JUNE 26 Flashcards
While driving in State B, a driver from State A collided with a motorcyclist from State B. The driver sued the motorcyclist in federal court in State B, seeking damages of $80,000. Although the motorcyclist was properly served with process and had notice of the action, he did not answer, and the court entered a default judgment against him for $80,000. Thereafter, the motorcyclist sued the driver in a federal court in State A, seeking compensation of $1 million for his injuries.
If the driver timely files a motion to dismiss the motorcyclist’s claim, how should the court rule?
A
The driver’s motion to dismiss should be granted because the motorcyclist’s claim was a compulsory counterclaim in the first action.
B
The driver’s motion to dismiss should be granted because the accident occurred in State B.
C
The driver’s motion to dismiss should be denied because the first action did not end in a final judgment on the merits.
D
The driver’s motion to dismiss should be denied because the motorcyclist’s injuries may have prevented him from filing an answer in the first action.
CORRECT ANSWER: A. The driver’s motion to dismiss should be granted because the motorcyclist’s claim was a compulsory counterclaim in the first action.
The motorcyclist’s claim against the driver was a compulsory counterclaim in the first action, and therefore the motorcyclist may not assert it in a second action. Under Rule 13(a), a party in an action must assert as a counterclaim any claim that “arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” Here, the motorcyclist’s claim against the driver is compulsory because it arises out of the same accident that was the basis of the driver’s claim. He therefore waived the claim by not asserting it in the first action. The fact that the defendant failed to appear in the first action and suffered a default judgment does not prevent waiver. Most courts hold that a counterclaim omitted from an action that terminates in a default judgment will be barred from any subsequent suits. (B) is incorrect because the driver lives in State A, and therefore the federal court for State A has personal jurisdiction of the driver and venue is proper there. (C) is incorrect because any judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the first action is considered on the merits, regardless of whether the judgment was obtained after trial, on summary judgment, or by default. (D) is incorrect. The motorcyclist’s failure to answer may be grounds to seek relief from the final judgment in the first action under Rule 60. Unless the motorcyclist seeks such relief, it is unlikely that a court would allow the motorcyclist to assert his claim against the driver in the second action.
A landowner’s will left his ranch to a rancher, his heirs, and assigns, so long as the property was used exclusively for ranch purposes, then to the landowner’s grandson. The remainder of the landowner’s property passed through the residuary clause of his will to the grandson. Seven years after the landowner’s death, the rancher began strip mining operations on the ranch. The grandson brought an action to quiet title to the ranch against the rancher, and the rancher counterclaimed on the same theory.
Who should prevail?
Question ID: MP119
A
The rancher, because the condition imposed on his interest under the will is void as violating the Rule Against Perpetuities.
B
The rancher, because the condition imposed is a restraint against alienation.
C
The grandson, pursuant to the residuary clause.
D
The grandson, because the condition imposed is valid and he takes according to the subsequent provision.
CORRECT ANSWER: C.
The grandson prevails because the ranch passed through the residuary clause. Under the Rule Against Perpetuities, the attempt to give the grandson an executory interest is void, so (D) is incorrect. However, the courts would simply read the conveyance without the language of the executory gift, leaving a possibility of reverter in the grantor, the landowner. Thus, (A) is incorrect. Because the grandson succeeded to the landowner’s interest as grantor via the residuary clause of the will, he will prevail. (B) is incorrect because there is no restraint on alienation contained in the will.
A brother and sister owned a large farm in fee simple as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest. For five years, the brother occupied and farmed the land. He never accounted to the sister for any income, but he did pay all real estate taxes when due and kept the buildings on the farm insured.
The brother died intestate survived by his son, his sole heir. Thereafter, the son occupied the farm but failed to pay real estate taxes for two years. The appropriate governmental authority held a tax sale to recover the taxes due. At such sale, the sister was the only bidder and obtained a conveyance upon payment of an amount sufficient to discharge the amount due for taxes, plus interest and penalties, and the cost of holding the tax sale. The amount paid was one-third of the reasonable market value of the farm.
Thereafter, the sister instituted an appropriate action against the son to quiet title in and to recover possession of the farm. The son asserted all defenses available. Except for the statutes related to real estate taxes and tax sales, there is no applicable statute.
Should the court quiet title in the sister so that she is the sole owner in fee simple of the farm?
