IR theory Flashcards
Classical realism arguments
System is characterized by conflict. Human history oscillates but doesn’t evolve. International regimes and institutions exist only to serve the interests of the dominant power. Basic foundations of theory have existed for millenia though not codified into theoretical framework until end of World War II.
Neorealism arguments
System is characterized by conflict but likelihood of conflict is dependent on the polarity of the system. States will choose to either bandwagon or balance. Relative power is important…one state’s gain implicitly means another state’s loss of security. Developed in the Cold War as bipolar world order created new systems in which bandwagoning and balancing became important. Theorists were increasingly concerned with balance of power as a means of mitigating conflict. (Hegemonic stability theory and bipolar stability were two competing ideas.)
Institutionalism arguments
Increasing interdependence between states reduces likelihood of conflict due to anarchy-mitigating effects of international institutions. States are not monolithic black boxes but their internal structure matters. Relationships between elites from different countries has an impact on international relations. Human history evolves. Future of international system will be more secure due to increasing dominance of international regimes. Developed toward end of Cold War as dominance of international institutions increased. Popular ideas include Democratic Peace Theory and commercial trade theory which both posit that conflict can be mitigated by either the spread of democracy or liberal trade capitalism.
Constructivism arguments
Norms and patterns of behavior can have an impact on state behavior but do so not through regimes (a la liberalism) but through state identities. Rejects the assumption that state priorities are exogenous (both liberalism and realism assume that international actors are rational, as defined by a desire for power, security, or welfare). Rather, identities are created through interaction in a state of anarchy. Social acts are defined as signalling process between actors in which identities are created.
Theory of theory classical arguments
From the Latin thealimi –> to observe, to look at. Classical understanding of theory is that we must deep dive into our subjects. We must study everything about them in order to describe them. The challenge of this conception of theory as applied to IR is that it is extremely complicated. Theorists must be adept at using history, anecdotal evidence, and facts to support their theory.
Theory of theory modern arguments
An explanation of how different variables interact. Don’t need hands-on with reality…in fact, abstract theories should be further away. Abstract theory is more narrow than Classical in that it focuses on a bunch of variables. It is both more concrete (real variables i.e. discussing impact of armored units) and more abstract (general application i.e. no case studies / countries). The greater the abstraction, the greater the power of the theory.
Both Theory of Theory modern and classical arguments
Both versions share some similarities, including: 3 levels of analysis (individual, state, system), 4 types of goals (describe, explain, predict, and prescribe), anarchic overarching system.
Classical Realism Assumptions
- State is the primary actor 2. International system is anarchic 3. States maximize power
Neorealism Assumptions
- State is the primary actor 2. International system is anarchic 3. States maximize security
Liberalism: Institutionalism assumptions
- International system is anarchic 2. States are not the only actors (international institutions, regimes, etc.). Internal structure of states matter. 3. Repeated interaction leads to regimes (norms, institutions) that can enable Pareto Optimal outcomes and mitigate conflict
Constructivism Assumptions
- International system is anarchic. 2. Identities shape behavior.
Theory of theory: Classical assumptions
the act of observing reality
Theory of theory: Modern assumptions
abstract model of reality
Doing Evil in Order to Do Good contributions
Called on princes (leaders) to recognize the objective law of International system and behave accordingly. Basically a criticism of leaders who attempt to follow moral principles. It is their responsibility to maintain their state, an endeavor that requires amoral calculations. For example, it is better to be feared than loved since men are naturally ungrateful but dread punishment. SUPPORTS ASSUMPTION 2: STATES ARE MAIN ACTORS
The State of Nature and the State of War contributions
Humans are basically equal and conflict is a natural symptom of this equality for some things are desired by both but can’t be enjoyed by both. As such, a state of nature in which there is no overarching government is characterized by war. Hobbes doesn’t use war to mean battles between armies or actual fighting (though these can occur) but rather the disposition toward conflict and no assurance of anything else. SUPPORTS ASSUMPTION 3: ANARCHY
The Melian Dialogue contributions
Melians are an example of a state that doesn’t get the reality of the international system. They attempted to appeal to the Athenians’ sense of morality and were crushed. Example of the assumptions of the international system in which the strong prey on the weak. SUPPORTS ASSUMPTION 1: STATES SHOULD MAXIMIZE POWER
Theory of International Politics contributions
Believes that classical realism is a good start but needs to be more scientific. Applies economic ideas to international relations theory. Most important of these applications is the transmutation of the market into the system. Believes that states are the main actors but act based on where they are in the system, not on who they are. Waltz is concerned with getting an abstract theory that can be broadly applicable. As such, he doesn’t focus on case studies and focuses on the system so theorists don’t have to look at n actors with n nuances. State behavior is changed by the system: objectives, motivations, and interests are modified by the system. The system socializes the states to make them all the same.
