interpretation of legislation of HRA 1998

Question 1

S3(1)

Answer 1

“So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.”

Question 2

RULE from donoghue v popular housing 2001

Answer 2

courts must reinterpret ecisting statutes in line with HRA
- lord woolf cj 75: Can cause problems for interpretation, in that s3 may require a court to “depart from the unambiguous meaning the legislation would otherwise bear… that is, depart from the intention of the Parliament which enacted the legislation.”

Question 3

lord steyn on interpretation

Answer 3

• might be justified in ‘adopt[ing] an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained’ (at [44]

Question 4

Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, Lord Nicholls [33]

Answer 4

• The court can give a meaning to the words that departs from their ordinary meaning (at [31–32]; see also Lord Steyn, at [49]), but they cannot reach an interpretation which is ‘inconsistent with a fundamental feature of the legislation’ (at [33];
• Where an interpretation would depart from the fundamentals of the legislation, the constitutional responsibility rests with Parliament to consider amending the text (at [33], see also s. 4 HRA). This interpretation of s. 3 recognizes the constitutionally proper limits of the courts’ powers, the aims of the HRA (see also Lord Steyn, at [40–42]), and the functional incapacity of the courts to deal with matters requiring resolution through a deliberative democratic process (at [33]).