Question ID: REAL00000110
A
Yes, because the sister survived the brother.
B
Yes, because the son and his father never shared any of the profits with the sister.
C
No, if the son pays the sister one-half of the reasonable market value of the farm.
D
No, if the son pays the sister one-half the amount she paid for the tax deed.
CORRECT ANSWER: D. No, if the son pays the sister one-half the amount she paid for the tax deed.
Answer D is correct. A confidential relationship exists between co-tenants. If co-tenants’ title is foreclosed at a tax sale, and one party buys the property at such a sale, the other co-tenants can acquire the same interest they previously held by promptly paying their contribution. This is particularly true when co-tenants are related. Answer A is incorrect. A tenancy in common has no right of survivorship. If a co-tenant dies, his interest passes to his heirs. Answer B is incorrect. In most jurisdictions, a co-tenant in possession of the property has the right to retain profits gained by his use of the property. He need not share them with co-tenants out of possession. Answer C is incorrect. As explained above, the son need only pay half the amount of the tax deed, not the reasonable market value.
A seller entered into a written contract with a vintner on April 4, whereby the seller agreed to convey a vineyard to the vintner for $2 million. The terms of the contract set the closing date as June 1. At the time the seller entered into the agreement with the vintner, the seller had no interest in the vineyard. On April 15, the seller entered into a written agreement with a landowner, whom the seller believed to be the owner of the vineyard. According to the terms of the agreement, the landowner was to convey the vineyard to the seller on or before May 25. Another term of the agreement stated “time is of the essence.”
On May 24, the landowner conveyed his interest in the vineyard to the seller. When the seller went to record the deed, she discovered from records in the recorder’s office that the landowner held clear title to only seven-eighths of the vineyard. It took some time for the seller to remove the cloud from the title and procure ownership in full of the vineyard. She finally did so on August 1, and on that day she tendered a warranty deed to the vineyard to the vintner. The vintner refused to tender $2 million or any other sum to the seller, asserting that the seller had broken her agreement by failing to close on June 1. The seller then sued the vintner for specific performance.
If the vintner prevails, what is the likely reason?
Question ID: MP136
A
Title was unmarketable, because the seller did not own the vineyard at the time she entered into the contract.
B
Title was unmarketable, because the seller only owned seven-eighths of the vineyard on the closing date.
C
Time was not of the essence in the seller-vintner contract.
D
A two-month delay in closing is determined to be unreasonable.
CORRECT ANSWER: D.
If the vintner prevails, it will be because the court determines that the seller’s two-month delay in closing was unreasonable. Generally, courts assume that time is not “of the essence” in real estate contracts. This means that the closing date stated in the contract is not absolutely binding in equity, and that a party, even though late in tendering her own performance, can still enforce the contract if she tenders within a reasonable time after the date. Here, if the court finds that a two-month delay is unreasonable, the seller will not be able to specifically enforce the contract. (A) is incorrect because contracts for the sale of land do not require the seller to hold title at the time she enters into the contract. She is only required to have marketable title at the date of closing so that she can deliver it to the buyer. Hence, the seller did not breach her contract with the vintner by not having an interest in the vineyard at the time of the contract. (B) is incorrect because the seller has a reasonable time after the date set for closing to tender performance unless the contract or circumstances indicate that time is of the essence. Here, nothing in the contract or the surrounding circumstances indicates that time was of the essence in the seller-vintner contract. Moreover, although title was unmarketable on June 1, the seller was able to clear title to the remaining one-eighth of the vineyard and tender performance to the vintner two months after the closing date. A delay of one month after the closing date has been deemed acceptable by courts where the buyer has been delayed in obtaining financing or the seller has been delayed in obtaining marketable title. Nevertheless the court could find that two months is an unreasonable delay, as in (D); if that were the case, it would not grant the seller specific performance. (C) is incorrect because it supports a finding in favor of the seller, as explained above.
A landlord leased a portion of the lobby of his office building to a vendor under a written lease for a term of 10 years at $500 per month. The lease provided that the shop was to be used as a candy and cigarette counter, which would be the “exclusive” vending facility in the building. The lease was silent as to the vendor’s right to transfer the leasehold interest.
Later, the vendor transferred his interest to a retailer by a writing providing that the vendor could reenter if the retailer failed to make rental payments to the landlord. The landlord subsequently sold the building to an investor, who installed several automatic candy and cigarette vending machines throughout the building. As a result, the retailer’s sales declined and she refused to pay any rent.
