J&J cases Flashcards

1
Q

Harris v. Balk

A

1905-

It ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over.

Plaintiff sought review of the appellate court’s decision denying the effect of a Maryland judgment for plaintiff in plaintiff’s action to recover a debt from defendant owed to plaintiff. Plaintiff attached the debt owed by the garnishee to defendant. Plaintiff personally served the garnishee, a non-resident of Maryland, with notice of suit for the debt to be tried in Maryland. Defendant claimed that the debt owed by the garnishee in North Carolina did not follow the garnishee when the garnishee travelled to Maryland and that Maryland courts could not gain jurisdiction over the garnishee. The United States Court of Appeals reversed.

The garnishee’s debt owed to defendant followed the garnishee everywhere. Since Maryland had a law that would allow defendant to pursue the debt owed by the garnishee to defendant, plaintiff could attach the debt owed by the garnishee to defendant, even though the garnishee was not a Maryland resident. The garnishee’s failure to notify defendant of attachment was not prejudicial because defendant had the opportunity to show that he did not owe a debt to plaintiff.

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2
Q

Hess v. Pawloski

A

1927- No jurisdiction (service by using state’s interstate)

A state’s power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their use by non-residents as well as by residents. A state may declare that the use of the highway by a non-resident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served.

Facts: A Pennsylvania resident negligently and wantonly drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Massachusetts and struck and injured an individual in the process. A case was filed against him to recover damages for the personal injuries. No personal service was made on him and no property belonging to him was attached. The service of process was made in compliance with Massachusetts Law. Pennsylvania resident argued that service of process deprived him of his property without due process of law.

Conclusion: The Court declared that Massachusetts had personal jurisdiction over him where the state, if making no hostile discrimination against non-residents, could declare the use of a highway by a non-resident was the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served, such that service was made upon plaintiff in error’s authorized agent. The Court further held that in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, there had to be actual service within the state of notice upon him or upon someone authorized to accept service for him. The Court further held the state, if making no hostile discrimination against non-residents, was empowered to declare that the use of a highway by a non-resident was the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process could be served. Accordingly, the judgment that denied plaintiff in error’s request for dismissal was affirmed.

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3
Q

International Shoe v. Washington

A

1945- Jurisdiction (minimum contact such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice)

Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he is not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Facts- International Shoe Co. was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. While the corporation did not have an office in Washington (“State”), it employed eleven to thirteen salesmen, who were residents of the State and who exhibited product samples to prospective buyers from the State. The corporation compensated the salesmen in the form of commissions for any sales from customers they solicited. Due to these business activities, the State issued a Notice of Assessment holding the corporation liable for contributions to the State’s unemployment compensation fund by virtue of the Washington Unemployment Compensation Act. Notice was served via mail and personal service to the Washington salesmen. The corporation refused to pay, arguing that they were not conducting business in Washington and thus the State had no jurisdiction over it. They further argued that the service of notice was insufficient to constitute due process. The trial court ruled in favor of the State and the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that there was sufficient business activity to hold the corporation liable for taxes to the State. The corporation appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The activities carried on in the state of Washington on behalf of the Corporation were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout the years in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in the course of which appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, including the right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those very activities. It is evident that the operations of the salesmen in Washington established sufficient contacts or ties with the state to make it reasonable and just, according to traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there. Hence we cannot say that the maintenance of the present suit in the State of Washington involves an unreasonable or undue procedure. It is enough that appellant established such contacts with the state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual.

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4
Q

Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson

A

1980- purposeful availment
The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.

plaintiffs bought car in NY then moved to OK; defendant had no other connection to the state

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. The court held that under the rule that a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the Oklahoma trial court could not, consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, exercise in personam jurisdiction over the New York automobile retailer and wholesale distributor, since the only connection between Oklahoma and such defendants–who closed no sales and performed no services in Oklahoma, who availed themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law, who solicited no business in Oklahoma either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach Oklahoma, and who did not regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market–was the fortuitous circumstance that a single automobile, sold by the defendants in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma.

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5
Q

Asahi v. California

A

1987- stream of commerce

Rule: The determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.