Politics Among Nations contributions
Basically provides an overview of the three main assumptions of classical realism by drawing upon historical authors. There is no progress in history, just technological change. Human desire for survival by domination will never change. The tendency to dominate for survival characterizes all human behavior and is justified as exogenous either through the religious concept of original sin or imperfect reason.
Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future contributions
Competition is always constant and intense. A race to the bottom is a degenerative process. Tears down bi and multipolarity, arguing that bi-multipolarity is the most stable. “Race to the bottom” means that any tit is met with a corresponding tat until we all blow up. Competition between the two superpowers is so intense that superiority in one area is impossible. Crisis is a normative factor. Preponderant states become so powerful that minor shifts in balance of power are nonthreatening. Bi-polar realm moderated by two hegemonic poles moderated by multipolar realm.
Multipolar Power Systems contributions
Argue that multipolar system are more stable (defined as the probability that no state will dominate, each will maintain its integrity, and there will be an absence of war). Stability is created by the rise of interaction (more interaction = more dyadic relationships = variety of interests and potential conflicts = cross-pressures against large-scale conflcit) and attention allocation (as number of relationships increases, resources for attending to each decreases and arms races are less threatening because each state isn’t sure the threat is against them specifically). These guys believe that multipolar systems are more stable but impermanent.
Bandwagoning for Profit contributions
Argues that bandwagoning is more prevalent in International System than other neorealists would choose to believe. Defines 3 types of responses to threats: jackal bandwagoning (bandwagon for rewards / security by weak states), wave-of-the-future bandwagoning (weak states bandwagon if they believe doing so will align them with a new world order), balancing (strong states balance in order to maintain the status quo).
The Anarchical Society contributions
Argues that notion of international order is impossible theoretical concept but states operate in international society in which rules and norms, even if not codified, persist. Fundamentally argues that viewing reality through structure of international society is limiting because there are nuances in group and individual behavior that go unnoticed.
Systems in Crisis contributions
Power Cycle Theory: similar to hegemonic stability theory but not diadic (roughly 5 meaningful actors in system). State power is roughly bell-shaped with ‘critical points’ of inflection. State’s estimation of capabilities is drawn from tangent line from critical point. At early stages, states under-estimate their capabilities and at mid stages, states over-estimate. Critical points represent uncertainty as states realize they’ve been over/under-estimating capabilities. In addition, transparency decreases at inflection points. Multiple states going through critical points at the same time increases the likelihood of conflict.
War and Change in World Politics contributions
Hegemonic stability theory: presence of a hegemon mitigates the effects of anarchy since the hegemon produces global public goods. These goods decrease the likelihood of conflict by decreasing uncertainty through regulation. Act as approximation of global government. System is fundamentally diadic (only meaningful actors are hegemon and challenger). Conflict becomes more likely as hegemon faces decreasing marginal returns on global public goods. Challenger covets the hegemon’s ‘prestige’ (basically ability to impose will through pre-existing legitimacy instead of raw force) and conflict arises as hegemon and challenger’s cost-benefit analyses shift.
The Unipolar Illusion contributions
Summary: unipolarity cant last. Hegemonic systems sow the seeds for their own destruction as states move to balance against them. Multipolarity is the only true equilibrium in ir.
Stability in a Unipolar World contributions
Argues that stability produced by unipolar world is durable, focusing on the current ‘pax-Americana.’ It is durable because it is less costly to maintain for both the pole (less cost to maintaining strong military) and others (no incentive to become revisionists). Unipolarity minimizes security and prestige problems that often lead to conflict.
Inside Terrorism contributions
Also defines modern terrorism through a historical summary of its evolution. Argues modern terrorism is characterized by 5 features (1 - political aims, 2 - use or threat of violence, 3 - broad psychological repercussions, 4 - executed by individuals inspired, organized, or motivated by existing group, 5 - perpetrated by subnation / non-state entity.
