IR Theory Final Flashcards
Robert Jervis
> Challenges the rational choice model of IR
> Ideas are “sticky” and best challenged by fully formed theories
> States are perceived as more hostile than they are
> These are illustrative–and the big theme is behavioral economics in IR
Irving Janis
> Essentially is a summary of herd mentality (As cohesion grows, dissent is punished and decision making becomes routine).
> Group is uncritical and uses self-reinforcing heuristics (filtering)
> Out-groups promote polarization and aggressiveness not single group member would normally take
> Variables that promote groupthink include personality and stress
> Not all groupthink is bad
> Theorists should study group process that produces miscalculation
Putnam
Level I - Negotiators develop preliminary agreement
Level II - Constituents decide whether to ratify
(Win set is the overlap)
Larger win sets make Level I agreement more likely
Larger wins sets can weaken a negotiator (but skill matters)
But misperception/deception can change dynamic as can international pressure
Bernstein
Deals with Cuban Missile Crisis
Allison Zeliko propose rational actor model flawed and instead look at organization behavior (model II) and bueracratic politics (model III)
Bernstein’s critique is essentially that theory is complex, muddled, and not validated by historical experience
Says, for instance, that the senior executive role–“the president decides”–is likely much more important
Byman and Pollack
Makes a case for level I analysis (primarily pushing back against realist arguments)
Individuals are key to understanding state intentions
Any second-level theory must look at level I actors to make sense
Leader expertise and personality traits are both state capabilities and help shape how other states react
Leadership is more important times of chaos or ambiguity
Van Evera
Makes the case that offensive dominance increases the chance of war
It increases vulnerabilities and magnifies advantages (feedback loops)
Trust decreases
Only the perception of offensive dominance matters
Promote defensive context to avoid war
Hoffman
Terrorism is hard to define
Terrorism has changed over time, for instance:
> French terror seen positive (swift justice)
> Political assassination Russia very targeted
> State terror (Stalin)
> IRA modernized terror (Media, money, and indiscriminate)
Terrorists try and muddy the waters but bottom line is Army/Rebels follow rules and norms
His definition: “The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”
Cronin
Cronin basically has the same definition of terrorism as Hoffman
Development of targets goes from empires –> colonial powers –> U.S. led international system/globalization
Religious terrorism is a new beast (literally sanction by God and good vs. evil)
Globalization is both a cause and a tool of terrorism (clash of civilizations)
Terrorism is biggest threat of current
Schroeder
19th Century stability was distinct from 18th century and not fully explained by conservative ideology, preservation of social order, and statesmanship
It is better explained by:
> The norms and treaty system that followed the Congress of Vienna
Fending off of extra-European world
System of barrier/jointly managed states (Switzerland)
Helped solve three problems:
> Maintain security and status of great powers
Insulate Europe from extra-European sources of conflict
Keep small states secure and independent while allowing for spheres of influence
Jervis (Concert of Europe)
Balance of power is the norm and concert system only prevail after major counter hegemonic wars
This is for two reasons:
> Alliances are more likely
> War is a less legitimate policy instruments (too costly)
The dynamics that preserve a concert system include:
> Higher than normal benefits of cooperation relative to
Defection
> Fear of the hegemon
> Transparency and predictability
Concert system tend to decay with time
Kissinger Asia
He wants some sort of balance of power system (Sees Asia as similar to 19th Century concert system in some ways
U.S. must be present without dominating
U.S. should maintain traditional alliances
U.S. should not pursue traditional containment–it isn’t possible–but should act alone to push back against regional hegemony (China)
Engagement, engagement, engagement!
Kissinger WW I
War could have been avoided if not for 1st-level failures (frivolous leaders)
Germany was expansionist and lacked an ideological framework (wanted to fight everyone and maximize military power)
- -> Provoked counterbalancing
- -> Wilhelm the 2nd was no Bismarck
- -> Tried to bully its way into an Alliance with Britain
Russia was only half engaged with Europe and was also expansionist but weak
Sagan
Is a critique of the “cult of the offensive” theory of WW I
Bureaucratic interests (independence and plan fulfillment etc.) miss other significant factors that contributed to offensive operates
–> Offensive strategies also helped fulfill alliance commitments
– > Offensive strategies can also be promoted by the military balance of forces (Belgium weakness etc.)
Sagan parlays this into a defense of extended deterrence
Beck
Perceptions of Chamberlain at Munich are frequently caricatures
Revisionist school says he was constrained by things such as:
> Vulnerability across the empire
> Need to promote U.S. entry into the war on Britain’s side
> Domestic politics
> Perceived military weakness
Counter revisionists concede the bad hand, but argue a more skillful negotiator could have gotten more
Some “lessons”
- Negotiating skill matters
- Public opinion/education matters
- Good intelligence matters
- Military matters
But… no real lessons
Waltz Globalization
World is integrated not interdependent (this isn’t new)
Integration is not the key to conflict avoidance (WW I happened and Cold War maintained peace between great powers)
States are still the preeminent actors in the global system
Current global market system is largely created and enforced by the U.S.
Some states may be left behind and push back against global interdependence
