not conjectural)

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3
Q

Types of Injury

A

1) physical
2) wallet (Hein, Scalia)
3) noneconomic –Laidlaw, environmental; Gill, vote dilution; Heckler, stigmatic injury; Bakke opportunity injury

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4
Q

Stigmatic Injury

A

Fletcher: must be connected to constitutional right

Ex: P must be personally denied equal treatment (Allen, Heckler), stigma violates 1A EC (Flast, 10 C)

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5
Q

Opportunity Injury

A

Sunstein: framing injury as limit on opportunity to compete, receive education (Bakke) avoids causation/redressability problems later

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6
Q

Concrete and particularized requirement

A

Must be concrete, otherwise impermissible generalized grievance (Richardson CIA); if harm concrete, can be widely shared (Akins)

Party seeking review must be among injured (Sierra Club v. Morton)

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7
Q

Imminence requirement

A

For injunction, injury must be likely (not speculative, Clapper)

General standard: substantial risk of injury (Susan B. Anthony List, 1A)

Higher standard: certainly impending (Clapper, national security context)

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8
Q

Probabilistic Harm

A

(i) how realistic threat of harm (insufficient in Summers, Forest)
(ii) perhaps standing if low probability but catastrophic consequences (MA v. EPA)

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9
Q

Causation

A

Injury must be “fairly traceable” to challenged action (link between conduct/injury)

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10
Q

Third-Party Intervention

A

P claims D is doing or should be doing something with respect to behavior of TP, who injures P (Linda R.S., child support; Allen, IRS)

Unlikely to generate causation or redressability

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11
Q

Redressability

A

Relief must “likely” cure injury (link between injury/relief) (Linda R.S.)

No redressability for injunctions for prospective relief where injury occurred in past (Lyons)

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12
Q

Taxpayer Standing

A

General rule: no; injury minute, uncertain effect on Treasury (Frothingham)

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13
Q

Flast Two-Part Nexus Test

A

Taxpayer must establish nexuses between (1) status as taxpayer and type of legislative action at issue; (2) status as taxpayer and precise nature of constitutional infringement alleged

Limited: (1) must be congressional T&S power at issue; (2) Congress must violate restraint on that power (Valley Forge distinguished as executive, Property Clause; Hein as executive; Ariz. Christian donations, not coerced extraction)

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14
Q

Individual Legislator Standing

A

General rule: no

Exception: Coleman – (i) injury = deprivation of personal entitlement to vote (not institutional injury, Raines; Windsor Scalia dissent); (ii) total nullification of vote such that result went other way

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15
Q

Institutional Legislature Standing

A

Ariz. State Legislature: legislature as institution has standing if (i) institutional injury; (ii) nullification of votes

[distinguish Raines: institution suing, not individuals]

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16
Q

Voter Standing

A

Gill: must allege injury to individual right to vote to be concrete and particularized

If injury = dilution, injury is district-specific

(concurrence: may also be 1A associational harm)

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17
Q

Third-Party Standing

A

Generally not allowed.

Can be provided discretionarily. Defendants’ Standing is most likely (subject to sanction); asking for benefit is more discretionary (Kowalski)

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18
Q

Prudential Standing Doctrines

A

1) Third-party standing
2) Zone of Interests
3) Generalized grievance ban? (Lexmark notes confusion)
4) Imprudent because governed by state law (Elk Grove)

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19
Q

Congressional Power to Confer Standing

A

General rule: Congress can authorize suits against gov’t to enforce law (Akins) or empower TPs to enforce the law (Laidlaw) but must be injury

20
Q

Competitor standing

A

(Sanders Bros.): no interest in freedom from competition, but statutes (e.g. FCA) can grant “aggrieved” private litigants, if financially injured by regulatory act (e.g. license), standing to represent public interest

21
Q

Civil rights enforcement

A

Congress has defined standing as broadly as Art. III permits for CRA to allow private AG suits (Trafficante); includes testers (Havens)

22
Q

Procedural rights

A

(Lujan/Spokeo): standing when officials violate procedures only if procedural violation leads to injury to separate concrete interest

Redressability analysis unnecessary

23
Q

Congressionally Defined Injuries

A

Kennedy (Lujan conc.): Congress defines injury/causation by (i) identifying the injury it seeks to vindicate; (ii) relating the injury to class of persons entitled to bring suit

24
Q

Procedural Rights and Regulatory Beneficiaries

A

Must show:

1) injury
(2) causation –some possibility that relief will prompt reconsideration (MA v. EPA
(3) redressability

