IO/Competition Policy Flashcards
Connor (2003)
CARTELS
- Median no. participants in cartel = 5
- 77% of cartels have 6/fewer participants
- Only 13% of cartels had 10/more participants
CARTELS
- Median no. participants in cartel = 5
- 77% of cartels have 6/fewer participants
- Only 13% of cartels had 10/more participants
Connor (2003)
….. (…..)
- Median no. participants in cartel = …..
- …..% of cartels have …../fewer participants
- Only …..% of cartels had …../more participants
Connor (2003)
- Median no. participants in cartel = 5
- 77% of cartels have 6/fewer participants
- Only 13% of cartels had 10/more participants
Real-world examples of determination of market size
- Nestle/Perrier
(i) Relevant product market = mineral waters
(ii) Relevant geographical market = France (due to high transport costs + difficulty of entry)
(iii) Nestle + Perrier had ~80% of French mineral water market, so authorities required divestiture - Volvo/Scania
(i) Market definition – heavy trucks, national markets
(ii) Volva + Scania market share in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland and Denmark ranged from 49%-91%
(iii) Price elasticity of demand estimated from 0.28-1.63
(iv) Merger forbidden due to analysis that welfare would decrease, even w/10% cost efficiencies
Volvo/Scania example
(i) Market definition – heavy trucks, national markets
(ii) Volva + Scania market share in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland and Denmark ranged from 49%-91%
(iii) Price elasticity of demand estimated from 0.28-1.63
(iv) Merger forbidden due to analysis that welfare would decrease, even w/10% cost efficiencies
Nestle/Perrier example
(i) Relevant product market = mineral waters
(ii) Relevant geographical market = France (due to high transport costs + difficulty of entry)
(iii) Nestle + Perrier had ~80% of French mineral water market, so authorities required divestiture
Nestle/Perrier example
(i) Relevant product market = …..
(ii) Relevant geographical market = ….. (due to ….. + …..)
(iii) Nestle + Perrier had …..% of French mineral water market, so authorities required divestiture
(i) Relevant product market = mineral waters
(ii) Relevant geographical market = France (due to high transport costs + difficulty of entry)
(iii) Nestle + Perrier had ~80% of French mineral water market, so authorities required divestiture
Volvo/Scania example
(i) Market definition – …..
(ii) Volva + Scania market share in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland and Denmark ranged from ….% to …..%
(iii) Price elasticity of demand estimated from ….. to …..
(iv) Merger forbidden due to analysis that welfare would decrease, even w/…..% cost efficiencies
(i) Market definition – heavy trucks, national markets
(ii) Volva + Scania market share in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland and Denmark ranged from 49%-91%
(iii) Price elasticity of demand estimated from 0.28-1.63
(iv) Merger forbidden due to analysis that welfare would decrease, even w/10% cost efficiencies
Bonnet and Schain (2017)
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MERGERS IN DAIRY MARKET
- Large heterogeneity in potential merger gains means rules of thumb misleading
- Just <1/2 of mergers produce zero synergies
- Less than 1/5 mergers produce synergies amounting to more than 5% of marginal costs
- Avg. marginal cost savings = 2.6%
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MERGERS IN DAIRY MARKET
- Large heterogeneity in potential merger gains means rules of thumb misleading
- Just <1/2 of mergers produce zero synergies
- Less than 1/5 mergers produce synergies amounting to more than 5% of marginal costs
- Avg. marginal cost savings = 2.6%
Bonnet and Schain (2017)
….. and ….. (…..)
- Large heterogeneity in potential merger gains means rules of thumb misleading
- Just ….. of mergers produce zero synergies
- Less than ….. mergers produce synergies amounting to more than …..% of marginal costs
- Avg. marginal cost savings = …..%
Bonnet and Schain (2017)
- Large heterogeneity in potential merger gains means rules of thumb misleading
- Just <1/2 of mergers produce zero synergies
- Less than 1/5 mergers produce synergies amounting to more than 5% of marginal costs
- Avg. marginal cost savings = 2.6%
Empirical evidence of merger synergies
Bonnet and Schain (2017)
- Large heterogeneity in potential merger gains means rules of thumb misleading
- Just <1/2 of mergers produce zero synergies
- Less than 1/5 mergers produce synergies amounting to more than 5% of marginal costs
- Avg. marginal cost savings = 2.6%
Connor and Bolotova (2006)
Avg. price over-charge by cartels = 29%
Avg. price over-charge by cartels = 29%
Connor and Bolotova (2006)
…… and ….. (…..)
Avg. price over-charge by cartels = …..%
Connor and Bolotova (2006)
Avg. price over-charge by cartels = 29%