Initial Public Offerings Flashcards

1
Q

What are Shareholders’ Primary Apprehensions when new Shares are issued?

A
  • Dilution.
  • Directors’ ulterior motives, e.g:
    • Unjust enrichment;
    • Maintenance or increase of power;
    • Transfer of wealth to other investors;
    • Unfair prejudice against minority shareholders;
    • Distortion of market accountability mechanisms (à la ‘friendly shareholders’ and takeover bids);

Textbook – P. 128.

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2
Q

What are the Two Forms of Dilution?

A
  • Value Dilution: Diminishment of current holdings’ real value and claims to company capital.
  • Voting Dilution: Diminishment of voting strength.

Textbook – P. 128.

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3
Q

Is it Acceptable for Directors to propose Issuing Shares at a price below Market (Trading) Value?

A

Yes, insofar as the discount is pursuant to ensuring the Issuance’s success and is otherwise in line with DDs.

Shearer v Bercain [1980] 3 All ER 295; Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821.

Ferran and Ho state that up to 40% discounts to par value have been observed and permitted in the UK.

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4
Q

What are the Benefits of placing Share Issuance largely under Directoral Discretion?

A
  • Larger pools of investors decrease the cost of equity finance.
  • Less bureaucracy increases equity financing’s efficiency and speed, which is especially important in a pinch.

Textook – P. 133.

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5
Q

What are the means by which Shareholders are shielded against either Dilution or Directors’ Ulterior Motives?

A
  • DDs.
  • Pre-emption rights.
  • Minority shareholder rights.
  • Requisite shareholder authorization.
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6
Q

How do Directors’ Duties protect Shareholders’ Interests?

A

They align shareholders’ interests with Directors’ interests, theoretically therefore decreasing the likelihood of diultion.

Companies Act 2006 – Chapter 2.

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7
Q

To what extent do Directors’ Duties assuage Shareholders’ Apprehensions?

A

Moderatly. Although they work to guard against the threat of ulterior motives,* given that it is acceptable to issue at below market value, they are largely ineffective against diultion.

Textbook – P. 130; *Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum [1974] UKPC 3

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8
Q

Regarding Issuance and Ulterior Motives, how is it Determined whether the Board has Transgressed its Duties?

A

The Proper Purpose Test, namely whether the dominant and primary purpose of the Issuance was compliant or transgressive.

Textbook – P. 130; Hirsche v Sims [1894] AC 654; Eclairs Group v JKX Oil & Gas [2015] UKSC 71.

Therefore, if an incidental, albeit desired, effect of an Issuance is to, for example, block a takeover bid, it will not result in a transgression of DDs.

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9
Q

What is the Consequence of Issuing Shares pursuant to an Ulterior Motive?

A

The Issuance will be voidable,* and the Directors will be in breach of their duties.**

Textbook – P. 130; *Hunter v Senate Support Services [2004] EWHC 1085 (Ch) and Hogg v Cramphorn [1967] Ch 254; **Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821.

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10
Q

What is the Effect of Minority Shareholders’ Rights?

A

Shareholders may have a claim against the firm if they can demonstrate that their rights have been adversely affected by an Issuance.

Textbook – P. 131.

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11
Q

Regarding Minority Shareholders’ Rights, what are the Lessons to be learned from the Precedent in Mutual Life Insurance?

A
  • No shareholder has an absolute right to expect their interest to remain constant forever.
  • Either the shares themselves or the rights attaching thereto must be affected; mere enjoyment is insufficient.
  • Good faith and commercial sensibility will prevent a claim from biting.

Textbook – P. 131; Mutual Life Insurance v The Rank Organisation [1985] BCLC 11.

The First Lesson contrasts with CJEU precedent, which states that shareholders’ right to retention of a proportionate share in the company’s capital is an inherent right, and that in cases of non-cash consideration, it is open for Member-States to provide for Preemption.* Following the case, it has become very common to exclude overseas shareholders from rights issues.

*Case C-42/95 Siemens AG v Henry Nold [1996] ECR I-6017.

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12
Q

Do the Procedures on the Variation of Rights apply to an Issuance which seeks to Allot Shares Ranking Alongside, or indeed Ahead of, an existing Class of Shares?