Pure stream of commerce v stream of commerce plus

Facts: A Japanese company manufactures tire valve assemblies in Japan and sells them to several tire manufacturers, including a Taiwanese company. The Taiwanese company incorporates the assemblies into its finished tires, which it sells throughout the world, including the United States, where 20% of its sales takes place in California. In 1978, in Solano County, California, the driver of a motorcycle lost control of his vehicle and collided with a tractor, as a result of which he was severely injured and his passenger, who was his wife, was killed. Could the court exercise jurisdiction over the Japanese company consistent with the due process clause? No because the original plaintiff settled and California no longer had jurisdiction over the Japanese company that the Taiwanese company filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from.

Conclusion: The Court held that the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company was unreasonable and unfair, so as to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere fact that petitioner knew that some of its component parts would be used in products that would be sold in the state did not provide the necessary minimum contacts for the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner did nothing to purposely avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state. Therefore, since there were no minimum contacts, the state was estopped by Fourteenth Amendment due process from exercising personal jurisdiction over petitioner.

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6
Q

J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro

A

2011- Stream of commerce

The United States Supreme Court has stated that a defendant’s placing goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers within the forum State may indicate purposeful availment. the defendant must purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Sometimes a defendant does so by sending its goods rather than its agents. The defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.

Respondent injured his hand while using a metal-shearing machine that petitioner British manufacturer produced in England. Petitioner’s company is incorporated and operates in England. Respondent filed a consumer’s products-liability suit in a state court in New Jersey, where the accident occurred. Petitioner sought to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. Respondent’s jurisdictional claim was based on three primary facts: A U. S. distributor agreed to sell petitioner’s machines in the US, its officials attended trade shows in several States, albeit not in New Jersey, and no more than four machines (the record suggests only one), including the one at issue, ended up in New Jersey. The state court entered judgment for respondent. On appeal, the court reversed.

In products-liability cases, it was a defendant’s purposeful availment that made jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The transmission of goods permitted the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant targeted the forum; generally, it was not enough that it might have predicted its goods would reach the forum State. The manufacturer directed marketing and sales efforts at the U.S., but the question was whether the New Jersey state court had the authority to exercise jurisdiction; thus, it was the manufacturer’s purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the U.S., that alone were relevant. The manufacturer had no office in New Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and it neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State. It did not have a single contact with New Jersey short of the product in question ending up in New Jersey. The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s holding was error.

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7
Q

BK v. Rudzewicz

A

1985- Choice of Law vs. choice of forum; contracts; long arm statute

Rule: Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum state, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.

Facts: A Florida corporation with principal offices in Miami and which conducted most of its restaurant business through a franchise operation brought an action for breach of contract in Florida against two franchisees, Michigan residents, alleging that these franchisees had breached the franchise agreement for their restaurant, located in Michigan. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, ruling that pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, a nonresident franchisee of the plaintiff was subject to in personam jurisdiction in Florida in actions arising out of its franchise agreement. The court subsequently entered judgment against the defendants. One defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed the judgment, concluding that the district court could not properly exercise personal jurisdiction pursuant to the long-arm statute because the circumstances of the franchise and the negotiations which led to it left the defendants bereft of reasonable notice and financially unprepared for the prospect of franchise litigation in Florida.

Must look at length of contract and contact

Long arm statute: Florida extends jurisdiction to any person who breaches a contract on the state of Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed by the state, so long as alleged act arises out of the contract breach

Conclusion: The United States Supreme Court held that Florida courts had jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute because a party that avails itself of the protections and benefits of the law of a forum state is subject to personal jurisdiction of that state. The Court found that the appellees had entered into a contract and established a substantial and continuing relationship with the appellant, a Florida resident. The Court further found that the appellee had fair notice that he might be subject to suit in Florida. The court further found that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend due process and reversed the holding of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.

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8
Q

Shaffer v. Heitner

A

1977-

The relationship among a defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the states is the central concern of the inquiry into the constitutionality of an exercise of personal jurisdiction.

A nonresident of Delaware who owned stock in a corporation that was incorporated in Delaware but which maintained its principal office in Arizona, brought a shareholder’s derivative action in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware, naming as defendants the corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation, and 28 present or former officers of one or both corporations. Pursuant to the nonresident’s motion under 10 Del C. 366, the court sequestered certain property, primarily stock, of a number of the nonresident individual defendants. Defendants contended, inter alia, that they did not have sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain the jurisdiction of that state’s courts, but the Court of Chancery ruled that the situs of the stock, which was by Delaware statute considered to be within that state, provided a sufficient basis for the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction by a Delaware Court. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the minimum contacts rule was not applicable since the jurisdiction in this case was quasi in rem and founded on the presence of stock in the Delaware.