Behind the Curve contributions
Outlines 4 waves of terrorism (1 - rising norms of humanitarianism led to terrorism within states, 2 - drive for national self-determination, 3 - similar to second but with greater nationalist zeal and international dimension, 4 - religious zeal and rejection of cultural globalization), noting that our response to modern terrorism is out-dated. We need to recognize the power asymmetries and react with economic, political, and military capabilities.
Power and Interdependence contributions
The international system is inherently chaotic due to the sensitivity and vulnerability of states to the events in other states. This system promotes coordination to overcome this chaos. Increasing interactions leads to greater sensitivity and vulnerability which leads states to seek out coordination. This coordination manifests itself in the form of regimes.
Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War contributions
Believes that offense-dominated systems are more likely to fall into conflict for 10 reasons: 1 - states are easier to conquer, 2 - self-defense is more difficult, 3 - insecurity, 4 - first-strike advantages are larger, 5 - windows of opportunity are larger, 6 - more hard-line diplomacy, 7 - acrimonious negotiations, 8 - greater secrecy = insecurity, 9 - arms races, 10 - preceding conditions create vicious cycle of offense-dominance.
After Victory contributions
Explains where regimes come from. After systemic conflict, the international system is malleable. Creation of new regimes falls on victors of conflict and thus represent their interests. Power plays important role.
Structural Causes and Regime Consqs contributions
Regimes are the causal intervening variable that provide a sense of general obligation which changes state behavior in anarchy. Once in existence, regimes work to perpetuate themselves. Summarizes the 3 views of regimes: 1) regimes prevent conflict, 2) regimes promote Pareto optimal outcomes, 3) regimes don’t do anything, they simply reflect the interests of the hegemon or dominant power.
After Hegemony contributions
Focuses on the ability of hegemonic power to enable Pareto Optimal outcomes. The true test of a regime comes with the hegemon’s decline. If the regimes are strong enough to continue to shape interactions after the hegemon’s decline, likelihood of conflict will decline. Written as the US’s hegemonic power is in decline, concerned with what will happen after.
Interests, Power, Knowledge contributions
Summary: attempts to synthesize various approaches to international institutions / regimes though concludes that such synthesis might be difficult. Recognition that divergent theories are attempting to explain the same phenomena.
Liberalism and World Politics contributions
Summarizes Kant, Schumpeter, and Machiavelli, noting how each contributes to an understanding of how democratic (liberal) peace could work.
The False Promise of Intl Institutions contributions
Written at the end of the Cold War, arguing that the Cold War provided lots of stability. Believes the post-Cold War system will see more conflict as bipolar arrangement erodes and declining stability becomes pervasive.
Prone to Violence contributions
Shows how the forced adoption of democracy in states that aren’t developed enough for it (strong rule of law, educated masses, level of economic development) can be a violent transition as candidates rely on lowest-common-denominator motivators (prejudice, racism, ethnocentrism) to rally support.
How Liberalism Produces Dem Peace contributions
Argues for DPT by examining instances in which democracies were close to war but shied away from it and other instances in which conflict actually broke out. He defends DPT against the definitional argument of its detractors by arguing its not how we define democracy today but rather how the players of the time did. For example, in the war of 1812, Americans didn’t view Britain as a democracy whereas they did view France as a kindred republic despite the French navy doing some questionable things to American sailors on the high seas. Uses primary documents of the time to defend his assertions that the perception is the key mechanism by which DPT works (or doesn’t).
Schumpeter contributions
Capitalism = trade means that markets replace war. Trade makes all goods accessible to all states, meaning that conflict for commercial gain is moot. If you can trade for goods at a cheaper cost than conquest, you will not go to war for them. The idea that relative gains are not important underpins this whole argument. Commercial ties will lead to liberal pacifism.
Engel contributions
Interaction shapes state preferences. Commercial interactions shape state behavior by changing what is preferable to a state. Since war-like behavior is not conducive to commercial gain, states will not engage in it.
What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate? contributions
Focused on the rules / norms that govern state behavior and the impact of interaction on these rules.
Anarchy is what States Make of It contributions
Rejects exogenous assumption of state interests. Instead argues that interests are the product of state interaction. When two agents interact for the first time, they do not operate based on worst-case assumptions (what a realist would say) but rather create mutually-reinforcing identities based on social acts. Argues that realist assumptions about anarchy are social constructs: they are effective only because everyone agrees on them…but other interpretations of anarchy can be developed into new social constructs.