A

No. Even though the commercial effect is a reduction of value, neither the shares themselves or the rights attaching thereto are affected by such an Allotment.

Textbook – P. 131; White v Bristol Aeroplane [1953] 2 WLR 144.

In practice, this issue may be resolved by having the Articles of Association state that such an Allotment would be treated as a Variation, namely of the existing shareholders’ rights, and thus requiring approval under the procedures laid out in §630-§631.

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13
Q

Is an Unfair Prejudice (§994) claim a meaningful alternative to a Minority Shareholders’ Rights claim?

A

No. It is at best an exit strategy, and difficult to execute at that, given its high threshold.

Textbook – P. 132; Companies Act 2006 – 994; Re BSB Holdings (No 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 155; Re Sunrise Radio [2009] EWHC 2893; Re Unisoft Group (No. 3) [1994] 1 BCLC 609; Re Coroin [2013] EWCA Civ 781.

In Sunrise, the Court found in favor of the claimants because the Board knew, or could foresee, that the shareholders either could not or were not inclined to subscribe and did not give the share price proper consideration in light of this knowledge.

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14
Q

Regarding §994, what are the Lessons to be Learned from Sunrise Radio?

A
  • The notion of unfair prejudice is to be applied flexibly to meet the circumstances of the particular case.
  • Where the Board knows or can foresee that a minority does not or may not have the funds or inclination to subscribe, it should factor that information into its pricing.
  • Shares should not unthinkingly be priced at par, especially if that would create a large discrepancy between value and price.
  • Failure to give proper consideration to price is a breach of fiduciary duty.

Re Sunrise Radio [2009] EWHC 2893.

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15
Q

To what extent does Requisite Shareholder Authorization assuage Shareholders’ Apprehensions?

A

Context-dependent. The Articles can circumvent the need for ordinary resolution, and in private companies with only one class of shares, the Board can outright issue unless the Articles so prohibit.

Textbook – P. 134; Companies Act 2006 – §549-§551.

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16
Q

What is the Consequence of Issuing Shares without due Authorization from Shareholders?

A

The Issuance is not voided or voidable, but the Directors face criminal liability if they were knowingly involved.

Textbook – P. 134; Companies Act 2006 – §549.

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17
Q

What are Preemption Rights?

A

Incumbent Shareholders’ right to first be offered a sum of the Allotment in nominal proportion to their existing holdings before Issuance, and on the same or more favorable terms thereof.

Companies Act – §561.

Under §561(4)(a), Treasury Shares are disregarded for these purposes. Proportionality is tempered by considerations of practicality, but in most cases, that should present no issues.

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18
Q

Do Pre-emption Rights apply in all Issuances or Allotments of Equity Securities?

A

Yes, save for four exceptions, namely:

  • Bonus shares (§564);
  • Non-cash issues (§565);
  • Employee share schemes (§566).
  • Compromises or Arrangements sanctioned in accordance with Part 26A, i.e. companies in financial difficulty (§566A).

CA 2006.

Under §560(1), an ‘Equity Security’ is an ordinary share or the rights to subscribe for, or to convert a security into, an ordinary share.

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19
Q

For how long does an Offer made pursuant to Preemption stand?

A

At least 14 days, commencing from send date. Such an offer may be made either on paper or electronically.

CA 2006 – §562.

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20
Q

In Practice, how can Pre-emption Rights be circumvented?

A

Pursuant to §565, if the proposed Issuance is supported by any non-cash consideration, pre-emption rights may be disapplied.

Textbook – P. 137; Companies Act 2006 – §565.

Vendor Placings and Cashbox Structures are two means of achieving this effect.

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21
Q

What constitutes Cash and Non-Cash Consideration?

A

The following constitute Cash Consideration:

  • Cash;
  • Cheque received in good faith, i.e. no suspicion it will bounce;
  • Release of a company’s liability for a liquidated sum;
  • Undertaking to pay cash at a future date, i.e. deferred consideration; or
  • Payment by any other means giving rise to a present or future entitlement to a payment, or credit equivalent, in cash.

Therefore, anything else is non-cash consideration.

CA 2006 – §583(3)

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22
Q

Can Preemption Rights be Disapplied?

A

Yes, either through the Articles of Association or by special resolution. Disapplication may also entail a modified application of Preemption Rights.