If the investor files suit against the retailer for the rent due, how should a court following common law principles rule?
Question ID: MP032
A
The investor has no direct claim against the retailer personally; his only remedy is to terminate the lease and sue the vendor for the rent.
B
The investor can recover $500 per month rent from the retailer.
C
The investor can recover nothing from the retailer because his installation of the vending machines allowed the retailer to immediately terminate her duties under the lease.
D
The investor can recover $500 per month rent from the retailer but only if the vending machines are removed.
CORRECT ANSWER: D.
The investor can recover $500 per month rent from the retailer. The retailer is liable to the investor for the rent because of her status as an assignee, and because at common law the rent and anticompetition covenants are independent. Absent an express restriction in the lease, a tenant may freely transfer his leasehold interest. To be an assignment, a transfer must be on the same terms as the original leasehold except that the transferring tenant may reserve a right of termination (reentry) for breach of the terms of the original lease that has been assigned. Because the vendor transferred all of his interest to the retailer, this transfer will be given effect as an assignment rather than a sublease despite the vendor’s reservation of a right of reentry. An assignee takes the place of the original tenant in a direct relationship with the landlord. The assignee and landlord are in privity of estate, so that each is liable to the other on all lease covenants that run with the land. Covenants held to run with the land include covenants to pay money. Because a covenant to pay rent runs with the land, an assignee owes the rent directly to the landlord for the time that they are in privity of estate. The investor and the retailer are in privity of estate. Thus, the burden of the vendor’s original covenant to pay rent runs with the land and binds the retailer. (A) incorrectly states that the investor has no direct claim against the retailer personally for payment of the rent. (C) and (D) are wrong because, at common law, a tenant’s duty to pay rent is considered an obligation independent of the landlord’s performance of his obligations. The landlord’s original agreement that the space leased to the vendor would be the exclusive vending facility in the building ran with the land. The provision would certainly have been intended to run with the land (it is highly doubtful that the vendor would have intended that a successor in interest to the landlord could lease space for competing vending facilities). Also, this agreement touched and concerned the leased premises because it benefited the tenant and burdened the landlord with respect to their interests in the property. The investor has breached this covenant by installing the vending machines. This breach by the investor will not, however, allow the retailer to terminate the lease or her obligation to pay rent under the lease; i.e., the retailer’s duty to pay rent is independent of the investor’s performance of his agreement that there would be no other vending facilities in the building. Thus, the investor can recover the rent payments regardless of whether the vending machines are removed, and the retailer’s remedy for the investor’s breach is to bring an action against the investor for any damages resulting from his installation of the vending machines.
A state statute provides as follows: Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from the date of filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered.
A landowner conveyed a lot in that state to his aunt, who had had a judgment lien recorded against her two years earlier in the county in which the land was located. One year later, the aunt conveyed the property to a buyer by general warranty deed. The deed did not mention the lien, but the buyer was aware of it. Two years later, the buyer conveyed the property to a creditor by special warranty deed. The creditor was not aware of the lien and her deed also made no mention of it. One year after that transaction, the creditor conveyed the property to a developer by general warranty deed. The developer’s deed did not mention the lien but the developer was aware of it. The next year, the developer entered into a contract to convey the property to an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s title search disclosed the judgment lien against the aunt, and the entrepreneur refused to proceed with the transaction because title was not marketable. The developer brought an action against the entrepreneur for specific performance and was denied relief. He then brought an action against the aunt, the buyer, and the creditor for breach of warranty.
Assuming that all transactions concerning the property were promptly and properly recorded, and that the party holding the judgment lien has taken no action as of yet to enforce it, which parties, if any, will be liable to the developer?
Question ID: MP246
A
No one, because the developer had actual knowledge of the lien when he purchased the property.
B
The creditor only, because the party holding the judgment lien has taken no action as of yet to enforce it.
C
The creditor and the aunt, because the buyer conveyed by special warranty deed.
D
The buyer and the aunt, because they were aware of the judgment lien but did not mention it in their deeds, but not the creditor, because she was not aware of the lien.
CORRECT ANSWER: B.
