Incident Response Flashcards
What can initiate incident response? (6)
- Automated detection systems or sensor alerts
- Company user report
- Contractor or third-party ICT service provider report
- Internal or external organizational component incident report or situational awareness update
- Third-party reporting of network activity to known compromised infrastructure, detection of malicious code, loss of services, etc.
- Analytics or hunt teams that identify potentially malicious or otherwise unauthorized activity
What do preparation activities include? (5)
- Documenting and understanding policies and procedures for incident response
- Configuring the environment to detect suspicious and malicious activity
- Establishing staffing plans
- Educating users on cyber threats and notification procedures
- Leveraging cyber threat intelligence (CTI) to proactively identify potential malicious activity
Why is it important to define baselines (systems and networks) before an incident occurs?
To understand the basics of “normal” activity
To be able to ensure resilient architectures and systems to maintain critical operations in a compromised state, what preparation activities should be included? (3)
- Having infrastructure in place to handle complex incidents, including classified and out-of-band communications
- Developing and testing courses of action (COAs) for containment and eradication
- Establishing means for collecting digital forensics and other data or evidence
As part of preparation activities, what needs to be done in terms of policies and procedures? (3)
- Document incident response plans, including processes and procedures for designating a coordination lead (incident manager).
- Put policies and procedures in place to escalate and report major incidents and those with impact on the agency’s mission.
- Document contingency plans for additional resourcing and “surge support” with assigned roles and responsibilities
What should policies address in terms of law enforcement? (3)
- notification
- interaction
- evidence sharing
What sources should be leveraged for cyber threat intelligence? (4)
- government
- trusted partners
- open source
- commercial entities
What includes threat indicators? (3)
- Atomic indicators, such as domains and IP addresses, that can detect adversary infrastructure and tools
- Computed indicators, such as Yara rules and regular expressions, that detect known malicious artifacts or signs of activity
- Patterns and behaviors, such as analytics that detect adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
What is the problem of atomic indicators?
Adversaries often change their infrastructure
(e.g., watering holes, botnets, C2 servers) between campaigns, the “shelf-life” of atomic indicators to detect new adversary activity is limited. They might also switch to new infrastructure during a campaign when their activities are detected.
What should businesses use to identify malicious activity when possible?
Patterns and behaviors, or adversary TTPs
, as TTPs provide more useful and sustainable context about threat actors, their intentions, and their methods rather than atomic indicators alone.
What is active defense?
Ability to redirect an adversary to a sandbox or honeynet system for additional study
, or “dark nets”—to delay the ability of an adversary to discover the agency’s legitimate infrastructure.
What can be implemented to enable defenders to study the adversary’s behavior and TTPs and thereby build a full picture of adversary capabilities?
Honeytokens (fictitious data objects) and fake accounts.
What has to be established to be able to share information between the incident handlers?
Communication channels (chat rooms, phone bridges) and method for out-of-band coordination.
Measures should be taken to ensure that IR and defensive systems and processes will be operational during an attack, particularly in the event of pervasive compromises—such as a ransomware attack or one involving an aggressive attacker that may attempt to undermine defensive measures and distract or mislead defenders. What are those measures? (5)
- Segmenting and managing SOC systems separately from the broader enterprise IT systems.
- Managing sensors and security devices via out-of-band means.
- Notifying users of compromised systems via phone rather than email.
- Using hardened workstations to conduct monitoring and response activities
- Ensuring that defensive systems have robust backup and recovery processes.
What should be done to void “tipping off” an attacker? (3)
- Have processes and systems to reduce the likelihood of detection of IR activities
- Do not submit malware samples to a public analysis service.
-
Do not
notify users of potentially comprised machines via email
What capabilities should be implemented in terms of technical infrastructure? (2)
- Capabilities to contain, replicate, analyze, reconstitute, and document compromised hosts
- Capability to collect digital forensics and other data
What needs to be established for incident data and reporting sharing?
Secure storage that is only accessible by incident responders
What means need to be ready for collecting forensic evidence? (3)
- disk and active memory imaging
- safely handling malware
- analysis tools and sandbox software for analyzing malware
What information should a ticket contain? (5)
- Anomalous or suspicious activity, such as affected systems, applications, and users
- Activity type
- Specific threat group(s)
- Adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed
- Impact
What should be leveraged to create rules and signatures to identify the activity associated with the incident and to scope its reach?
Threat intelligence
What is often the most challenging aspect of the incident response process?
Accurately detecting and assessing cybersecurity incidents - incident triage.
What activities are part of incident triage? (4)
- Determining whether an incident has occurred
- Determining the type of incident
- Determining the extend of the incident
- Determining the magnitude of the compromise (within cloud, OT, hybrid, host, and network systems)