Textbook – P. 139; CA 2006 – §569-§571 pursuant to §551.

If disapplication is effected by means of resolution, it ceases to be effective once the §551 authorization to which it relates is revoked or expires (absent renewal). Special resolution majority is 75% under §283.

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23
Q

Can Preemption Rights be Excluded?

A

In a private company, yes, through a provision in the Articles.* In a public company, not really, because an alternative to the statutory scheme must be incorporated into the Articles.**

Textbook – P. 139; CA 2006 – *§567-**§568.

In either case, therefore, positive steps must be taken to opt out of the regime. This is appropriate given Pre-emption Rights’ importance as a shareholder safeguard.

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24
Q

Why do Companies elect to Disapply Preemption Rights?

A
  • Efficiency. Although they protect shareholders, they increase the cost of funds for firms.
  • To escape the statutory regime and opt for the Listing Rules regime.

Ferran and Ho – P. 120.

Listing Rules, particularly LR 9, only apply to premium-listed companies.

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25
Q

What are the Advantages of the Listing Rules Regime over the Statutory Regime?

A
  • Shorter minimum offering period, i.e. ten business days for the date on which the offer is first open for acceptance.
  • Enables the sale of fractional shares for the firm’s benefit.
  • Enables the notification of overseas shareholders as the firm sees fit.
  • Allows use of Open Offers in lieu of Rights Issues.

Ferran and Ho – P. 121-125. FCA Listing Rules – 9.3.11-9.3.12, 9.5.1-9.511.

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26
Q

To whom do Preemption Rights not apply to begin with?

A

The Holders of:

  • Warrants;
  • Convertible debt securities; or
  • Non-voting (participating) preference shares.

Ferran and Ho – P. 117.

According to the authors, this is because otherwise would not be compatible with the Second Company Law Directive: European Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I-10139.

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27
Q

Are Preemption Rights are Reliable Safeguard against Dilution?

A

Context-dependent. Shareholders may not possess the necessary finances to maintain their proportion, and if the company is private, the necessary liquidity to facilitate the trade of shares may be absent.

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28
Q

What is a Letter of Allotment?

A

A letter which permits the transference of preemption rights from a willing shareholder to a third-party, typically because the former cannot afford to exercise said rights while the latter can.

CA 2006 – §561(2).

“The Companies Act does not require offers to be made in the form of renounceable letters of allotment. In this respect, therefore, statutory protection is less than comprehensive.”

Ferran and Ho – P. 116.

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29
Q

Must Offers pursuant to Preemption be made in the Form of Renouceable Letters of Alltoment?

A

Not under the Companies Act, but under the FCA Listing Rules, in the case of a Rights Issue, shareholders must be made a Preemption Offer in such a form.

Ferran and Ho – P. 116.

A Rights Issue is, “an offer of new shares or other securities made to existing shareholders in proportion to their shareholdings.”

Thomson Reuters, Rights Issue.

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30
Q

How does a Renouceable Letter of Allotment aid Shareholders relative to a Preemption Offer?

A

Shareholders, using their Renounceable Letters of Allotment (or other (or other negotiable document, e.g. Provisional Allotment Letter) can sell their right purchase the shares in the market nil paid.

Thomson Reuters, Nil Paid Rights.

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31
Q

What is the Consequence for Failure to Comply with the laws on Preemption Rights?

A

The firm, and any officer who knowingly authorized or permitted the contravention, will be held jointly and severally liable to compensate entitled parties for any resultant loss, damage, costs, or expenses.

CA 2006 – §563.

An entitled party is whomever was owed a Preemption Offer but was never made one. A two-year cut-off applies to claims under §563.

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32
Q

Does a Failure to Comply with Preemption Laws Invalidate the relevant shares?

A

No. However, the Court can exercise its §125 power, “to rectify the Register of Members by removing the names of persons to whom shares have been wrongly allotted.”*

Ferran and Ho – P. 116; *Re Thundercrest [1995] BCLC 117.

Critically, Thundercrest concerned a small private company and a wrongful allotment of shares by the Board to itself. Wrongfulness was a result of an illegaly short minimum offering period and actual knowledge of the Board that the entitled party did not receive the offer letter. The Court believed that not using §125 would have enabled the Directors to profit from their own wrongdoing.