B is Correct. The developer will prevail only against the creditor because only the creditor has committed an actionable breach of the covenant against encumbrances. A grantor making a conveyance by general warranty deed generally makes five covenants for title, and warrants against title defects created both by herself and by all prior titleholders. The covenant of seisin, the covenant of right to convey, and the covenant against encumbrances are present covenants and are breached, if at all, at the time of conveyance. The covenant for quiet enjoyment and the covenant of warranty are future covenants and are breached only on interference with the possession of the grantee or his successors. Unlike the future covenants, the present covenants do not “run” with the grantee’s estate and cannot be enforced against the covenantor by successive grantees in most jurisdictions. Here, because the party holding the judgment lien has not taken any action to enforce it, there is no disturbance of possession and the future covenants have not been breached. Since the only covenant that has been breached was the covenant against encumbrances, only the developer’s grantor, the creditor, is liable. (A) is incorrect because most jurisdictions hold that a covenant against encumbrances is breached even if the grantee knew of the encumbrance, particularly if it is an encumbrance on title, such as a mortgage or lien, rather than a physical encumbrance such as an easement. (C) is incorrect, even though it is true that the buyer will not be liable because she conveyed by special warranty deed, which covenants only that the grantor herself did not create any title defects. As discussed above, the aunt is not liable to the developer because any future covenants she made have not been breached. (D) is incorrect because, as discussed above, neither the aunt nor the buyer has breached any covenant owed to the developer, regardless of their knowledge of the lien. On the other hand, the creditor has breached her covenant against encumbrances despite her ignorance of the judgment lien.
Congress wishes to enact legislation prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of the sexual orientation of the potential purchaser or renter. Congress wants this statute to apply to all public and private vendors and lessors of residential property in this country, with a few narrowly drawn exceptions.
Which of the following provides the strongest basis for enactment of this legislation by Congress?
Question ID: CLAW00000640
A
The General Welfare Clause, because the conduct the statute prohibits could reasonably be deemed to be harmful to the national interest.
B
The Commerce Clause, because the sale or rental of almost all housing in aggregate could reasonably be deemed to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
C
The enabling clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, because that amendment prohibits discrimination against badges of past discrimination.
D
The enabling clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because that amendment prohibits public and private actors from engaging in discrimination.
CORRECT ANSWER: B.
B) is correct. Congress’s power to regulate commerce is very broad, but it does have limits. To be within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, a federal law must regulate (i) the channels of interstate commerce, (ii) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons and things in interstate commerce, or (iii) activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. When Congress attempts to regulate intrastate activity under the third prong above, the court will uphold the regulation if it is of economic or commercial activity and the court can conceive of a rational basis on which Congress could conclude that the activity in aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce. The sale and rental of housing is an economic or commercial activity and the court could find that in aggregate it substantially affects interstate commerce. (A) is incorrect. The General Welfare Clause relates to spending of federal monies: Congress may spend to “provide for the common defense and general welfare.” Nonspending regulations are not authorized. (C) is incorrect. The Thirteenth Amendment abolishes slavery and involuntary servitude. The enabling clause of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to adopt appropriate legislation proscribing private racially discriminatory acts. It would not apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation. (D) is incorrect. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states (not the federal government or private persons) from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process and equal protection of the law. It does not apply to private actors unless the private actors are working in concert with state actors.
A state enacted a sales tax on specified items purchased within the state. A subdivision of the federal government purchased from a dealer in the largest city in the state 100 new automobiles for use by federal agencies operating within the state.
Must the federal government pay the sales tax applicable to the new auto purchase?
Question ID: ML039
A
No, unless Congress has consented to such a tax.
B
No, because the tax unfairly discriminates against interstate commerce.
C
Yes, because the tax is nondiscriminatory.
D
Yes, because there is a rational basis for the tax and it does not appear to be a disguised penalty.
CORRECT ANSWER: A.
A is Correct. As a direct tax on the federal government, the sales tax is invalid unless Congress has consented to such a tax. (B) is wrong because the tax is on all autos purchased in the state, regardless of their source, and thus, there is no burden on interstate commerce. (C) is wrong because direct state taxation of the federal government is invalid whether or not discriminatory, absent the consent of Congress. (D) is wrong because, as stated, unless Congress consents, a direct tax on the federal government is invalid. Thus, the fact that there is a rational basis and that the tax is not a penalty does not matter: The question is one of the power to tax, not whether the tax itself is appropriate.