Whether the minimum contacts test of International Shoe should have been applied to assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction. yes.

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment. In support of its ruling, the Court held that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe should have been applied to assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction. The Court noted that defendants’ seized property did not have sufficient contacts with the state to support Delaware’s assertion of jurisdiction over defendants. The Court further held that defendants had neither purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the state, nor had any reason to expect to be brought before a Delaware court.

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9
Q

Burnham v. California

A

Divorce, California had personal jurisdiction because husband was in California for 3 days

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10
Q

Goodyear v. Brown

A
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11
Q

Mullane v. Central

A

1950- constitutional requirement of notice and method of service of process

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendancy of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.

Appellee bank and a trust company established a common trust fund that complied with N.Y. Banking Law Section 100-c. Appellee petitioned for a settlement of its first account as a common trustee. Upon the filing of the petition, appellant was appointed the special guardian. The only notice given to the beneficiaries was by a publication in a local newspaper that was in strict compliance with Section 100-c. Appellant objected, contending that the notice and statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were inadequate to afford due process. The New York Court of Appeals overruled the objection.

The Court reversed, holding that the notice requirement under Section 100-c was inadequate because it did not provide for a means to contact those who could easily be informed by other means. The notice had to reasonably convey the required information and afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.

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12
Q

McGee v. International Life Ins.

A

When a state court’s jurisdiction is based on a contract that has a substantial connection with another state, due process is satisfied. In other words, a state court can enforce a judgment from another state, if there are “minimum contacts” with their own state.

Ins. company contacts decedent; ins. company is taken over by International; International then mails recertification and contract; upon death McGee send death cert. to Int’l; They refuse to pay; it was reasonably foreseeable that they would have to defend themselves in the state; they purposefully availed themselves.

The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the Texas court of civil appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not preclude the California court from entering a judgment binding on International because McGee’s suit was based on a contract that had a substantial connection with California. The insurance policy was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there, and Franklin, the insured, was a resident of California when he died. There was no contention that International did not have adequate notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and appear.

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13
Q

Hanson v. Denckla

A

1958- moved after contact was made (unilateral activity)

A defendant cannot be called upon to defend an action in a different State unless they have “minimal contacts,” with that State. The defendant must purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.

Testatrix, who became a domiciliary of Florida after executing a trust in Delaware, and who executed in Florida a will and a power of appointment of the trust assets, died in Florida.

Florida courts lacked jurisdiction in rem over the action involving the trust, since the trust situs was in another state, and that those courts also lacked jurisdiction in personam over the trustee because there were no minimum contacts with Florida prerequisite to the exercise of power over him. And, since it was found that under Florida law a trustee is an indispensable party over whom the Florida court must acquire jurisdiction before it has power to enter judgment in a proceeding affecting the validity of the trust, the Florida decree was held of no effect, and not entitled to full faith and credit in Delaware.

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14
Q

Calder v. Jones

A

1984- effects test on libel of magazine targeting celebrity in their home state, magazine purposely availed itself

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any state with which the defendant has certain minimum contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

The California resident brought a libel action against a national magazine based in Florida and against its reporter and magazine’s editor, individually. Both reporter and magazine’s editor were served by mail in Florida. They both moved to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court granted the motion. On appeal, the state appellate court reversed the lower court order and found jurisdiction. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal.

The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was proper based upon the effects of their intentional conduct in California. Respondent’s career was centered in California, the article was drawn from California sources, and the harm was suffered in California. The Supreme Court noted that petitioners were not charged with untargeted negligence, but rather their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California, and under the circumstances, petitioners must have reasonably anticipated being sued there. The Supreme Court held that petitioners’ status as employees did not shield them from jurisdiction, because their individual contacts with California were sufficient.

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15
Q

Burdick v. Superior Court

A

2015- aiming activity toward person v. aiming activity toward the state; effects test fails- no personal jurisdiction

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. The plaintiff must present facts demonstrating that the conduct of defendants related to the pleaded causes is such as to constitute constitutionally cognizable minimum contacts.

Plaintiffs sued defendant Douglas Burdick, an Illinois resident, for defamation and other intentional torts, based on an allegedly defamatory posting made by Burdick on his personal Facebook page while he was in Illinois. Respondent court denied Burdick’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Burdick has challenged that ruling by petition for writ of mandate or prohibition.

