II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

Question 1

In whom are executive power and control over administrative agencies vested?

Answer 1

Art. VII, Section 1. Executive Power
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Art. VII, Section 17. Control Over Admin Agencies
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Question 2

How does the President exercise his disciplinary powers?

Answer 2

1. CONTROL
   a. Power to alter, modify or overturn the judgment of the subordinates [in other words, how to substitute]
   b. See to it that subordinates are doing their jobs
   c. Limited to executive departments, bureaus, offices
   d. This is the greater power
2. SUPERVISION
   a. Ensure that laws are faithfully executed
   b. More encompassing than control – no qualification

Can the President control ALL admin agencies?
It depends on whether the enabling statute has given power of review to the President.

Question 3

What is Congressional Oversight Power?

Answer 3

1. It is a tool for controlling/checking the exercise of power/acts of administrative agencies.
2. Seeing to it that the agencies follow legislative intention
3. Part of Congress’ prerogative in delegating powers of Congress to agencies
4. Scrutiny, investigation, legislative supervision (Macalintal v. COMELEC)

What is the purpose of oversight?

1. To monitor the laws created by administrative agencies
2. To look at the application by an administrative agency of a statute

Question 4

Categories of Congressional Oversight Functions

Answer 4

1. Scrutiny - Congress may request info and report from the other branches of government, recommend, or pass resolutions for consideration of the agencies involved
2. Congressional investigation - involves a more intense digging of facts
3. Legislative supervision - most encompassing, a continuing and informed awareness on executive operations, involves inquiry into past executive branch actions, allows scrutiny of exercise of delegated law-making authority and retention of part of the same
   a. Exercised through veto provision which requires the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress and it retains the right to approve or disapprove

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se but is integral to the separation of powers However it must be limited to the ff:

1. Scrutiny - based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation
2. Investigation and Monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Congress has an option in the enactment of legislation either to formulate the details or assign it to the executive branch. For the latter, the law must be complete in its essential terms and allow for implementation to fill up the details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to apply the law (contingent-rule making).

Question 5

Can the CHR try and decide cases?

Answer 5

NO. The Commission on Human Rights has NO jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights; and it is NOT another court or quasi-judicial agency.

It can investigate/fact-find on all forms of human rights violations including civil and political rights, but CANNOT adjudicate or exercise judicial functions (i.e. trying and deciding cases).

Other powers:

1. Grant immunity from prosecution
2. Request assistance from other departments [Cariño, et al. v. Commission on Human Rights, et al, G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991]

CHR has contempt powers which should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. (ex. contempt for refusal to participate).

CHR cannot issue a writ of preliminary injunction as that is an adjudicative power. Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by law and not derived by implication. The CHR can instead seek the remedies on behalf of the victims. [Simon, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Human Rights et al, G.R. No. 100150, 5 January 1994]

Question 6

Does the Ombudsman have veto powers over agencies and government officers?

Answer 6

NO. The Ombudsman does NOT have veto or revisory powers over discretionary acts of an agency/officer vested with discretion by law.

PBAC was evidently guided by the rule that bids should be evaluated based on the required documents submitted before, and not after, the opening of bids, that should further dispel any indiscriminate or whimsical exercise of discretion on its part.

Powers of the Ombudsman:

1. Investigatory Power;
2. Prosecutory Power;
3. Public Assistance

Functions; 
1. Authority to Inquire and 
2. Obtain Information; and 
3. Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement Preventive Measures. [Concerned Officials of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Vasquez, et al, G.R. No. 109113, 25 January 1995
]

Question 7

What does it mean when a prosecutor is deputized by the Ombudsman?

Answer 7

Under §31 of the Ombudsman’s Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the “supervision and control” of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor’s) decision.

Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman has contempt powers as a means of enforcing lawful orders. It may also order the preventive suspension of any officer or employee pending investigation under certain circumstances.

The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. [Lastimosa v. Vasquez, et al, G.R. No. 116801, 6 April 1995]

Question 8

Can the Sandiganbayan prosecute graft cases cognizable by regular courts?

In relation to the first question, what is the extent of authority of the Special Prosecutor?

Answer 8

YES. (On Uy v. Sandiganbayan) This Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman “to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.” -> But not to the exclusion of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may ONLY act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. [Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, et al, G.R. Nos. 145957-68, 25 January 2002]

Question 9

Can the Ombudsman exercise administrative supervision over a judge of the court?

Answer 9

NO. The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal/administrative complaint before his office against a judge pursuant to his investigative power over public officers. He must indorse it to the SC for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. [Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, et al, G.R. No. 124295, 23 October 2001]

Question 10

Can the Ombudsman directly remove an erring government official?

In addition, are the Ombudsman’s disciplinary powers recommendatory or mandatory?

Answer 10

YES.

Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and the Judiciary.

The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

Laja Doctrine: “the Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory. “ Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
[Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, et al, G.R. No. 165416, 22 January 2008]

Question 11

Can the President exercise powers of control over the Ombudsman?

Answer 11

NO.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been characterized under the Constitution as “independent,” are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.

Under the 1987 Constitution, an “independent Office of the Ombudsman” is created. The existing Tanodbayan is made the Office of the Special Prosecutor, “who shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”
The Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department.

Who checks the Ombudsman and its deputies? The Ombudsman as higher superior body, judicial review of the Courts