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33
Q

Under the Companies Act, if Proper Procedure is observed, do Peemption Rights guard Shareholders against Dilution?

A

No. Passive and non-responsive shareholders increase the risk of wealth erosion and dilution for active shareholders.

Ferran and Ho – P. 117.

Henceforth, this shall be termed the Lazy Shareholder Problem.

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34
Q

How does the FCA Listing Rules address the Lazy Shareholder Problem?

A

Shares that would have otherwise gone to Lazy Shareholders must be offered publicly, and any premium obtained thereupon (expenses netted) must be returned to their would-be Holders.

FCA Listing Rules – 9.5.4.

That is, unless the proceeds do not exceed £5, in which case they may be ratined by the firm.

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35
Q

According the Preemption Group, what are some of the Factors that Investors consider when presented with a Preemption Disapplication Resolution?

A
  • Dilution of value and voting power.
  • Soundness of the firm’s reasoning for doing so.
  • Firm’s size, sector, and stage of development.
  • Firm’s stewardship, governance, and performance.
  • Availability of alternative means of finance, and the necessity of disapplication in their light.
  • Contingency plans.
  • Ex ante management of shareholder relations.

Preemption Group – Disapplying Preemption Rights, a Statement of Principles (2015) [7].

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36
Q

What are the Advantages of Going Public?

A
  • Broader investors pool from which to raise equity, thereby decreasing the cost of equity capital.
  • Circumvention of financial limitations or disinclinations of existing shareholders.
  • Exit route for existing shareholders.
  • Decreased dependence on debt and retained earnings.
  • Increase share liquidity and value, given the transferability requisites that come with listing.*
  • Use the firm’s shares as consideration, e.g. share-for-share transactions.
  • Benchmark metric for share value and company performance, thereby facilitating pay-for-performance or other metric-based tools.
  • Corporate governance improvements, whether due to market pressures or the onboarding of new key managers.
  • Higher prestige, whether through the ‘Plc.’ mantle or greater publicity.
  • Decreased cost of debt capital (for the all reasons above).

Textbook – P. 487-492; *FCA Listing Rules – 2.2.4.

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37
Q

What are the Disadvantages of Going Public?

A
  • Very resource-intensive, i.e. time-consuming, costly, complex.
  • Increased and ongoing regulatory and disclosure obligations, which themselves incur further costs.
  • Exposure to financial markets’ disciplining.
  • DDs become more onerous.
  • Dilution of corporate governance controls (for Founders).

Textbook – P. 492-493.

38
Q

What are the Factors which Influence the Time-Intensiveness of Costliness of Going Public?

A
  • Regulatory regime.
  • Available means of flotation.
  • Target investor demographic.
  • Favorability of market conditions.
  • Available stock exchanges (including tiers).
  • Frim’s size, sector, and stage of development.

Textbook – P. 493.

39
Q

For a Private Company, what is the First Step in an IPO?

A

Becoming a public company,* given that private companies cannot issue shares to the public** or have their securities admitted to an Official Listing.***

Textbook – P. 494; *CA 2006 – §90-§96; **§755; *** FSMA 2000 (Official Listing of Securities) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/2956, Reg. 3.

This entails the cost of additional statutory rules which come with benig a public company, e.g. minimum capital requirements or the differential treatment of legal capital rules. Cumulatively, the effect is a higher cost of administration.

40
Q

By what means can a Public Company make an Offer for its Shares to the Public?

A
  • Placement, more appropriate for smaller Issuances.
  • Offer for Sale or Subscription (usually coupled with listing on a stock exchange), more appropriate for larger Issuances.

Textbook – P. 494.

In legal actuality, the ‘offer’ an invitation to treat. Listing on a stock exchange is not stricly necessary to complete an Offer of Sale.

41
Q

What is the Difference between an Offer for Sale and an Offer for Subscription?

A

The former entails the purchase of existing or alloted shares, whereas the latter entails the purchase of entirely new shares, i.e. have not been issued or alloted.

Ferran and Ho – 371.

For my purposes, when distinguishing between Offers and Placements, I will use the two interchangeably.

42
Q

Generally speaking, why is a Placement more appropriate for Smaller Issuances?

A

An Offer of Sale is extremely time-consuming and expensive, and therefore may be uneconomical if the capital being sought is insufficiently large.

