Identity and Mind - Essay

Question 1

• Present the non-materialist zombie argument. •• Present one possible response

Answer 1

Explanatory gap in the functionalist argument
F says anything that fulfills the function is enough to say that it is in that function
Arg says imagine a zombie that fulfills the functional definition of pain but doesn’t actually have the experience of pain

NICKEL:
Defining qualia: distinctive feel of an experience

Functionalism: all mental states are functional states
THEN Anything that fulfills the functional definition of a mental state (e.g.) pain is in that mental state
BUT: it’s possible for something to realize the functional definition of (e.g. pain) without the qualia of pain, call this a zombie (argue for this using the sorites argument)
THEREFORE Functionalism is false

•• Response: deny that qualia exist or matter
Maybe say that it would be begging the question (qualia in this argument is necessarily a part of mental states)

Question 2

• What is the psychological contintuity theory of personal identity? •• Present an argument that, if this theory is true, then human agents cannot survive the death of their bodies as non-corporeal creatures such as angels or spirits. ••• Present one objection to this argument.

Answer 2

•
Psychological Cont.: Person A at time t1 is the same person as person B at time t2 if and only if A and B are connected via the memory criterion and other, forward-looking relations

••
Genuine memories require bodies (motivated by genuine memories and delusional memories, such as jacques/napoleon case)(This claim’s a result of distinction between genuine and delusional memories; argue that identity requires genuine memories; argue that genuine memories req. identity relations)
Angels (etc.) don’t have bodies
So angels don’t have genuine memories of humans

•••
There could be other relations that don’t require psychological continuity; Perhaps fission cases - show that psych cont. is not the same as identity

Question 3

• Why, according to Williams, is fear appropriate in the kind of experiment he considers in The Self and the Future? •• What does he take the appropriateness of fear to show? ••• Give one possible objection to this argument.

Answer 3

• Read person A’s mind and read person B’s mind, write A’s into B; “There’s a sequence of cases in which fear is appropriate, beginning with the first case of the amnesia operation on A; —– all the way to case 7 which is the experiment; fear is appropriate in 7 because it’s appropriate continuously from 1 through 7, and
if we identify with 6, then identity consists in bodily identity

• • if we identify with 6, then identity consists in bodily identity
• •• Sorites argument, there IS a big enough different down this slippery slope; combinedly the small steps