Insurance + Risk Aversion Flashcards
What is a Risky Prospect?
Set of Payoffs (W1, … , Wn)
- Each Payoff occurs w/ Prob. (p1, … , pn, ∑pi =1)
How can we Evaluate a Risky Prospect?
Calculating EU
EU = ∑ pi U(Wi)
What does a Risk Neutral person’s Utility look like?
Straight 45º Line - EU(L) = U [E(W)]
What does a Risk Averse person’s Utility look like?
Concave Utility Function
EU(L) < U [E(W)]
What does a Risk Loving person’s Utility look like?
Convex Utility Function
EU(L) > U [E(W)]
What is the Exp. Wealth?
E(W) = p(T - C) + (1 - p)T
= T - pC
What is the Exp. Utility of Wealth?
EU(W) = p U(T - C) + (1 - p) U(T)
What is the Utility of Exp. Wealth?
U [E(W)] = U(T - pC)
What 2 things does an Insurance Contract specify?
Compensation - Y
Premium - X
What is Compensation under Full Insurance and what level of Wealth does it provide?
Y = C
Certain Wealth : T - X
When is Full Insurance acceptable to a buyer?
S: U(S) = p U(T - C) + (1 - p) U(T) => S = Value that gives EU
F.I Acceptable: U(T - X) ≥ U(S)
When will a Risk Averse person NOT Buy Insurance?
If X > T - S
What Premium will an Insurance Company accept?
X ≥ pY
What is the Actuarially Fair Premium?
X = pY - due to Competition in Market
- Exp. Profits = 0
What are Fair Odds?
X = pY
What are Unfair Odds?
X > pY
What are Favourable Odds?
X < pY
What level of Wealth does Full Insurance provide?
Certain Wealth
What is Wealth w/ No Theft + Insurance?
Wnt = T - X
What is Wealth w/ Theft + Insurance?
Wt = (T - C) + (Y - X)
= (T - X) - (C - Y)
When does Wnt = Wt?
When Y = C - Full Insurance
When is E(W) the same, regardless of level of Insurance + Prove it?
Under Fair Odds E(W) = p (T - C + Y - X) + (1 - p) (T - X) = T - pC + (pY - X) Fair Odds - X = pY => E(W) = T - pC - NOT dependent on Y
What is the Insurers’ Exp. Profit?
E(π) = p (X - Y) + (1 - p) X
Find Insurers’ Zero Profit in terms of Wnt and Wt?
E(π) = p (X - Y) + (1 - p) X
- Wt = T - C + Y - X
- Wnt = T - X
=> E(π) = p (T - C - Wt) + (1 - p) (T - Wnt)
How do you find the Insurers’ Zero Profit Line in State Space?
E(π) = p (T - C - Wt) + (1 - p) (T - Wnt)
Rearrange: Wt = [((T - pC) - E(π))/p] - [(1 - p)/p]Wnt
Take dWt/dWnt = - [(1 - p) / p] < 0
S.O.C: d2Wt / dWnt dp = 1 / p^2 > 0
What happens to Zero Profit Line when p Increases?
Line becomes FLATTER
How do we find the Insureds’ I.C?
EU = p U(Wt) + (1 - p) U(Wnt)
Total Diff.: dEU = [p U’(Wt)] dWt + [(1 - p) U’(Wnt)] dWnt
Rearrange: dWt / dWnt = - [(1 - p) / p] x [U’(Wnt) / U’(Wt)] < 0
S.O.C: d2Wt / dWnt dp = (1 / p^2) x [U’(Wnt) / U’(Wt)] > 0
How does Increased p affect the I.C?
Higher p –> Higher Risk –> Flatter I.C
- Willing to give up Less in Theft State to have more in NT State than before
What is the Insurance Outcome w/ Fair Odds?
I.C is Tangent to Zero Profit Line
- [(1 - p) / p] = - [(1 - p) / p] x [U’(Wnt) / U’(Wt)]
=> U’(Wnt) = U’(Wt)
=> Wnt = Wt - Full Insurance
What is the Insurance Outcome w/ Unfair Odds?
Insurance sold using p’ > p - Exp. Profit Line becomes FLATTER
tangency now requires: - [(1 - p’) / p’] = - [(1 - p) / p] x [U’(Wnt) / U’(Wt)]
=> U’(Wnt) > U’(Wt) - Partial Insurance