The appellate court granted nonresident defendant’s writ petition and held that California residents who alleged that a nonresident had defamed them by way of Internet social media posting failed to meet their burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10, because the nonresident’s knowledge that the allegedly defamatory posting might harm people in California did not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement under the effects test, absent evidence that the posting had a California audience and had been expressly aimed or intentionally targeted at California.

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16
Q

Daimler AG v. Bauman

A

2014- casual or isolated activity vs. systematic and continuous activity
Domicile:
1. PPB
2. State of incorporation
3. exceptional cases (Perkins: could not in PPB because a war had pushed them to Ohio)
If you have these three, do not worry about the reasonableness factors

Rule: All-purpose jurisdiction speaks of instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state are so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities. Accordingly, the inquiry is whether that corporation’s affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.

Facts: A class action suit was filed by Argentinian residents in California against against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft , a German public stock company, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. The complaint alleged that Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, committed several human rights violations. Jurisdiction over the lawsuit was predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), a subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey.

Conclusion: The corporation’s slim contacts with the state were not so continuous and systematic as to render the corporation essentially at home in the state and subject to suit in the state for claims of the foreign residents for conduct which did not occur in or impact the state. Further, neither the corporation nor the U.S. subsidiary were incorporated or had a principal place of business in the state, which were paradigm bases for general jurisdiction, and the transnational context of the dispute implicated risks to international comity from the broad assertion of general jurisdiction.

17
Q

Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise

A

For purposes of determining venue under the standard of where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, courts look, not to a single “triggering event” prompting the action, but to the entire sequence of events underlying the claim.

Defendants, La Reunion Francaise, S.A. (“La Reunion”), T.L. Dallas & Co. Ltd. (“T.L. Dallas”), and Schaeffer & Associates, Inc. (“Schaeffer”), issued and underwrote a marine policy for plaintiff Daniel L. Uffner, Jr.’s sailing yacht. The yacht subsequently caught fire and sank in Puerto Rican waters. Uffner’s insurance claim was denied due to the alleged absence of a “current out-of-water survey.” Uffner sued for bad-faith denial of his insurance claim. Defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and improper venue. The district court granted the motions based upon lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded. The Court held that defendants had waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by not raising it in the motion to dismiss. The district court had dismissed the case on this ground sua sponte, which was error, as under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g), (h)(1)(A), failure to include this ground in defendants’ motion to dismiss waived it, and defendants thereby consented to the court’s jurisdiction. The Court also held that venue in the District of Puerto Rico was proper, as the sinking of the yacht in Puerto Rican waters was a substantial part of the events giving rise to Uffner’s claim for loss under his insurance policy. Moreover, defendants did not allege venue there would confer a tactical advantage to Uffner or prejudice their own case in any way.

18
Q

MacMunn v. Eli Lilly Co.

A

2008- Venue for DES case

A defendant must make two showings to justify transfer. First, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff originally could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district. Second, the defendant must demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer to that district. As to the second showing, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1404 calls on the court to weigh a number of case-specific private and public interest factors. The private interest considerations include (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. The public-interest considerations include (1) the transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws, (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts, and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home.

In a products liability case, plaintiff husband and wife sued defendant drug company. The case arose from the wife’s mother’s ingestion of diethylstilbestrol (DES) while she was pregnant with the wife in 1962. The drug company removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and moved to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (District of Massachusetts). The drug company argued that both private and public interests favored transfer primarily because the case had little if any ties to the present district. Plaintiffs opposed transfer citing numerous cases involving the same drug company and subject matter that have been resolved in the present district.

The fact that almost all the witnesses resided in Massachusetts clearly weighed in favor of transfer. The strong presumption in favor of plaintiffs’ choice of forum was overcome because the present district had no meaningful ties to the controversy and plaintiffs resided in Massachusetts. Additionally, the operative facts giving rise to the plaintiffs’ claim arose in Massachusetts. The drug company argued that Massachusetts had a strong interest in seeing that the product liability claims of Massachusetts citizens were tried fairly and effectively. The present district’s familiarity with DES litigation did not counterbalance that interest. Finally, the present district had a more congested docket than the District of Massachusetts. While both districts had similarly experienced magistrate judges in settling DES cases, that factor shaded nearer to transfer.