A township located in a farming community was composed mostly of persons belonging to a specific religious sect. To help instill proper respect for authority in children, which was a central tenet of the sect, and to maintain order in the classroom, the local school board allowed teachers to inflict corporal punishment. Such punishment was inflicted on a fourth grader in a township school immediately after his teacher saw him pulling a girl’s hair. Neither he nor his parents belonged to the religious sect. When the boy’s parents learned of the incident, they hired an attorney. Rather than suing the teacher for battery as permitted under state law, the attorney brought an action against the teacher under a federal statute providing a cause of action for damages against any government employee who deprives a person of his constitutional rights.
Should the court find the policy allowing corporal punishment to be constitutional?
Question ID: ML128
A
No, because the punishment policy violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause.
B
No, because the boy was denied any kind of hearing, in violation of his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
C
Yes, because under the doctrine of parens patriae states may impose any punishment they see fit.
D
Yes, because the punishment was not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
CORRECT ANSWER: D. Yes, because the punishment was not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The punishment here is constitutional because it does not violate any constitutional provision. The best answer reflecting this reasoning is (D)—there was no Eighth Amendment violation here—because paddling students as a disciplinary measure has not been found to be cruel and unusual punishment. (A) is incorrect because there is no Establishment Clause violation here. Under the Establishment Clause, if there is no sect preference, government action generally will be upheld if the action serves a secular purpose, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not excessively entangle government with religion. There is no sect preference under the school board’s corporal punishment rule here, the rule has the secular purpose of maintaining order in the classroom (the fact that this coincides with the tenets of a local religion does not change that conclusion), its main purpose neither advances nor inhibits religion, and there is no excessive entanglement. (B) is incorrect because there has been no deprivation of procedural due process. The Supreme Court has held that although corporal punishment may involve a liberty interest, no hearing is required prior to inflicting such punishment; the possibility of a common law action in tort is sufficient procedural protection. [Ingraham v. Wright (1977)] (C) is incorrect because it is too broad. The doctrine of parens patriae allows the state to stand in the shoes of a parent, but even a parent may not impose any punishment he sees fit (e.g., a parent may not break a child’s arm as punishment for stealing).
Congress provided funds to a group of young scouts. A person believed that this particular scouting group practiced racial discrimination and brought suit to enjoin the federal provision of funds to this group.
Assuming the factual allegation regarding racial discrimination is correct and that the person has standing to challenge the expenditure, how should the court rule?
Question ID: ML274
A
Deny the injunction, because the discrimination is by a private entity.
B
Deny the injunction, because the scouts have a First Amendment right to associate.
C
Grant the injunction, because the scouts are violating the Equal Protection Clause.
D
Grant the injunction, because by providing the funds, Congress is promoting segregation.
CORRECT ANSWER: D.
D is Correct. Under the Equal Protection provisions of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Congress may not engage in any activity that promotes segregation. Here, by providing funds to a scouting group that engages in segregation, Congress has violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and this would thus be the strongest argument. (A) and (B) are incorrect because, while the discrimination might be by a private entity and members of private entities generally may associate with whom they like, by providing funding for the private entity, Congress is supporting discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. (C) is incorrect because the Constitution generally prohibits only action by the government. In some cases, private action might be considered state action (e.g., where the government is entangled with the private action). It is unclear whether the scouts’ actions here would be considered government action. In any case, the Equal Protection Clause would not apply against the federal government, making (D) a better answer choice.
A state that is subject to severe winters generally allows the use of studded tires between October 1 and March 31. However, the legislation allows counties to opt out and prohibit the use of studded tires year round, because studded tires tend to tear up pavement more than nonstudded tires, thus necessitating more frequent road repairs. No other state in the region allows use of studded snow tires at all. The state law contains one exception: it excludes “doctors” from any county ban on the use of snow tires because they might have to cross county lines in emergencies. After the passage of the legislation, only one county in the state invoked its right to ban the use of studded snow tires.
A lawyer who lives in the state was angered that the legislature had given special privileges to doctors but not to lawyers. One January day, with studded tires on his car, he drove from his home county, which allowed use of studded tires, into the county that banned them. A sheriff’s officer noticed the lawyer’s studded tires and cited him. After being convicted and fined, the lawyer appealed.