Textbook – P. 495.

43
Q

By what means is an Offer of Sale or Subscription made to the Public?

A

Through a Prospectus, a heavily-regulated document that is meant to provide potential investors with the data they need to make an informed decision on subscription.

Textbook – P. 495.

44
Q

How is the Risk of an Offer of Sale or Subscription Underperforming hedged against?

A

Through underwriting, which, for a fee, entails an investment bank either:

  • Subscribing for the whole Issuance and thereafter itself making an offer of sale to the Public; or
  • Subscribing for any leftover securities which the Public has not purchased.

Textbook – P. 495.

There may also be sub-underwriting, where the Lead Bank other financial institutions to share in the risk.

45
Q

How is the Share Price of an Issuance usually determined?

A

On a fixed basis, typically determined as late as possible and with an aim to ensure a modest over-subscription.

Textbook – P. 495.

Rarely, applicants may be invited to tender at or above a minimum price, with the highest bidders getting to subscribe and all others being eliminated.

46
Q

What is a Placement?

A

An agreement between a firm and an investment bank to distribute the former’s shares to institutional investors who have agreed to purcahse them.

Textbook – P. 496.

There is therefore no offer to the public, however, Placements are usually coupled with a listing on a stock exchange.

47
Q

What are the Advantages of Listing on a Stock Exchange?

A
  • Increases share liquidity by providing a secondary market for trading; and as a result
  • Facilitates investment by initial subscribers because it gives them a greater chance to thereafter realize a gain.

Textbook – P. 497.

Generally, this step will only be skipped if the firm does not wish for its shares to widely traded or to comply with with additional regulation.

48
Q

Why might a Firm wish to List Internationally?

A

To gain exposure to:

  • New markets;
  • Greater liquidity;
  • More advanced technology;
  • Higher accounting standards;
  • Better shareholders’ rights protection;
  • More reputable and attractive markets; or
  • More skilled analysts and institutional investors;

Textbook – P. 499.

49
Q

What is the Difference between Underwriting and Bookbuilding?

A

Bookbuilding markets securities prior to pricing them, guaging the demand therefor and other factors to determine an appropriate figure in lieu of simply fixing the price.

Ferran and Ho – P. 372.

Otherwise, there are no differences.

50
Q

What are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Bookbuilding?

A

It more accurately matches price with demand, but comes at a higher cost and potentiates conflicts of interest for the Bookbuilder.

Ferran and Ho – P. 372.

Bookbuilders, like Underwriters, tend to be Investment Banks. It will be context-dependent whether the benefits outweigh the costs.

51
Q

When is a Share Alloted?

A

“When a person acquires the unconditional right to be included in the company’s Register of Members… in respect of the shares.”

CA 2006 – §558. More generally, also §549-§559.

52
Q

What is a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC)?

A

A vehicle that IPOs and raises capital with the sole purpose of merging with a private company, thereby taking it public without the otherwise necessary rigmarole, within two years of floating.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [3].

There are therefore two key transactions in place, namely an IPO and a Merger.

53
Q

What is the Lifecycle of a SPAC?

A

Pre-Acquisition:

  1. The Sponsor and Investors infuse the SPAC with capital.
  2. The SPAC proposes a Merger within two years.
  3. SPAC shareholders either redeem their shares or sell them.
  4. Contemporaneous with the Merger, the Sponsor (and others) infuse further equity capital into the SPAC (PIPEs).
  5. The SPAC executes the Merger.

Post-Acquisition:

  1. Remaining SPAC shareholders own a small equity stake in the acquired company.
  2. The Sponsor (and others) own similarly small equity stakes in the acquired company.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [13-14].

‘Others’ is a reference to third-party investors. Given the small equity stakes resultant, typically a median of 35%, it cannot truly be said that the SPAC ‘acquired’ the target company. Realistically, it is more a merger which renders. a private company public.

54
Q

Who Creates and Administers SPACs?

A

The Sponsor, who is typically an Institutional Investor of some sort.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [3].

The Sponsor is typically either a Hedge Fund, Private Equity House, Investment Bank, or an enterprise which specializes in the creation and administration of SPACs.

55
Q

What are the Risks that SPAC Shareholders are exposed to?