Hypotheses on Misperception contributions
Basically argues that actors in the international system are likely to take new evidence and attempt to fit it into established views. This leads to a number of cognitive problems that can explain otherwise ‘irrational’ state behavior throughout history.
Norms, Identity, and Nat Sec in Germany and Japan contributions
They were in a situation where they should have helped the US in the Gulf War. Should have sent at least the appearance of small forces. But intense domestic pressure stopped them from doing that.
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be better contributions
Argues that nukes reduce the likelihood of conflict through 1) making the cost / benefit analysis of war unattractive 2) increasing clarity over each others’ military capabilities 3) reducing arms races (if you have a nuke, you’re just as scary to your enemy as if you had 15). Argues that the spread of nukes is good because, even in developing countries, they are still primarily concerned with survival. Furthermore, military dictatorships are okay because military leaders are better at recognizing threat of nukes.
The Diplomacy of Violence contributions
Schelling argues that traditional military capabilities required the defeat of an opposing military before the coercive power of ‘hurt’ could be brought to bear on a state. However, with nuclear weapons, this is no longer the case. As such, military strategy and the traditional diplomacy of violence is now constant, changing foreign relations.
Diplomacy contributions
(Correct me if I’m wrong here Alison): Kissinger argues that WWI was fundamentally the product of rigid alliances whose inflexibility lead to arms races.
Groupthink contributions
Despite the intention of overcoming human error by crafting strategies in groups, Janis argues that groups bring with them a host of psychological errors of their own. Primary among these is the desire for members of a group to maintain and enhance group cohesion. This basic human tendency results in various cognitive errors such as silencing dissent, ignoring data, and taking stronger stances towards the opposing group(s).
From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation contributions
(Correct me if I’m wrong here Shannon): Jervis basically analyzes the concert of Europe as a causal intervening variable that changed state calculus by increasing the costs of non-cooperation and the benefits of alignment. The also decreased communication barriers and norms between states. While concerts are rare, they can occur, particularly after conflicts in which capabilities are reduced and interests are aligned.
Europe’s Classical Balance of Power contributions
Gulick basically summarizes European history from the early 1800s to the end of the 19th century. He focuses on the role played by the various diplomats involved in the negotiations designed to balance against each other. However, this focus also highlights the place of random chance and human error in shaping human history. These greater leaders overreacted to Napoleon’s return, allowing Russia to obtain too many holdings. The eventual disappearance of Alexander the Great and the other diplomats towards the end of the 1800s signaled the collapse of the system of alliances they had worked so hard to create. However, neorealists would argue that this period highlights the validity of stability-affirming alliances in the international realm due to its longevity. Liberals would focus on the role institutions played. And classical realists would maintain that it was the efforts of great leaders to achieve this period of peace.
Munich’s Lessons Reconsidered contributions
Beck reexamines the Munich Conference, particularly focusing on the external factors that pushed Chamberlain to accept the Munich Agreement and cede the Sutenland to Hitler. While he recognizes the general validity of criticisms against Chamberlain’s appeasement approach, he argues that Chamberlain’s story suggests different conclusions that need to be drawn. Primary among these was the unreliable intelligence Chamberlain was forced to deal with. Uncertainty surrounding German military capabilities lead Chamberlain to overestimate the risks of more aggressive negotiation tactics, particularly given the poor state of British capabilities. Furthermore, he should have been more proactive in exposing the war-adverse British people to the risks of war and motivate greater military preparation. Finally, he should have been a less trusting, more devious negotiator himself with Hitler.
War by Time-Table contributions
(Correct me if I’m wrong here Shannon): Taylor summarizes the events that led up to WWI, focusing on the reliance on war mobilization plans that were devised totally independently from policy and politics. This meant that, as hostilities increased, war became more likely and more broad by the stipulations of these mobilization plans. Some examples of this reliance on military strategy include: russia’s inability to mobilize troops only near Austria-Hungary, creating the impression of a threat to all of Germany, Germany’s requirement to fight a war on two fronts and attack France from the north draws in not only France but also Great Britain that would have otherwise not been involved.
