Human Factors in Aviation Flashcards

1
Q

Pilot Competency is Based on

A

Knowledge
Skill
Ability

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2
Q

Training factors to ensure competency of individual pilot

A
Communication
Aircraft manual flight
Aircraft auto flight
Leadership and teamwork
Problem solving and decision making
Application of procedures
Workload management
Situational awareness
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3
Q

What is the accident rate of flying

A

1.2 per million flights,

zero per billion km flown

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4
Q

percent accidents caused by humans?

A

73% or 70%-80%

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5
Q

summarise accident trend in modern aviation

A

0 deaths per billion km

since 1959 rapid decline in accident rate, due to GPWS

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6
Q

use of statistics to develop strategy for future improvement

A

can identify trends

can then address possible changes in equipment, training procedures and organisation

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7
Q

3 components of TEM model

A

Hope to avoid all threats and errors
Detect errors and deal with them

Threat - External, unexpected, crew cannot predict

Error - Internal, crew’s fault. Erron action or inaction

Undesired Aircraft State - crew-induced aircraft position or speed deviation, misapplication of flight controls, incorrect systems leading to reduction in margins of safety.

UAS must be crew-induced. ATC/weather things are threats.

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8
Q

3 types of threat - LEO

A

Latent
Environmental
Organisational

Though in some questions latent may be included inside organisational and environmental.

Can have latent, anticipated or unexpected organisational or environmental threats

Anticipated - eg weather
Unexpected - eg aircraft malfunction without warning
Latent - equipment design, mangement cutbacks, short turnaround schedules, optical illusions

Environmental - Can be planned or spontaneous
eg - ATC, airport, weather, terrain

Organisational
Usually latent
eg - Aircraft, cabin, ground, documentation, scheduling

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9
Q

Explain and examples - Latent threat

A

Often hidden until it becomes apparent

eg - misplaced waypoint in flight software

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10
Q

Explain and examples - Environmental threat

A

Derived from the conditions that you are working in.

Generally steps can be taken to reduce these, but generally have to be dealt with in real time

eg temperature, weather, rain..

eg ATC issue such as language

eg issue with airport such as runway misaligned or bad surface, birds, bad signs

eg terrain, high ground/slope

eg similar call signs

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11
Q

Explain and examples - Organisational threat

A

To do with the company. Can normally be somehow mitigated

eg policy, communication, 
eg operational pressure, delays
eg errors with charts
eg error from crew
eg maintenance error
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12
Q

Give ICAO definition of error

A

actions or inactions by the flight crew that lead to deviations from organisational or flight crew intentions or expectations

Errors must be observable.

Error can be any person, not just pilot

Primary interaction defines what kind of error.

Types of error: PAC

Procedural - Interacting with procedure
Aircraft Handling - When touching control system
Communication - Must be talking to people

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13
Q

examples of countermeasures for threats, errors and undesired aircraft states

A

GPWS
Steady systematic approach to flight safety

Avoid
Trap - stop it having consequences
Mitigate - stop consequences getting worse

Another list of error handling -

Error Prevention - rarely possible, needs new design
Error Reduction - minimise likelihood and magnitude
Error Detection - make apparent as fast and clearly as possible
Error Recovery - make easy to rapidly recover
Error Tolerance - minimising consequences

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14
Q

explain and examples of Procedural Error

A

not doing checklists accurately,
wrong callouts
omitted briefings
documentation - wrong fuel/pax etc

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15
Q

explain and examples - Undesired Aircraft State

A

flight crew-induced aircraft position or speed deviations, misapplication of flight controls, or incorrect systems configuration, associated with a reduction in margins of safety

eg altitude/attitude
eg wrong runway
eg bad ground handling
eg incorrect aircraft configuration

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16
Q

summarise relevance of shell model

A

Model to deal with human error

Software - rules and procedures, not just computery
Hardware - systems, displays,
Environment - Internal and external, noise, political. Situation in which L,H and S must operate
Liveware - Human, most important. Any person involved in flight. physical wellbeing, knowledge, attitides, culture, stress
Liveware (peripheral) - other humans, controllers, flight crews, engineers, maintenance personel, management and admin

This model looks at the interactions between these 5 things, with the Livewire centre of the grid

17
Q

analyse interaction between the bits of SHELL

A

QUITE COMPLEX - will do in class

18
Q

explain how interaction between individual crew members can affect flight safety

A

NOT COVERED YET

19
Q

explain how interaction between flight crew and management can affect flight safety

A

NOT COVERED YET

20
Q

distinguish between open and closed cultures

A

not covered, verify
Open - everyone knows risks, accidents, dangers. Allows mistakes to be reported without risk of sanctions. Allows others to benefit from the knowledge.

Closed - things covered up, perhaps to save face

21
Q

Illustrate how safety culture is reflected by national culture

A

Russian people dubious of Nuclear power. Soviet government seeks to show that it is riskless by not reporting any issues. This means that no-one appreciated the dangers and no-one knew to be afraid. Conspiracy of silence, nothing learned from minor incidents,

Safety culture is a sub-set of national culture

22
Q

Safety first in terms of a commercial entity

A

Always need to balance safety and profit

23
Q

James Reason Swiss cheese model

A

Holes in layers of Swiss cheese are where there are gaps that prevent threats and errors creeping through.

Two types of accidents -Individual and Organisational

Individual has few defences
Organisational has many defences - harder to get through, so people actually less aware of risks.

If these holes and errors line up, then this will lead to an outcome.

Latent holes stationary
Active errors are holes that are moving around

A system is vulnerable if one error can affect a whole system

24
Q

State important factors that form good safety culture

A

Each employee has the same attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that combine to form a good overall safety culture.

Starts with an Informed-Culture, ie if humans are aware of danger, they will take steps to stop it

Reports dont identify
Must be trust

Considering a typical civil aviation environment, the Safety Culture is relatively enduring, stable and resistant to change. This is true according to a question.

25
Q

Distinguish between Just Culture and Non-Punitive Culture

A

Just culture - Members know that things can be reported without fear of punishment.

Not-no-blame.

Non-punitive is no-blame

26
Q

Name components of James Reason safety culture

A
Just
Informed
Learning
Flexible
Reporting