25
Procedural Rights and Regulated Parties
Nearly always have standing to challenge regulation
26
Qui Tam Suits
Relator has Art. III standing (assigned gov't claim)
27
APA Standing
Grants judicial review to (i) person who suffers legal wrong because of agency action or (ii) person who is aggrieved by agency action within meaning of statute
28
ZOI Test
(Data Processing) – P must demonstrate: (1) injury in fact (constitutional minimum); (2) be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question (question of statutory interpretation of COA – neither prudential nor constitutional, Lexmark)
29
State Law Ps in Federal Court
Must follow federal standing rules (Hollingsworth) Exception (ASARCO) – if original P didn’t have federal standing, but state judgment causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to petitioner federal court has jurisdiction
30
Two Types of Severability
1) By Part | 2) By Application
31
Severability Clauses
(Hellerstadt) – informative, but not determinative; legislature can’t require courts do perform “quintessentially legislative functions” of drawing complex lines
32
As-Applied Challenges
Statute cannot be applied to P
33
Facial Challenges
No set of circumstances under which statute is valid (bizarre hypos excepted) Conventional wisdom – nearly impossible to succeed outside 1A context (1A special, chilling)
34
1A Overbreadth
(Jews for Jesus): individual whose speech/conduct may be prohibited can bring facial challenge because statute also threatens nonparties (who want to engage in protected expression but don’t) Test: (1) substantially overbroad – statute significantly compromises 1A protections for nonparties; (2) no obvious limiting construction
35
Realist Key to Facial/As-Applied Challenges
Constitutional tests – Ps claim invokes constitutional test (SS, MRR), which may analyze statute as-applied or on its face (e.g. abortion, 2A, EP, federalism cases = facial) Practice tip: don’t label challenge as “facial” increases judicial anxiety (Salerno)
36
General Principles of Severability
1) If statute only has few unconstitutional applications --> sever, invalidated as-applied 2) If obvious way to sever statute to save it from invalidity --> sever, invalidated as-applied 3) If not obvious that severing is needed to save statute, but this application is okay and there’s an obvious way to sever should court eventually determine it’s necessary --> uphold without deciding severability (Yazoo, U.S. v. GA) 4) Severing must be consistent with legislative intent – severable unless Congress wouldn’t have enacted provisions independent of unconstitutional ones (Jackson, Morales-Santana) 5) Courts will not sever statutes in a way they view as creatively rewriting the statute (Lopez, won’t add jurisdictional hook; but see Skilling honest services fraud rewrite) 6) Presumption of severability (Yazoo)
37
Mootness
(Defunis) = P must continue to have cognizable injury from filing to judgment
38
Conceptualization of Mootness
Prudential (Rehnquist – rooted in policy) or constitutional (Scalia – Art. III)
39
Exceptions to Mootness
1) Voluntary cessation (Laidlaw) – if possibility that D will return to old ways, no mootness; heavy burden on D (Heckler) to show “absolutely clear” it won’t happen again (Viteck) 2) Capable of repetition, yet evading review (WI Right to Life, voting cycle) – burden on D to rebut; must be capable of repetition between the same parties
40
Mootness of Criminal Cases
death moots (Singer) completion of sentence doesn’t (Sibron) because (i) short sentences could escape review, (ii) collateral consequences of conviction
41
Mootness of Class Actions
Class actions (Geraghty): named Ps can continue to represent class after their case is mooted if class is certified before case is mooted (or if mooted after motion to certify, Genesis)
42
Disposition of Moot Cases
Vacatur in civil cases (Munsingwear, change of law) Discretionary vacatur in settlement (presumptive value of law clarification) Criminal: dismissal of appeal but not conviction (Dove) State cases – SCOTUS dismisses those that moot (ASARCO), but Defunis vacated/remanded
43
Ripeness
(Abbot Labs): two factors – (i) fitness of issues for adjudication (current factual development of record is deficient); (ii) hardship to the parties if adjudication is withheld
44
Conceptualization of Ripeness
``` Constitutional core (need enough facts to judge) + Discretionary layers (since remedy is usually injunction, requires equitable evaluation of how much hardship is enough) ```
45
Types of Ripeness Challenges
1) Challenges to statute/reg as unconstitutional (UPW, Abbot Labs) Regulated parties: if required to change behavior immediately --> ripe (Abbot Labs) Takings Clause: no taking (and thus suits for just compensation not ripe) until state challenges are exhausted (Williamson) [Exception: exhaustion futile?] 2) Challenges to discretionary executive action --> generally not ripe (O’Shea) (past ≠ future) Rationale: unclear who will be hurt; injunction reiterates law --> requested prohibitory injunction enforced like structural injunction (interferes with day-to-day state proceedings)