19
Q

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno

A

1981- FNC (venue) matter: plane crash in scotland; pilot was British; plane manufactured in USA (PA); petitioner had stronger case in USA

Dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens may be granted even though the law applicable in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff’s chance of recovery. The possibility of an unfavorable change of law should not, by itself, bar dismissal.

The Respondent’s decedents died in an aircraft in the Scottish Highlands. All the decedents were Scottish residents, as were their heirs. As the decedents’ personal representative, respondent filed suit against petitioner in the United States because petitioner manufactured the aircraft in Pennsylvania and the law was more favorable to their case. Petitioner wanted to litigate the tort action in Scotland. A district court dismissed the action, but the lower appellate court reversed the district court’s decision.

The possibility of an unfavorable change in the law in Scotland should not, by itself, bar dismissal. The court held that plaintiffs may not defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the chosen forum, since the possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. In this case the proper forum was Scotland given that fewer evidentiary problems would be posed if the trial were held in Scotland; the inability to implead potential third party defendants clearly supported holding the trial in Scotland; and public interest favored trial in Scotland, the accident having occurred in its air space, all the decedents being Scottish, and apart from the manufacturers, all potential plaintiffs and defendants being either Scottish or English.

20
Q

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins

A

1938- Choice of law; use federal law or state law when it is state claim

Except in matters governed by the U.S. Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. Whether the law of the state shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state, whether they be local in their nature or general, be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.

Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company (“Erie”) while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that state. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation, or maintenance, of the train. He further claimed that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee on a commonly used beaten footpath, which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks, and that he was struck by something that looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars. Tompkins brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company was a corporation of that state. The circuit court affirmed the judgment in favor of Tompkins, refusing to consider Erie’s claim that it was not liable for Tompkins’ injuries under state common law. It held instead that liability was a question of general law about which federal courts were free to render independent decisions.

Should the law of the state be applied instead of federal common law? Yes.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that there was no federal general common law, and that except in matters governed by the U.S. Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied by federal courts in any diversity case was the law of the state. In so holding, the Court disapproved the contrary doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), finding it an unconstitutional assumption of powers by federal courts that invaded state autonomy and prevented uniformity in administering state law. The Court also held that § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 was not declarative of the Swift doctrine.

21
Q

Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co

A

1928- is contract valid? state law v. federal law; taxi company incorporates itself in another state to create diversity and to get into federal court

Without its consent, the property of a railroad company may not be used by taxicab men or others to solicit or carry on their business, and it is beyond the power of the state in the public interest to require the railroad company without compensation to allow its property so to be used.

Respondent taxi company, under a contract with a railroad, had an exclusive right to park at the station while awaiting trains and to solicit passengers to use its services. Respondent filed suit against petitioner taxi company for interference with the contract after petitioner began to solicit business in similar ways at the station. Petitioner appealed after respondent obtained an injunction, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Court held the contract was valid because it was beyond the power of the State in the public interest to require the railroad company to allow its property to be used by taxi companies without compensation. The Court held detriment to the public interest would not be presumed without a showing of improper conduct and freedom of contract would be enforced by the courts. Petitioner sought to rely upon prior state court decisions, but the Court stated that while it was inclined to follow decisions of the state in which the controversy arose, it was free to exercise its independent judgment in the application of federal common law principles to questions of general law.

22
Q

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.

A

1941- In diversity cases, should the federal courts follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states in which they sit? yes
Federal court had to decide which state law to use, DE or NY

The prohibition against independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts. Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side. Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to the federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent “general law” of conflict of laws.

Respondent, a New York corporation, transferred its entire business to petitioner, a Delaware corporation. Petitioner contracted to use its best efforts to further the manufacture and sale of certain patented devices covered by the agreement, and respondent was to have a share of petitioner’s profits. The agreement was executed in New York, the assets were transferred there, and petitioner began performance there although later it moved its operations to other states. Respondent was voluntarily dissolved under New York law in 1919. Ten years later it instituted this action in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that petitioner had failed to perform its agreement to use its best efforts. Jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship. In 1939 respondent recovered a jury verdict of $100,000, upon which judgment was entered. Respondent then moved to correct the judgment by adding interest at the rate of six percent from June 1, 1929, the date the action had been brought. The District Court granted the motion, taking the view that the rights of the parties were governed by New York law and that under New York law the addition of such interest was mandatory. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

The court upheld the ruling in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 that states: “In diversity of citizenship cases, the federal courts, when deciding questions of conflict of laws, must follow the rules prevailing in the States in which they sit.”

