J. L. Mackie (Nihilism) (Error Theory) Flashcards
Mackie’s Central Claim
There are no objective values (nihilism)
- Moral Values: goodness, badness, rightness, wrongness, etc.
- Aesthetic Values: beauty, sublime, ugliness, etc.
-There are no objective values - nihilism
• Moral values: goodness, badness, rightness, wrongness, etc.
• Aesthetic values: beauty, sublime, ugliness, repulsiveness, etc.
– “The claim to objectivity”
• Moral judgments are beliefs in objective moral values
– Moral error theory
• All affirmative (e.g. “X is wrong”) moral beliefs are false
• All non-affirmative (e.g. “X is not wrong”) moral beliefs are trivially true
– Moral distinctions
• There are natural differences between types of moral acts (e.g. kind, cruel)
• But no differences in value between them (e.g. rightness, wrongness)
“The claim to Objectivity”
Moral Judgments are beliefs in objective moral values
Moral Error Theory
- All affirmative (e.g “X is wrong”) moral beliefs are false
- All non-affirmative (e.g. “X is not wrong”) moral beliefs are trivially true
Moral Distinctions
- There are natural difference between types of moral acts (e.g. kind, cruel)
- But, there are no differences in values between them (e.g. rightness, wrongness)
The Methodology
- Mackies distingushies between three questions:
- Is X wrong
(‘normative’ question) - What does “X is wrong” mean?
(‘semantic’ question) - Is there such a thing as wrongness?
(‘ontological’ question)
On 1. Is X wrong?
- This is a (first-order) normative question: which actions are right and wrong
• Different first-order normative ethical views provide answers to these questions based on their conception of the good. - Is lying wrong if lying to your friend makes her happy (or makes it the case that she avoid sadness from learning the truth?
• Bentham’s view: It’s not wrong since lying would promote utility
• Kant’s view: Lying is wrong. It is your duty to be truthful - Mackie is not concerned with this sort of question
On 2. What does “X is wrong” mean?
- This is a (second-order) semantic question: the meaning of moral claims
-What does “murder is wrong” mean?
•Subjectivist: “murder is wrong” means “murder is wrong for me”
•Moral Relativist: “murder is wrong” means “murder is wrong-for-us”
•Expressivism: “murder is wrong” means “murder [boo]!”
•Naturalist Realism: “murder is wrong” means “murder produces pain”
•*Non-naturalist Realism: “wrong” refers to a non-natural entity: wrongness
- Mackie argues that the non-naturalist realist is correct (about what we mean when we make ordinary moral judgments (“what he did is wrong”)
- Our Moral claims, judgement, or beliefs involve a claim to objectivity
- Ethical terms refer to non-natural intrinsic values
A claim to objectivity (i.e. an appeal to something being, in some sense, objective):
-Objectivity (entities, properties, standards)
•Independent of any mind (that is, one’s opinions, beliefs, hopes, etc.)
-Subjectivity (entities, properties, standards)
•Dependent on, or a function of, a person’s opinions, beliefs, hopes, constitution, preferences, etc.
On 3. Is there such thing as wrongness?
-This is a (second-order) ontological question: whether values-entities exist
•different metaethical theories will provide different answers
-Do objective values such as Goodness or Wrongness actually exist?
*This question is what Mackie’s is concerned with
An Ontological Thesis
No objective values exist
Error Theory
Form of the argument:
(i) “X is Z” is true only if there is such a thing as Z
(ii) There is no such thing as Z
(C) Therefore, “X is Z” is never true
The Basic Claim:
-“All affirmative first-order [moral] judgments are false, since they include, by
virtue of the very meanings of their terms, unwarranted claims to objectivity”
Affirmative judgments: “X is Z”
-always false
Non-affirmative judgments: “X is not Z”
-always true
Mackie argues that all claims to objectivity must be rejected
Arguments from queerness
Two parts:
- Metaphysical (i.e. the nature of x): “If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the
universe”
- Epistemological (i.e. how could we know x?): “If we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of
moral perceptions or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of
knowing everything else”
Arguments from queerness
“Queerness” from metaphysical and epistemic commitments
- The problem does not concern the non-natural nature of moral values
- The problem concerns their nature of as “calling for” and “motivating”
Arguments for queerness
•”Queerness” from metaphysical and epistemic commitments
(1) The nature of objective moral values as ‘calling for’ something
• Objective moral good: “to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it”
• Objective moral wrong: “not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it”
(2) Nature of moral entities as also intrinsically motivating
• These entities are able to motivate you to do what they call for
(3) The nature of the a purported special faculty detecting objective values
• This strange faculty would be unlike any other faculty or ability we have
Queerness
A special faculty of intuition detecting non-natural entities that intrinsically demand things of you and intrinsically motivate you to do or avoid things