A

None. If a merger is realized, they may either participate or redeem the cash value of their shares with interest. If no merger is realized, the latter option is still available.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [3].

Share redemption nevertheless entitles shareholders to retain their warrants and the rights associated with their shares (somewhat uncommon), therefore serving as additional compensation for the opportunity cost incurred.

56
Q

How do the Shareholders of SPACs come into their Shares? In other words, what means does a SPAC employ when Going Public?

A

Placement.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [6].

57
Q

What are SPACs’ Structural Flaws?

A
  • High and opaque imbedded costs.
  • Poor alignment of Agent/Shareholder interests.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [6].

58
Q

How do Sponsor derive Compensation?

A

Prior to the IPO, it acquires a sum of SPAC shares at a nominal price that will be adjusted to 25% of IPO proceeds or, equally, 20% of post-IPO equity. This is known as the Sponsor’s Promote.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [11].

Sometimes, “the Sponsor’s interest increases automatically if additional equity is invested at the time of… [the] merger.”

59
Q

How are a SPAC’s costs and expenses covered?

A

In addition to the Promote, the Sponsor will purchase warrants, shares, or both, at prices which it estimates reflect fair market value; the proceeds thereof are used to fuel the SPAC.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [11].

60
Q

What is done with the Proceeds of a SPAC’s IPO?

A

They are placed into a trust and invested in Treasury Bonds. Under the Deed, the trust assets can only be abet a(n):

  • Acquisition of a company;
  • Capital contribution to an acquired company;
  • Distribution to shareholders in case of liquidation; or
  • Redemption of shares.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [11].

61
Q

In Liquidation, does the Sponsor retain its Investment?

A

No.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [11].

62
Q

What is a SPAC Roadshow, and what is its Purpose?

A

A marketing campaign of proposed mergers to potential investors. Its purpose is to:

  • Garner attention in the public markets, thereby giving intial investors an exit route which leaves cash within the SPAC.
  • Attract private investment, namely through the form of equity infusions into the proposed merger.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [13].

The latter purpose is otherwise referred to as a Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE).

63
Q

How important is the SPAC Roadshow?

A

Very. Given that the majority (92%-97%) of initial investors will seek to dispose of their holdings prior to Merger, it is critical to ensuring the SPAC is adequately capitalized to actually acquire the target.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [16-17].

‘Disposal’ describes either redeeming the shares or reselling them. The Roadshow is effectively a second IPO. In Klausner’s Cohort, 77% received PIPEs, 61% received equity from the Sponsor, and 44% received both. The mean equity infusion was 40%.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [21].

64
Q

Given the pattern of Investment-Divestment-Reinvestment, what can be said is the Role of a SPAC’s IPO Investors?

A

To take the SPAC public, thereby allowing new shareholders to invest and facilitate the eventual Merger, a transaction which the original investors effectively play no role in.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [22].

65
Q

What is the Nature of the Imbedded Costs of SPACs?

A

They constitute, “value extracted by parties other than the principals to the SPAC’s ultimate investment transaction,” thereby reducing, “the amount of net cash per share,” the SPAC contributes to the Merger.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [22].

The Principals are the SPAC’s shareholders and the Target and its shareholders.

66
Q

What are the Causes of Imbedded Costs in SPACs?

A
  • The Sponsor’s Promote (20%).
  • IPO investors’ warrants and rights.
  • Fees, e.g. underwriting, accounting, and legal and financial advice.
  • Share redemptions.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [22].

More warrants and rights, higher fees, higher redemptions, and lower PIPEs all equate to lower cash per share.

67
Q

What is the Practical Effect of Imbedded Costs?

A

They reduce the net cash per share contributed to the Merger by a mean of $4.10, down from $10.00, a representation of the amount extracted in compensation paid to the various parties involved.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [22].

$10.00 is the standard price tag of a SPAC share.

68
Q

Who bears the Imbedded Costs?

A

Non-redeeming shareholders (NRSs), directly in proportion to the discrepencies between pre-merger net cash and post-merger share price, and the Merger’s price tag.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [33].

The ill-returns of NRSs are especially woesome in the months after, suggesting, “a continuous downward adjustment in the market’s valuation of post-merger SPACs.”

69
Q

Do Imbedded Costs harm Sponsors?