What is the lawyer’s best argument for getting the ban invalidated?
Question ID: ML103
A
The statute interferes with his fundamental right to practice his profession in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
B
The statute violates his right to travel.
C
The statute violates the Commerce Clause by placing an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce.
D
The ban on studded snow tires is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest because it will likely result in an increased loss of life.
CORRECT ANSWER: D.
The best argument for getting the law invalidated is that it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The lawyer would argue that the statute violates equal protection because it singles out one class of citizens for special treatment. Because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect nor quasi-suspect class is involved here, the case would be decided under the rational basis standard. For a law to be held invalid under the rational basis standard, the plaintiff must show that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Toward this end, the lawyer might argue that the law will really cost more money than it will save, perhaps because the resulting number of injuries due to the absence of studded tires will more than offset the money saved in road repair. (This argument will likely fail, however, because courts give legislatures broad discretion in making such determinations, and the statute does appear to be rational. Nevertheless, this is the lawyer’s best argument.) (A) is incorrect because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV applies only to discrimination by a state against nonresidents, and here the lawyer is a resident of the state that enacted the legislation. (B) is incorrect because nothing in the facts indicates that the right to travel is involved—at least not the constitutionally protected right to travel. The right to travel involves interstate travel, and here, the legislation concerns only an intrastate travel issue. (C) is incorrect because there is no unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. If Congress has not allowed or prohibited state regulation in the area, a nondiscriminatory state regulation will be upheld only if its burden on commerce does not outweigh a legitimate local interest. Here, because no other state allows studded snow tires, the ban does not discriminate against out-of-state vehicles and does not burden commerce. (If other states allowed these snow tires, there might be a viable Commerce Clause issue.)
A man was arrested in a state for armed robbery. A combined preliminary hearing to determine probable cause and initial appearance was held within 20 hours of his arrest. Probable cause was found, and bail was properly denied under the state’s Bail Reform Act. A state statute provided that when a defendant is in custody, his trial must begin within 50 days of his arrest. After 50 days had passed since the man’s arrest and no trial had been held, he filed a motion for dismissal for violation of his right to a speedy trial under the state constitution, which tracked verbatim the speedy trial provision of the United States Constitution. The trial judge held that he was bound to follow federal interpretations of the speedy trial provision and granted the man’s motion on that basis. On appeal, the state supreme court agreed with the trial judge. The state prosecutor seeks to challenge the ruling in the United States Supreme Court.
If the Supreme Court thinks that the state court wrongly decided that the man was denied his right to a speedy trial under federal standards, how should it proceed?
Question ID: ML130
A
Reverse the decision because the state speedy trial provision cannot be interpreted in a manner different from federal interpretations.
B
Reverse the decision and remand it to state court because the state speedy trial issue was so intertwined with the federal question that it would be difficult to determine on which ground the state court relied.
C
Decline jurisdiction because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a state from challenging a decision of its supreme court in federal court.
D
Reverse the decision and remand the case to be decided on the independent state grounds only.
CORRECT ANSWER: D.
The best way to approach this question is to eliminate the wrong answers first. (A) is incorrect because state constitutional provisions do not have to be interpreted exactly the same as federal provisions; the federal Constitution provides the minimum rights that states must provide, but states are free to grant broader rights. Thus, even though a 50-day delay may be constitutional under the federal Constitution, it can still be held unconstitutional under a state constitution. (B) is incorrect because the facts make it clear that the state court was relying on federal case interpretations. Moreover, if the Supreme Court could not decide whether the case was based on federal or state grounds, it would not reverse the case, because a federal court will not hear a case that can be based on adequate and independent state grounds; rather, it would dismiss the case or remand it to the state for clarification. (C) is incorrect because the Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits federal courts from hearing actions by a private party or foreign government against the state government; it does not bar a state from appealing a ruling from its own court system. Thus, (D) is correct. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, because it has jurisdiction to hear appeals from a state’s highest court concerning the constitutionality of a state statute, and as indicated above, the state court’s decision was not based on independent state grounds; the decision was based on federal case law interpreting an identical federal provision. Thus, jurisdiction was proper and the Court could reverse the state court decision and hold that a 50-day delay does not violate the federal Constitution. However, the case should be remanded so that the state may decide whether the delay was too long under state law, since a state is free to provide its citizens with more civil protection than is required by the federal Constitution.