The Clash of Civilizations contributions
Huntington argues that, with the Cold War over, patterns of conflict are reverting to their historical cleavages along the borders of civilizations. He argues that these ancient battle lines reflect the broadest groups by which humans self-identify, borrowing from constructivism’s interest in cultural norms and identities in arguing for new patterns of conflict. Despite his use of decidedly non-realist metrics, this is fundamentally a reaffirmation of realism’s basic assumptions of human behavior as survival oriented. While the lines of alignment may have shifted, the basic drivers of conflict remain.
Accidents Waiting to Happen contributions
Legro argues that it is not the simple case that dominant militaries inherently lead to conflict. Rather, there exist military cultures and norms that, when aligned, can actually reduce the chances of escalation. He examines various examples of approaches to warfare (use of submarines against merchant vessels, use of chemical weapons, bombing of civilians), arguing that their escalation or de-escalation was the product of aligned (chemical weapon de-escalation) or divergent (Germany’s use of subs, Britain’s use of ‘strategic’ bombing) military norms.
The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? contributions
Friedberg summarizes the different IR theories perspectives on the future of US-China relations from both optimistic and pessimistic perspectives. These include: realist (optimist: China’s territorial aims are moderate, balanced by US, China is land, US is sea, domestic turbulence in China weakens them…pessimist: China’s power is rising, increasing threats and arms races to US and allies in the region, China wants revenge for its century of humiliation), liberal (optimist: economic integration, spread of democracy, and strong international institutions will all keep conflict from breaking out…pessimist: CHina is not a democracy yet and the transition is likely to be painful, creating incentive for leaders to focus on external targets for better unity, there are also groups in both countries that would gain from conflict and will push for it domestically), and constructivist (optimist: identities and norms are endogenous and will make China want to be accepted by the international community…pessimist: ideas and norms can harden in times of crisis.)
The End of History contributions
Fukuyama argues that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the only remaining ideological challenger to western liberal democracy disappeared, an event he describes as the end of history. While conflict will continue, the historical importance of conflict as competitions between alternate structures of societal organization will disappear. Fukuyama, like Huntington, borrows ideas from constructivism in focusing on the difference between material destruction and ideological destruction.
Power and Weakness contributions
Argues that American and European sensibilities have diverged since the end of the Cold War with Europe entering a Kantian utopia (“perpetual peace”) but eschewing conflict and military might in so doing. Meanwhile, the US still operates in a Hobbesian state of nature, effectively guarding the European Union against the vagaries of an anarchic world. The divergent understandings of foreign policy are not the product of specific presidents or wars but rather a reflection of power capabilities in Europe and America. Europeans prefer appeasement and negotiation due to their weak military capabilities while Americans prefer the opposite approach for the opposite reason. Concludes that Americans should not be concerned by the strategic decoupling of American and European foreign policy because Europe isn’t powerful enough to constrain America. However, America should use the opportunity to adopt a more European approach to diplomacy.
The Coming Anarchy contributions
Travels around Africa and Turkey, concludes that we’re all totally boned. Nation states will go the way of the dodo, the rabble will take over, and chaos will ensue.
The Melian Dialogue quotes
“The strong do what they want, the weak suffer what they must.”
The Neoconservative Moment contributions
(Correct me if I’m wrong here Shannon): Fukuyama argues that neoconservative ideas are basically totally wrong because they are excessively realist, excessively idealist, and don’t understand soft power. (Shannon’s response) yes, that’s basically it.
The State of Nature and the State of War quotes
“In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things are require such force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
Doing Evil in Order to Do Good quotes
“I conclude, therefore, with regard to being feared and loved, that men love at their own free will, but fear at the will of the prince, and that a wise prince must rely on what is in his power and not what is in the power of others, and he must only contrive to avoid incurring hatred.”
Theory of International Politics quotes
“Some states prefer survival to their other ends and will act to ensure it….States are alike in the tasks they face but different in their capabilities….Goal of a theory is not to reflect reality but to come up with an alternate reality that may or may not be true…”
Politics Among Nations quotes
“Human nature, in which politics finds its roots, has not changed since the philosophers of Greece, India, and China had first tried to describe them.”
War and Change in World Politics quotes
?If the disequilibrium in the int?l system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redist?n of power will be established?
The Anarchical Society quotes
“System arises when 2 or more states that have sufficient contact and behavior to impact each other.”
Inside Terrorism quotes
“Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorist seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.”