A

No. “Sponsors’ returns are very high, even when post-merger price performance is poor.”

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [38].

Returns compute to a mean and median of 549% and 257%, respectively.

70
Q

Do Imbedded Costs harm Target Shareholders?

A

Yes, but only to the extent that NRSs, “extract some surplus from the deal.”

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [22].

71
Q

Why might it be said that SPACs are Socially Deletrious?

A
  • Targets do not pay the orthodox costs of going public.
  • Sponsors’ incentives diverge from shareholders’ interests.
  • Mispricing and misallocation of resources could result.
  • Circumvention of the traditional vetting process results in decreased transparency.
  • If the Sponsor does not add post-merger value equal to the value it extracts, additional social costs will be incurred.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [47].

72
Q

In light of Imbedded Costs, are SPACs a more Cost-Effective means of Going Public relative to IPOs?

A

No. Measuring cost as a % of cash delivered, SPACs (62%) cost 34% more than IPOs (28%).

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [50].

73
Q

Given that a SPAC is effectively a Merger, from a Disclosure standpoint, what are the Implications of such a Classification with reference to Public Offering Regulations?

A

Projections made are given,safe harbor from liability in private actions.” This decreases information asymmetries by enabling the dissolution of more data without fear of suit. Aggressive over-projection is also a risk, though.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [53].

The First Point is particularly important for pre-revenue or low-revenue companies, who may have little else other than projections to persaude investors and win over their capital.

74
Q

What is ‘Going Over the Wall’?

A

The practice of providing investors with, “confidential information on which to make an investment decision,” thus decreasing information asymmetries and increasing the accuracy of price discovery.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [54].

This is also a feature of IPOs, but significantly rarer relative to SPACs. It is especially relevant to companies with sensetive information that is pertinent to investment decisions, but which cannot be made public.

75
Q

How does Going Over the Wall increase the Accuracy of Price Discovery?

A

Any PIPEs resultantly validate the project’s value.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [54].

76
Q

Does Going Over the Wall amount to Insider Trading?

A

It can. Prophylactically, the PIPE Investor will require that the information it received be made public in the SPAC’s filings once the deal is announced.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [55].

77
Q

What are Earnouts and how do they increase the Accuracy of Price Discovery?

A

Earnouts are provisions that entitle the Target to compensation should it meet certain financial thresholds. It defers pricing the Merger until the Target has performed and the market has reacted accordingly, thereby increasing the accuracy of price discovery.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [55].

78
Q

To what extent are SPACs more Price-Certain than IPOs?

A

Only Slightly:

  • The price is determined just a few weeks out (if that) from Merger, and is subject to ongoing negotiations throughout;
  • “The the total amount of net cash a Target receives,” i.e. the Merger’s price tag, is unknown until the Merger is concluded.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [58].

79
Q

To what extent are SPACs more Deal-Certain than IPOs?

A

Not at all. To the extent that net cash is sufficient to satisfy the Target, that is not a structural feature of the SPAC, but a show of proper execution.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [58].

Deal certainty is a measure of price risk, i.e. the risk that a Merger or IPO will be unacceptably priced.

80
Q

To what extent are SPACs faster than IPOs?

A

Not meaningfully. To the extent that they are, this is only because firms that IPO begin their preparations earlier, rather than because SPACs require less time to complete.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [59].

81
Q

According to Klausner et al., what would a ‘Better SPAC’ look like?

A
  • No warrants or subsisting rights given to IPO investors.
  • Lower Sponsor compensation, adjusted for, “redemptions and aligned with post-merger share value.”
  • Underwriters billed, “on the basis of nonredeemed shares.”
  • Larger PIPEs from the Sponsor (and others).

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [61].

82
Q

Which Features of SPACs can be Transposed into IPOs?

A
  • Sponsors may be incorporated to identify firms ready to float, support them thereafter, and liaise with Underwriters (Placement).
  • Earnouts, in the form of OTM Call Options with strike prices calibrated accorindgly, may be given to management and investors to incentivize performance.

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, [64].

83
Q

What states §171?

A

Directors must act within their powers, in accordance with the company’s Constitution,* and exercise their powers for the purposes conferred thereby (the Proper Purpose doctrine).**

CA 2006 – *§171(a); **§171(b).