23
Q

Guar. Tr. Co. v. York

A

1945- Is the federal court bound by local state law? yes. court of equity not thought to have; outcome determinative test

In all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state court

The suit, instituted as a class action on behalf of respondent nonaccepting noteholders and brought in a federal court solely because of diversity of citizenship, is based on an alleged breach of trust by petitioner trustee in that it failed to protect the interests of the noteholders in assenting to the exchange offer and failed to disclose its self-interest when sponsoring the offer. Petitioner moved for summary judgment, which was granted. On appeal, the judgment that a federal diversity court was not bound by a state statute of limitations was reversed. The court concluded that the federal diversity courts were required to apply state law to determine the outcome of litigation, regardless of whether the remedy was in law or in equity. Respondent noteholder’s suit against petitioner trustee arising from an alleged breach of trust was remanded for further proceedings

The court noted that under the Erie Doctrine, in all cases where a federal court had jurisdiction solely because of diversity of citizenship, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state court. The doctrine required the federal diversity court to follow state law, and if the statute of limitations under state law barred recovery in a state court, the federal court could not afford recovery. The court reiterated that the source of substantive rights enforced by a federal diversity court was state law, and that this law determined the outcome regardless of the forum or whether the remedy was in law or in equity.

24
Q

Hanna v. Plumer

A

1965- Should the adequacy of service of process in a federal diversity action be measured by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(1)? yes

Federal courts sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of substantive law, are bound by state court decisions as well as state statutes.

The plaintiff, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to recover for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligence of a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Service was made upon the executor of the deceased by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with the executor’s wife at his residence, in compliance with Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4(d)(1). Because Massachusetts law required service by “delivery in hand” upon the executor, the District Court entered summary judgment for defendant, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held that in a suit where a plaintiff happened to be a non-resident, and a right was enforceable in a federal as well as in a state court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may vary at times because the two judicial systems were not identical. reversing, the Court held that the adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), designed to control service of process in diversity actions, neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 2072, nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that Rule 4(d)(1) was therefore the standard against which the District Court should have measured the adequacy of the service.

25
Q

Walker v. Armco Steel Corp

A

1980- Should the Oklahoma statute of limitations apply as opposed to the Federal rule? yes; court concludes that there is no direct conflict between the Rule and the state statute, because Federal Rule 3 does not address what act satisfies the statute of limitations; it only defines “commencement of an action” for purposes of measuring various time periods under the Federal Rule themselse.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a collision with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning.

An Oklahoma resident was injured by the shattering of a nail he had attempted to pound into a wall, claiming that the nail was defective because of the out-of-state manufacturer’s negligence in manufacture and design. The injured person brought suit against the manufacturer within the state statute of limitations, but service was not made until more than 60 days after expiration of the limitations period. Under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 97 (1971), service was too late, but service would have been timely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. The district court dismissed the complaint because the Oklahoma tolling statute was an integral part of its statute of limitations. The court of appeals agreed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

The Court reviewed prior rulings concerning statutes of limitation, and held that under those rulings, the state tolling provisions applied. The Court noted that in diversity actions, Rule 3 governed the date on which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules began to run, but it did not affect state statutes of limitation. On the other hand, the state statute was a statement of a substantive decision by the state that actual service on the defendant was an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations. Rule 3 and Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 97 (1971) therefore each controlled its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.

26
Q

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore

A

1979- Are the stockholders collaterally estopped from re-litigating the question of whether the proxy statement was materially false and misleading? yes

Offensive estoppel is precluded where plaintiff could have easily joined in the earlier action, or where application would be unfair to a defendant.

Respondent stockholders sued petitioner corporation alleging misleading and material misrepresentations in petitioner’s proxy statement. Before the action came to trial, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed suit against petitioner, making essentially the same allegations, and entered a declaratory judgement after a trial finding that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading. Plaintiff in the stockholder’s action moved for partial summary judgment against the defendants, asserting that the defendants were collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issues that had been resolved against them in the SEC’s action. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that such an application of collateral estoppel would violate the defendants’ right to a jury trial, but the United States Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

The application of offensive collateral estoppel will not reward a private plaintiff who could have joined in the previous action, since the respondent probably could not have joined in the injunctive action brought by the SEC. Offensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase rather than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action. Trial courts should be given broad discretion to determine when the use of offensive collateral estoppel should be applied. Here, the petitioner had an opportunity to litigate their claims.