Determining whether a Director has the power to act is merely a matter of construction; determining when has improperly exercised that power is the challenge.

84
Q

What Considerations arise when Examining §171, Ultra Vires action, and the Proper Purpose Doctrine?

A
  • Was the Director acting within the limits of his Powers, as so defined by the Constiution and any contracts with the company
  • Was the Director acting in Good Faith?
  • What were the Director’s motivations, and how can it be demonstrated which motivations most drove him?

Sealy and Worthington – P. 343.

85
Q

Regarding the Proper Purpose Doctrine and Share Issuance, what is the Lesson to be Learned from Punt v Symons & Co?

A

Share Issuance is a power that must be exercised, “for the benefit of the company,” e.g. when it becomes necessary or desirable for the company to raise capital.

Sealy and Worthington – P. 343; Punt v Symons & Co. [1903] 2 Ch 506.

86
Q

Regarding the Proper Purpose Doctrine and Share Issuance, what are the Lessons to be Learned from Hogg v Cramphorn?

A
  • Good Faith alone does not preclude liability under §171.
  • Majority rule is unimpeachable (unless oppressive), and acting against it, even if done earnestly, warrants liability under §171.
  • Share Issuance is a fiduciary power.
  • Shareholders are entitled to ratify a proposedly defective Issuance should they see fit.

Sealy and Worthington – P. 344; Hogg v Cramphorn [1967] Ch 254.

87
Q

Regarding the Proper Purpose Doctrine and Share Issuance, what are the Lessons to be Learned from Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum?

A
  • The Court must assess the substantial purpose underlying a power’s exercise, and whether said purpose was improper.
  • Adherence to the Doctrine cannot be solely characterized by either Good Faith or a desire to raise capital for the firm.
  • Self-interest’s involvment disqualifies Good Faith.
  • Absence of self-interest does not preclude liability.
  • It is wrong and unconstitutional to issue chiefly to create voting power.
  • Shares may be issued for reasons other than financing, e.g. maintaining the company’s financial stability.
  • It is impossible to define the exact limits which Directors must not pass.
  • Demarcation followed by examination of impropriety is the correct way to investigate claims under §171.

Sealy and Worthington – P. 345; Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821 (Privy Council).

88
Q

Regarding the Proper Purpose Doctrine and Share Issuance, what are the Lessons to be Learned from Mills v Mills?

A
  • Directors must react to matters which affect shareholders’ rights inter se.
  • Where there exists two classes, and a decision would benefit one and harm the other, the principal question is, “what is fair as between [them],” rather than one of the company’s interests.
  • A Director’s status as a shareholder does not de facto invalidate his decisions.
  • Directors are not Trustees, and cannot be held to their standard.
  • Ultra Vires and Motive are the core considerations under §171.

Sealy and Worthington – P. 347; Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 (High Court of Australia).

89
Q

Regarding the Proper Purpose Doctrine and the Motives of Directors, what is the Lesson to be Learned from Hindle v John Cotton?

A

“Where the question is one of abuse of powers, the state of mind of those who acted, and the motive on which they acted, are all important.”

Sealy and Worthington – P. 350; Hindle v John Cotton (1919) 56 Sc LR 625, applied in Eclairs Group v JKX Oil & Gas [2015] UKSC 71.

This effectively emphasizes the subjective nature of the test.

90
Q

Regarding the Proper Purpose Doctrine and the Motives of Directors, what is the Lesson to be Learned from Eclairs Group?

A
  • Save influence by dishonesty or self-interest, mixed-motive decisions will only be set aside if, “the primary or dominant [motive]… was improper.”
  • Primacy or dominance is determined by examining causality, with reference whether to harm or injustice has been suffered by shareholders.
    • An outright ‘but for’ test was suggested, but not wholesale adopted.
  • “The [Doctrine] is a principle by which equity controls the exercise of a fiduciary’s powers in respects which are not, or not necessarily, determined by the instrument [i.e. contract term].”

Sealy and Worthington – P. 350; Eclairs Group v JKX Oil & Gas [2015] UKSC 71.

The Third Lesson verily states that impropriety is both a subjective and objective assessment, in that it is necessary to understand Directors’ subjective intentions and to objectively assess whether those intentions drove them to enact something improper.